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ABSTRACT
Cybercrimes and digital security breaches are on the rise: savvy businesses and
organizations of all sizes must ready themselves for the worst. Cloud computing has become
the new normal, opening even more doors for cybercriminals to commit crimes that are not
easily traceable. The fast pace of technology adoption exceeds the speed by which the
cybersecurity community and law enforcement agencies (LEAs) can invent countermeasures to
investigate and prosecute such criminals. While presenting defensible digital evidence in courts
of law is already complex, it gets more complicated if the crime is tied to public cloud
computing, where storage, network, and computing resources are shared and dispersed over
multiple geographical areas. Investigating such crimes involves collecting evidence data from
the public cloud that is court-sound. Digital evidence court admissibility in the U.S. is governed
predominantly by the Federal Rules of Evidence and Federal Rules of Civil Procedures.
Evidence authenticity can be challenged by the Daubert test, which evaluates the forensic
process that took place to generate the presented evidence.
Existing digital forensics models, methodologies, and processes have not adequately
addressed crimes that take place in the public cloud. It was only in late 2020 that the Scientific
Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE) published a document that shed light on best
practices for collecting evidence from cloud providers. Yet SWGDE’s publication does not
address the gap between the technology and the legal system when it comes to evidence
admissibility. The document is high level with more focus on law enforcement processes such
as issuing a subpoena and preservation orders to the cloud provider.
This research proposes IaaS Public Cloud Forensic Acquisition (IPCFA), a
methodology to acquire forensic-sound evidence from public cloud IaaS deployments. IPCFA
focuses on bridging the gap between the legal and technical sides of evidence authenticity to
help produce admissible evidence that can withstand scrutiny in U.S. courts. Grounded in
design research science (DSR), the research is rigorously evaluated using two hypothetical
scenarios for crimes that take place in the public cloud. The first scenario takes place in AWS
and is hypothetically walked-thru. The second scenario is a demonstration of IPCFA’s
applicability and effectiveness on Azure Cloud. Both cases are evaluated using a rubric built
from the federal and civil digital evidence requirements and the international best practices for
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digital evidence to show the effectiveness of IPCFA in generating cloud evidence sound enough
to be considered admissible in court.
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INTRODUCTION
Cybercrime in the era of cloud computing has introduced challenges and complications
for existing digital forensics science and its existing models, methodologies, and practices
(Choo et al., 2017; Cohen, 2013; Grispos, Storer, & Glisson, 2012; NIST Cloud Computing
Forensic Science Working Group, 2014; Simou, Kalloniatis, Gritzalis, & Mouratidis, 2016).
While theories such as Bayesian and Dempster-Shafer could be adjusted to help with analyzing
digital crime artifacts retrieved from cloud environments (Dykstra, 2013a), there is little
documented information about formally tested and legally accepted methods or techniques that
can be used to retrieve digital forensics data from Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) public
cloud deployments. According to the American Bar Association (ABA), the foundation for
digital evidence to be considered admissible in court is authenticity and integrity (Dickson,
2011). Authenticity has traditionally been tied to expert witness testimony. Furthermore, the
testimony can be challenged in courtrooms with the Daubert Standard (Daubert test), which
requires that expert witnesses show that they have used a published, known, scientific
methodology to perform their collection of the evidence. The second requirement is to maintain
the integrity of the collected data and the generated evidence, and this has been accomplished
through maintaining a clear, undoubted, and well-documented chain of custody.
The National Institute of Justice (NIJ, 2007) provides guidelines for first responders on
how to acquire and preserve digital evidence and generate court-admissible evidence; however,
public cloud data acquisition was not covered in that publication. Other researchers, such as
(Alqahtany, Clarke, Furnell, & Reich, 2015), provided a new methodology for forensic data
acquisition in IaaS deployments, but it requires architectural changes and support by the
underlying Cloud Service Provider (CSP) to be effective. (Dykstra, 2013a) proposed a novel
system for cloud forensics acquisition that was tested successfully on private cloud IaaS
deployments such as OpenStack. These systems can be very useful in the case of public cloud
investigations, but they require acceptance and adoption by the Cloud Services Providers
(CSPs). The question remains, however, whether it is possible to acquire indubitable digital
evidence from Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) deployments in public clouds, present it in
court, and gain the acceptance and support of the judges and jurors, all without involving CSPs.
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This study introduces a practical methodology for collecting forensic data from IaaS
public cloud deployments. The methodology is built on the known boundaries of the existing
major IaaS providers, such as Amazon, Google, and Microsoft, and uses the Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE) and the Daubert Standard as guidelines. The methodology aims to ensure
admissible and authentic evidence-generation that can be defended in court and validated via
expert witness testimony. Data integrity and chain of custody are the bases of the proposed
method. Hypothetical cases that simulate successful attacks are used to generate data for a
sample case studies. The same hypnotical scenarios are investigated following the various
available best practice sources for forensic data acquisition such as RFC 3227 (Killalea &
Brezinski, 2002) and the Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence publications (SWGDE,
2018b, 2020). That feedback is then used to adjust the methodology as needed to produce
forensic data that successfully satisfies all the evidence rules and withstand scrutiny in court.
Because there is no actual court case used for the validation of this methodology, the
forensic data’s court-soundness is assessed against a specially designed rubric based on the
existing best practices and recommendations for digital forensic acquisition as well as the
various electronically stored information (ESI) legal rules and regulations. The scope of the
testing and validation of the methodology is limited to the IaaS service model. This research is
grounded in design science (DSR) and adheres to all design science guidelines as outlined by
Hevner, March, Park, & Ram (2004). The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows:


Chapter One provides an overview of cloud computing, digital forensics, cloud
forensics, forensics models, digital evidence acquisition, and digital evidence
court admissibility.



Chapter Two contains a literature review of current and foundational research
including court admissibility and the Federal Rules of Evidence and other relevant
standards. Challenges with cloud forensics and IaaS service models and available
tools are highlighted, and the research gap is identified.



Chapter Three addresses the research methodology and a definition of the success
criterion for the proposed artifact, IPCFA, is presented. This chapter provides an
overview of the validation, experimentation, and evaluation methods for the
proposed methodology, as well as other elements related to the selected research
methodology.
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Chapter Four details the proposed methodology (IPCFA) and the various
proposed phases, as well as how each phase can be carried out.



Chapter Five covers the actual applications and demonstration of the proposed
methodology.



Chapter Six discusses the proposed artifact effectiveness, outcomes of the
demonstration and validation, as well as it articulates the assumptions.



Chapter Seven reflects upon the limitations of this research and expands on the
possible future research to overcome such limitations and extend the validity of
this research. Finally, it provides the conclusion of this research.
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CHAPTER ONE
BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
Public Cloud Computing
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), cloud
computing is a “computing model where a pool of computing resources is shared, rapidly
provisioned and released, and the usage of each resource is measured” (Mell & Grance, 2011).
Thus, public cloud computing can be defined as a cloud that can be used by the general public
and is physically hosted on the cloud service provider’s premises. One of the most common
public cloud services is the Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) model. According to Gartner
(2019), the revenue of the worldwide public cloud market was forecasted to grow by 6.3%
during the year 2020 alone, and the second fastest-growing market will be the IaaS model,
driven by the “increasing adoption of cloud-first strategies in organizations” (Gartner, 2019).
The IaaS model is closest to the traditional, virtualized datacenter services, where the customer
is responsible for all layers above the virtualization system, or the hypervisor, including the
operating systems of the virtualized servers. In this service model, the service provider abstracts
the storage and network infrastructure resources, which make up the major portion of the
architecture paradigm that provides multitenancy in the cloud. An organization often adapts the
IaaS model when it is trying to achieve one of the well-known strategic goals of cloud
migration, such as hosting-cost reduction or operations effectiveness, on-demand server
(computing) deployments, or flexibility and scalability of resources (elasticity). Some of the
largest IaaS providers referenced throughout this research are Amazon Cloud (AWS), Google
Cloud (GCP), and Microsoft Cloud (Azure).

Information Security in the Public Cloud
Recently, CSPs have successfully emphasized security and compliance as additional
strategic goals in explaining why organizations should move to the public cloud. Most CSPs
today consider themselves secure because they follow security best practices or guidelines and
are certified with known security compliance bodies, such as PCI (“Official PCI Security
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Standards Council Site,” n.d.), HIPPA (Health Information Privacy, 2015), or ISO/IEC
(ISO/IEC 27001 Information Security Management, n.d.). From their published websites, AWS
(Compliance Programs--Amazon Web Services (AWS), n.d.), Azure (Compliance in the
Trusted Cloud | Microsoft Azure, n.d.), and Google (Cloud Compliance - Regulations &
Certifications, n.d.) list the compliance certifications each CSP holds. The list is comprehensive
and shows certifications from almost all global compliance bodies as well as government
agencies in the different regions of the world.
Moving to the public cloud does not guarantee security by default. The security of
organizational data in the public cloud is a shared responsibility, and the particularity of the
level of accountability is determined by type of service model chosen. In an IaaS model, the
CSP might be responsible for the physical network and servers (computing), storage, and
hypervisor security, and the customer might be responsible for the security of the operating
systems, user access management, overlay network, traffic flow management, applications, and
application data (Shared Responsibility Model Explained, n.d.). The breakdown of security
responsibilities is not fully standardized amongst CSPs, especially the tenant or customer aspect
(Shared Responsibility in the Cloud - Microsoft Azure, n.d.) (Shared Responsibility Model Amazon Web Services, n.d.). This shared security responsibility model brings with it a myriad
of legal and technical challenges in how cybersecurity incidents are handled in public clouds,
specifically in how digital forensics can take place.
Customer Data/Information Access and Confidentiality
Customer Accounts & Access Controls
Customer
Accountable

Customer installed Platforms & Applications
Customer Virtual Servers & Operating Systems
Customer Virtual Network & Security Configurations
Data/Information Access and Confidentiality
Cloud Hypervisor

CSP
Accountable

Physical Servers & Operating Systems
Physical Network & Security Configurations
Datacenter & Physical Access Control

Figure 1 - The common IaaS shared security accountability model
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Digital Forensics
According to the National Institute of Justice, “digital evidence is information stored or
transmitted in binary form that may be relied on in court” (NIJ, 2016). Further, NIST defines
digital forensics as the practice of collecting and examining digital evidence (NIJ, 2016). NIST
SP 800-86 categorizes the digital forensics (DF) model into four high-level phases: Collection
(Acquisition), Examination, Analysis, and Reporting (NIST Cloud Computing Forensic
Science Working Group, 2014). This model assumes that media is collected and examined, the
data analyzed, and the acquired evidence reported. The focus of this dissertation is the collection
(acquisition) phase of digital forensics.
An organization wanting to investigate a security breach on their locally hosted servers
and possibly generate digital evidence for litigation purposes can follow one of the various
published digital forensics processes. Forensic data and evidence acquisition can be performed
by the corporate staff or directly by law enforcement agencies with the proper legal
authorization. A server can be seized, hard drives can be imaged, and then data can be analyzed.
The Chain of Custody (CoC) should be maintained throughout this process. For an organization
engaging with this process with data and infrastructure hosted on one of the many public cloud
services providers, there are few formally and legally tested guidelines or processes related to
obtaining such evidence, aside from trying to convince the CSP to take part in the investigation
process. Sometimes, depending on the required evidence, using existing remote forensic
acquisition techniques to obtain some of required data is possible.

Digital Forensics - Models
Though NIST in its publication (NIST Cloud Computing Forensic Science Working
Group, 2014) has referenced a four-phase digital forensics model, many more models and
frameworks also exist dating back to 1999 (McKemmish, 1999). According to (Simou et al.,
2016), the digital forensics community proposed more than eighteen models from 1999 to 2016.
All of these models share the concept of taking a media or data repository from a criminal case,
executing multiple processes on the extracted media, and generating lawful evidence that is
scientifically reliable and legally acceptable. Following a preparation or initiation phase for the
forensic investigation, in which data related to the case are identified and collected, the
collection phase is the starting point. The subsequent phase is the examination, in which the
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data collected previously are investigated and the most relevant pieces of data extracted. The
third stage is the analysis of the extracted data to uncover possible evidence. The last phase is
reporting, in which the findings are presented to the relevant entities. Almost all of the proposed
models share these four phases, though some use different names or expand these phases into
smaller sub-phases. Table 1 compares the phases of eight of the well-known models.
Table 1- The Well-Known Digital Forensic Models and Their Respective Phases
Model

Proposed Phases

(McKemmish,
1999)
(Palmer, 2001)

Identification, preservation, analysis, presentation
Identification, preservation, collection, examination, analysis,
presentation

(Baryamureeba &
Tushabe, 2004)
(NIJ, 2008)

Readiness, deployment, traceback, dynamite, review
Preparation, identification, collection, preservation, packaging,
transportation storage, examination, analysis, reporting,
documentation

(Agarwal, Gupta,
Gupta, & Gupta,
2011)

Preparation, secure scene, survey, document the scene, secure
communication channel, collection, preservation, examination,
analysis, presentation, results review

(Martini & Choo,
2012)

Evidence source identification and preservation, collection,

(Cohen, 2013)

Identification, collection, presentation, transportation, storage,

examination and analysis, reporting and presentation

analysis, interpretation, attribution, reconstruction, presentation,
destruction
(NIST Cloud
Computing
Forensic Science
Working Group,
2014)
(Zawoad, Hasan,
& Skjellum, 2015)

Collection, examination, analysis, presentation

Identification, collection, examination, analysis, presentation,
verification, preservation

The abovementioned models and frameworks attempt to address the overall approach
of digital forensics and propose various phases to ensure that the extracted evidence is as
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complete as possible. Few researchers have investigated expanding these phases, proposing
processes and methodologies to execute each one properly. This is a significant oversight of
our discipline. At the 2006 Digital Forensic Research Conference (DFRWS), Ieong (2006)
presented a model called FORZA, which takes a different approach to digital forensics research.
He proposed a digital forensics framework that focuses on the various roles involved in an
investigation and the creation of a table of roles and responsibilities to help guide the complete
life cycle of the digital forensics investigation. By incorporating the business and legal aspects
of the investigation, FORZA framework creates processes that can be followed and executed
by practitioners that yield trustworthy and defendable results that, in turn, prosecutors can rely
upon to draw conclusions.
Adams, Hobbs, and Mann (2013) proposed the advanced data acquisition model
(ADAM), which is composed of multiple digital forensic processes that can easily be followed
and understood in courtrooms. The authors argue that the “domain of digital forensics is lacking
generally accepted processes and procedures to which they and the courts can refer” (Adams et
al., 2013, p. 25). While their proposed model has only three phases, they detailed how to execute
each phase and provided all required information to successfully carry out the forensic
investigation from the beginning to the end. This literature review suggests that no other
scholarly papers expand any of the digital forensics models’ phases or provide procedural
methodologies for the execution of each phase, more specifically for public cloud forensic
acquisition.

Digital Forensics - Acquisition
Digital evidence is intrinsically fragile and can be distorted, damaged, forged, or
destroyed intentionally or by inappropriate handling, so it must be handled with care. According
to the U.S. Department of Justice, digital evidence is always latent and unstable juristically; it
can also be time-sensitive (NIJ, 2008). When investigating a cybercriminal activity that
involves compute nodes or physical networked servers, there are potentially numerous
resources for digital evidence (U.S. Department of Justice; Office of Justice Programs; National
Institute of Justice, 2004). Of most concern in this research are the data stored on hard drives
(non-volatile) and memory contents (volatile). The process of acquiring evidence from a server
can be very complicated and greatly dependent on the specific case. In traditional digital crimes
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involving a computer or a mobile device, the forensic process can begin by seizing the physical
device, removing the hard drive (dead forensic acquisition), connecting it to the examinercertified computer, and then running the appropriate tools to extract trusted copies of the data.
No single tool can acquire and collect forensic data from all possible venues. The
commercial tools most often used today by industry experts and law enforcement agencies
(LEAs) are Guidance Software EnCase, Access Data's Forensic Toolkit (FTK), and Magnets
AXIOM (Alqahtany et al., 2015). Most of the time when server seizure is not possible for legal
or technical reasons, specialized remote acquisition (or remote forensic acquisition) tools can
be used to perform data collection remotely. If memory (RAM) imaging is needed (to collect
network traffic information, encryption keys, or other volatile data), then a non-invasive process
can be followed (live forensic acquisition) to obtain the needed information with as little impact
as possible on the investigated system. Whether the forensic examiner decides to perform live
or dead acquisition, defining an order of volatility (OOV) is critical to a fruitful and nonerroneous forensic data collection. Figure 2 represents the SWGDE-recommended order of
volatility when it comes to acquiring live computer systems. The recommendation is to acquire
all data in the RAM; then dump a copy of all running processes, which can partially be collected
from the RAM image; get the list of open network connections; capture systems settings and
configurations; and finally acquire the non-volatile data stored in the disk media (SWGDE,
2014).
RAM
(Memory)

Running

Network

System

Processes

Connections

Settings

Storage
Media

Figure 2 - Sample computer volatility order (SWGDE, 2014)
According to NIST, “identification, collection, and preservation of media can be
particularly challenging in a cloud computing environment” (NIST Cloud Computing Forensic
Science Working Group, 2014, p. 11). Collecting digital evidence from a physically accessible
system is technically feasible: a search warrant can be issued and associated with a specific
device and location, and law enforcement officers can be engaged to identify and acquire the
needed data. In traditional digital forensics models, the system or device involved can be seized
and then the rest of the process applied. The process cannot be followed in the public cloud
because of its fundamental architecture where the network is shared so the storage is shared and
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physically split between multiple physical devices or geographical locations. In fact, physical
access might not be permitted at all, so alternative methods must be pursued.
START

Prepare for dead acquisition

NO

Computer is
powered ON?

Collect a bit-by-bit disk
image of the hard drive

YES

Prepare for live acquisition

Collect physical memory
image

Collect other relevant
volatile information

END

Collect a bit-by-bit disk
image of the hard drive

Figure 3 - Traditional digital forensics acquisition – a high-level overview
As with traditional forensics, no single methodology can be prescribed in every
circumstance for the acquisition or collection of forensic data from a cybercrime scene. Each
investigation is different and requires a different set of tools and techniques. In the past few
years, the Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE) has published two
documents that shed light on some of the best practices for digital evidence forensic acquisition
(SWGDE 2014, 2018). Table 2 presents a summary of recommendations, including a subset
from SWDGE recommendations, to be followed by forensic examiners during the acquisition
or collection phase of a digital forensics’ investigation. Another extremely valuable source on
best practices related to digital forensics followed by the international DF community is Digital
Forensics Processing and Procedures by Watson and Jones (2013). The book goes into greater
details of the complete life cycle of digital evidence and the importance of chain of custody.
This handbook includes technical and non-technical procedures and best practices to comply
with international regulations such as ISO 17020, ISO 17025, and ISO 27001. While looking
into forensic acquisition from methodical and technical points of view, RFC 3227 (Killalea &
Brezinski, 2002) cannot be omitted, as it provides a great amount of detail on the technical
procedure and best practices of collection as well as examples of which tools can be used.
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In this research, best practices have been extracted from the above-mentioned resources,
organized, and merged when possible, then each recommendation is assigned an impact (trust)
factor, which either enhances or devalues the effectiveness of the collected data. In this case the
factor could be the integrity, authenticity, or operability of the collected evidence or data. While
integrity and authenticity of the data might have a direct impact on the trustworthiness of the
generated evidence, operability contributes to the errorless and seamless extraction of quality
information and evidence from the acquired data.
Table 2 - Digital Forensic Acquisition Recommendations and Associated Impact Factor
Best Practice
1) Prepare order of volatility for each system before starting
the acquisition process.

Impact Factor
Integrity/Operability

2) Minimize, to the maximum extent possible, changes to the
source data.

Integrity

3) Minimize adverse effects as much as possible when
choosing the acquisition technique.

Authenticity

4) Document the acquisition process in as much detail as
possible.

Authenticity

5) Make all actions taken during the acquisition process
auditable, where applicable.

Authenticity

6) Use tools validated for use according to NIST CFTT
(trusted binaries).

Integrity

7) Prepare destination media before beginning of the
acquisition process.
8) Store acquired data on a trusted platform.
9) Acquire and save data in raw format, when possible.

Authenticity/Integrity
Authenticity/Integrity
Operability

10) Preview the contents of potential data sources prior to
acquisition.

Integrity

11) Live acquisition tools should execute trusted binaries from
controlled media.

Integrity
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12) Execute live acquisition at the lowest possible level of
privilege.

Integrity

13) Document "memory smear" if experienced during a live
memory acquisition.

Integrity

14) Consider carefully the order in which data are collected.

Integrity/Operability

15) Review acquired data for completeness and certainty.

Integrity/Operability

16) Review tool output and logs for indications of failures.

Integrity/Operability

17) Compute a cryptographic hash value for the acquired data
using NIST approved algorithms.

Integrity

18) Document the physical and logical chain of custody
properly.

Integrity

Digital Forensics - Admissibility
The general definition of digital evidence admissibility (forensically-sound evidence)
has been constantly debated in the forensic science community, most especially when it comes
to acceptance in courts of law, nationally or internationally. During the International Hi-Tech
Crime and Forensics Conference (IHCFC) of October 1999, the SWGDE and the International
Organization on Digital Evidence (IOCE) presented a set of international principles to govern
the acquisition and recovery of digital evidence that would be acceptable in courts of law
(SWGDE & IOCE, 2000). The proposed principles were well received and adopted by many
organizations and governments, including the United States.
Table 3 - SWGDE and IOCE Standards and Principles (SWGDE & IOCE, 2000)
IHCFC Principle
1) Upon seizing digital evidence, actions taken should not change that evidence.
2) When it is necessary for a person to access original digital evidence, that person must
be forensically competent.
3) All activity relating to the seizure, access, storage, or transfer of digital evidence
must be fully documented, preserved, and available for review.
4) An individual is responsible for all actions taken with respect to digital evidence
while the digital evidence is in their possession.
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5) Any agency that is responsible for seizing, accessing, storing, or transferring digital
evidence is responsible for compliance with these principles.

Furthermore, according to McKemmish (2008), forensic soundness could be defined as
the “application of a transparent digital forensic process that preserves the original meaning of
the data for production in a court of law” (p. 10). The author in this publication proposed four
criteria to evaluate the reliability of an electrically generated evidence:
1. The generated evidence did not get affected by the digital forensic process.
2. All the generated errors can be identified and satisfactorily explained.
3. The entire followed DF process can be independently examined and verified.
4. The forensic analysis been undertaken by an experienced individual
In addition to the admissibility recommendations mentioned above, evidence
admissibility in the U.S. court system has always been justified via compliance with a specific
set of rules and regulations. For digital evidence to be called upon in U.S. courtrooms—that is,
to be “admissible in court,” it must conform to guidelines that govern how the evidence is
collected, authenticated, preserved, and presented. These guidelines are called the Federal Rules
of Evidence (FRE). According to the American Bar Association, for digital evidence is
admissible if it meets five criteria: (1) the evidence must be relevant to what the court case is
about (FRE 401, 402, 403); (2) it must be authentic and proven accurate by technical witness
expertise (FRE 901); (3) it must not be hearsay or contribute to changing the probability of facts
that would otherwise be true (FRE 801); (4) if the evidence is a voice recording or a photograph,
the original or accepted duplicate might be presented (FRE 1003); and finally, (5) its probative
value must be assessed against its possible unfair prejudice (FRE 104, 105).
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Figure 4 – U.S. court digital evidence admissibility workflow
FRE 902 - Evidence that is self-authenticating is a relatively recent and significant
Federal Rule of Evidence that was amended in December 2017. This new rule provides
information about how electronic records generated by electronic systems can be selfauthenticated. The rule has fourteen items listed that require no extrinsic evidence of
authenticity to be considered admissible. The rules that concern digital forensics are 902(13)
and 902(14) and their prerequisite rules 902(11) and 902(12). Below are the quoted definitions
related to each FRE:


FRE 902(11): “Certified Domestic Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity.”



FRE 902(12) “Certified Foreign Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity.”



FRE 902(13): “Certified Records Generated by an Electronic Process or System.”
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FRE 902(14): “Certified Data Copied from an Electronic Device, Storage Medium,
or File.” (Federal Rules of Evidence, 2017)

The 902 FRE rule also addresses the point of digital identification, where hash values
can be used to authenticate that the electronic record is what it purports to be. According to the
ABA, FRE 902(13) specifically provides more information on the self-authentication of “A
record generated by an electronic process or system that produces an accurate result, as shown
by a certification of a qualified person that complies with the certification requirements of Rule
902(11) or (12). The proponent must also meet the notice requirements of Rule 902(11)” (Toft,
2018). This rule has a significant impact on the global digital forensics’ community in terms of
practices, costs, timelines, and unexpected evidentiary arguments.
Courts regularly require that expert witnesses validate evidence claims based on the
Daubert (Ryan, 2009a) or Frye standards (Ryan, 2009b). Daubert is the most commonly used
test today, deriving from the 1993 Supreme Court case, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579. Daubert uses five factors to determine if the methodology
followed is acceptable: “(1) whether the theory or technique in question can be and has been
tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) its known or
potential error rate; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation;
and (5) whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community”
(Ryan, 2009a). Frye, the older and more rarely used standard, is derived from Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 in 1923. While Daubert has multiple factors to determine whether the
methodology followed by the expert witness is valid, the Frye standard calls only for general
acceptance within the scientific community (Ryan, 2009b).
Another set of rules to follow, more specifically designed for ESI and evidence acquired
through a subpoena for a civil case, is the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). The two
rules that may be applicable when addressing a CSP are FRCP 34 (Rule 34. Producing
Documents, Electronically Stored Information, and Tangible Things, or Entering onto Land,
for Inspection and Other Purposes, n.d.), which allows a request to preserve, collect, and
possibly inspect data, and FRCP 45 (Rule 45. Subpoena, n.d.), which allows for a subpoena. In
criminal cases, subpoenas can be obtained by applying the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
and invoking Rule 41 (search warrant). FRCP Rule 41 is used by prosecutors after the case has
been filed. Search warrants are used prior to the case being filed with the prosecutor. In civil
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matters, however, subpoenas are used quite frequently. All of these rules were crafted for
traditional forensics investigations and evidence collection, and then adopted for digital
forensics.

Statement of the Problem
The acquisition phase of a digital forensics’ investigation is one of the most critical and
fundamental phases of the entire process. If the investigation has not been performed
appropriately, it can be challenged in court with regards to chain of custody, completeness of
documentation, integrity of the generated evidence, and methodology used to acquire the
evidence (Montasari, 2017). Though telecommunications companies have to comply with
federal laws—such as the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA),
which permits law enforcement agencies to use wiretaps—no such law exists for dealing with
CSPs (Dykstra, 2013a). Access to direct authentic evidence that is physically collected by law
enforcement officers might not a viable option when dealing with incidents in the public cloud.
Following the traditional forensic acquisition methodologies and techniques, by design, is not
feasible to conduct court-grade investigations in the realm of the public cloud.
The problem is there is a lack of digital forensic methodologies that can be followed to
collect court-grade digital evidence from IaaS public cloud environments (Barrett, 2018;
Dykstra, 2013a). The aim of this research is to complement and extend the existing traditional
digital forensic acquisition methodologies and processes to encompass public cloud
deployments, while continuing to comply with federal and civil laws. The aim is to preserve
the authenticity and integrity of the collected evidence, thus supporting the credibility of expert
witnesses, and ease the decision for jurors and judges. Therefore, we are presented with the
following research question: What digital forensic tools and acquisition techniques are
applicable for court-grade evidence acquisition from IaaS deployments in the public cloud?
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
Research trends and developments
In the past two decades, researchers have published many scholarly articles, papers, and
books that shed light on the possibilities and limitations of cloud computing in delivering
services. According to Dykstra (2013a), until 2012, all cloud-focused research was about
offerings “such as resource allocation strategies, load balancing, large data analysis, and the use
of cloud technology in other disciplines including medicine and higher education” (p. 12).
Though the main research area for this proposal is the IaaS deployments of the public cloud
computing model, it is also interesting to note the trends in literature and research related to
cloud computing overall as compared to research that focuses on cloud security and on cloud
forensics. It is not feasible to accurately locate and catalogue every publication related to cloud
computing but using statistical approximation can help us understand generally what has been
published so far. Finding a single association or online library that had a copy of all possible
published work was also very challenging, so Google Scholar was the best tool that could search
hundreds of research associations and organizations to get more comprehensive results.
This high-level systematic search encompassed all scholarly work from around the
world and was not filtered to publications from the major associations only. The publication
timeframe was limited to 2010 through 2020 (inclusive), and a-per-year count was recorded.
This search filtered for compound phrases in the metadata as well as the various sections of the
published work. The outcome of this search shows the serious lack of research when it comes
to addressing forensic science applications in the realm of cloud computing. The limitation to
this search is work that has not been published electronically or made available through online
libraries. Sample compound searches used include the following:
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-

"cloud computing" "cloud * computing" OR "Public Cloud" OR "private cloud" -"cloud
security" -security -forensics

-

"cloud security" "cloud * security" OR "Public Cloud" OR "private cloud" -forensics

-

"cloud forensics" OR "cloud computing" OR "Public Cloud" OR "private cloud" "digital

Number of Publications

forensics"
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Figure 5 - Cloud Forensics research trend in the past ten years
Landscape of known challenges
In the past six years, the security of the data and information hosted in the public cloud
has become a significant and controversial topic with comparisons made between securing onpremises assets and securing the same in the multitenant public cloud space. As a result, the
research community started resolving the ambiguities and attempted to settle the debates about
cloud security. They have uncovered many challenges and proposed some successful solutions.
One of the challenges is Incident Response (IR) and Digital Forensics (DF) in the public cloud,
which is being researched presently (Alqahtany et al., 2015). Researchers have been actively
publishing about the challenges of exercising digital forensic science related to Anything-as-aService (XaaS) incidents (Freet, Agrawal, John, & Walker, 2015). Almost all researchers have
categorized the challenges into three categories: technical, architectural, and legal. Few
researchers have decided to categorize challenges according to the various frameworks or cloud
services models (Freet et al., 2015; Grispos et al., 2012). NIST, on the other hand, has
categorized challenges into nine categories in its draft report (NIST Cloud Computing Forensic
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Science Working Group, 2014). This literature review revealed that most of the challenges
usually span more than a single category, concentrating on the legal or judicial domain.
During the past decade, researchers have identified the following high-level digital
forensics challenges, and although there are many more, the list below highlights the most
commonly referenced ones. Those highlighted challenges can exist in any or all of the
commonly adapted cloud service models such as Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), Platform-as-sService (PaaS), and IaaS. By design, the more control users have over a service layer, the fewer
challenges they face. For example, IaaS should have fewer forensic challenges than SaaS.
Solutions have also been proposed for some of these challenges, but that doesn’t mean they
have been widely adopted or accepted by CSPs, regulatory bodies, or forensic tools
development organizations. Table 4 shows some of the commonly referenced challenges and
their respective categories, as well as how sometime a challenge can span multiple categories.
Table 4 - Common Challenges and Corresponding Categories
1)

2)

3)

4)

Challenge
No access to the hypervisor logs or
volatile data
(Freet et al., 2015)
(Simou et al., 2016)
(Grispos et al., 2012)
(Alqahtany et al., 2015)
(Cohen, 2013)
(Zawoad et al., 2015)
High dependency on the CSP
(Simou et al., 2016)
(Freet et al., 2015)
(Alqahtany et al., 2015)
(Dykstra, 2013a)
(Zawoad et al., 2015)
No physical access & difficulty of
imaging
(Grispos et al., 2012)
(Simou et al., 2016)
(Alqahtany et al., 2015)
(Dykstra, 2013a)
(Barrett, 2018)
(Zawoad et al., 2015)
Trusting the collected data integrity
(data provenance)
(Simou et al., 2016)

Technical





Architectural

Legal
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(Freet et al., 2015)
(Alqahtany et al., 2015)
(Dykstra, 2013a)
(Cohen, 2013)
(Zawoad et al., 2015)
5) Time zones synchronization
(Grispos et al., 2012)
(Simou et al., 2016)
(Alqahtany et al., 2015)
(Cohen, 2013)
6) Maintaining chain of custody
(Grispos et al., 2012)
(Simou et al., 2016)
(Alqahtany et al., 2015)
(Dykstra, 2013a)
(Cohen, 2013)
(Zawoad et al., 2015)
7) Legal authority and geographical
boundaries (location)
(Grispos et al., 2012)
(Simou et al., 2016)
(Miranda Lopez, Moon, & Park,
2016)
(Alqahtany et al., 2015)
(Dykstra, 2013a)
(Barrett, 2018)
8) Lack of standardized cloud forensics
acquisition tools
(Grispos et al., 2012)
(Simou et al., 2016)
(Freet et al., 2015)
(Alqahtany et al., 2015)
(Dykstra, 2013a)
(Barrett, 2018)
(Zawoad et al., 2015)
9) Lack of standardized cloud forensics
examination tools
(Grispos et al., 2012)
(Simou et al., 2016)
(Freet et al., 2015)
(Alqahtany et al., 2015)
(Dykstra, 2013a)
(Barrett, 2018)
10) Lack of literacy of court jurors
(Grispos et al., 2012)
(Alqahtany et al., 2015)
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(Cohen, 2013)
(Zawoad et al., 2015)
11) Lack of literacy for public cloud
customers
(Simou et al., 2016)
(Alqahtany et al., 2015)
(Dykstra, 2013a)
12) Lack of literacy for cloud
investigators
(Alqahtany et al., 2015)
(Cohen, 2013)





The literature overview done by (Simou et al., 2016) resulted in a comprehensive
summary table referencing all previously identified challenges and the proposed solutions.
Though their research findings are perhaps now antiquated, their highlighting of the challenges
expressed, and the solutions proposed between 2011 and 2016 remains useful. Their literature
review shows that most of the challenges can only be addressed by the CSPs. Although some
of the challenges happen to capture the attention of the research community, who have proposed
multiple viable solutions, no evidence suggests that those solutions were adopted by CSPs.
These proposed solutions vary in implementation requirements, but to address the most critical
challenges and help build legally acceptable forensics practices, CSP involvement is inevitable
(Alqahtany

et

al.,

2015).

Clearly,

most

of

the

challenges

fall

into

the

collection/acquisition/preservation phase of the various digital forensics models. Someone
wanting a quick reference and overview of existing challenges (table of problem/solution pairs)
can look into (Simou et al., 2016), (Miranda Lopez et al., 2016), (Freet et al., 2015), and
(Alqahtany et al., 2015), all of whom have compiled a holistic summary of the challenges and
the respective proposed solutions in the past decade.

Cloud Forensics - Models
Cloud forensics has been defined as “the application of scientific principles,
technological practices and derived and proven methods to reconstruct past cloud computing
events through identification, collection, preservation, examination, interpretation and
reporting of digital evidence” (NIST Cloud Computing Forensic Science Working Group, 2014,
p. 2). NIST’s definition implies the application of the NIST digital forensic model to guide
forensic investigation in a cloud computing environment, which contradicts the findings of
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academic researchers in the field, such as Barrett and Kipper (2010) and Martini and Choo
(2012).
The research performed by Martini & Choo (2012) is considered one of the few notable
studies that attempted to tackle the bigger picture of cloud forensics and proposed an integrated
digital forensics model that could actually be adapted and followed to conduct investigations in
various cloud deployments. In their publication, the authors started by going over the various
cloud forensic challenges highlighted by the research community, then reviewed some of the
commonly used models, namely Kent, Chevalier, Grance, & Dang (2006) and McKemmish
(1999), analyzed the gap, and established new requirements to be able to carry-on forensic
investigation in cloud environments. Their proposed model is a hybrid of both Kent et al.,
(2006) and McKemmish (1999), consisting of four phases: Evidence Source Identification and
Preservation; Collection; Examination and Analysis; Reporting and Presentation. The major
distinction of the proposed model occurs during the examination and analysis phase. The
authors reason that during this phase in cloud forensic investigation, some iterations might be
required as “cloud computing usage would most likely be discovered based upon the
examination and analysis of physical devices and this would lead to a second (or more)
iteration(s) of the process” (Martini & Choo, 2012, p. 75).
The same researchers, one year later, attempted to add more rigor and validation to their
proposed model and applied it successfully to cloud storage open source services OwnCloud
(Martini & Choo, 2013). Furthermore, in the same year, Quick & Choo (2013c) attempted to
generalize the previously proposed methodology and demonstrated its effectiveness to
successfully acquire forensic data from three of the most popular cloud file storage providers:
Dropbox (Quick & Choo, 2013a), Google Drive (Quick & Choo, 2014), and Microsoft
SkyDrive (Quick & Choo, 2013b). While this model was successful in producing forensicallysound data from SaaS deployment, the literature shows no demonstrations of IaaS-related
deployments or investigations.

Cloud Forensics - Tools
One of the biggest challenges facing cloud forensics is the lack of digital forensics tools
that are designed with cloud computing in mind. There is a tremendous need for tools to perform
acquisition, complete analysis, and forensic examination of the cloud data remotely (Almulla,
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Iraqi, & Jones, 2014). The Computer Forensic Tool Testing (CFTT) project at NIST attempted
to create a list of trusted tools to perform traditional digital forensics as well as cloud forensics.
The effort generated tool specifications, test procedures, test criteria, test sets, and test hardware
(Allen, 2017). As of March 2021, the published “cloud forensics” tools on the CFTT website
are all purposed for SaaS investigations such as OneDrive, Flickr, Dropbox, and such. There is
no tool related to IaaS investigations listed in the database. While there are many popular,
documented, traditionally tested and widely used digital forensics tools such as the Linux-based
“dd” or the commercial grade “FTK,” the literature did not show any scholarly work related to
systematically testing such tools on public cloud acquisitions.
According to Dykstra (2013a), traditional forensic tools are not well suited to the vast
quantity of data nor the type of data in the cloud, and often cloud infrastructure management
tools are lacking in forensic options. Moreover, few available examples of cloud investigations
can be used by practitioners for educational purposes. Prior to Dykstra developing FROST
(Dykstra, 2013a), no known useable tools had been designed specifically for cloud forensics.
FROST is the closest tool available today to perform real credible forensics on the management
plane of private clouds (OpenStack). The idea was to convince CSPs to take a similar approach
to making their offered services forensically capable. This led Dykstra to evaluate and analyze
different leading commercial digital forensics tools to see if they could be used for cloud
forensics. Though FROST was developed in response to cloud forensic challenges, some
existing commercial tools, such as FTK Remote Agent, EnCase Remote Agent, and X-Ways,
have also been used to perform live and remote forensics to some extent.
Dykstra argues that another challenge is the format of the data. Cloud providers who aid
in an investigation might provide the investigators with data that is in propriety VMs or in
unsupported formats. These could be difficult or impossible to analyze with popular tools such
as EnCase or Access Data's Forensic Toolkit (FTK). Thus, state or local law enforcement
agencies may be unable to fully investigate cybercrimes that involve cloud-based infrastructure
or cloud storage. According to Zawoad et al. (2015), another important challenge is the
capturing of volatile data. When a virtual machine is powered off, all such volatile data is lost
unless an image of the instance or a stateful snapshot is made. Some data, such as registry files,
may therefore be lost, and someone could intentionally exploit this to ensure the loss of volatile
data.
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Few researchers have argued that CSPs can restructure and introduce valuable forensic
capabilities at the hypervisor level (Poisel, Malzer, & Tjoa, 2013). Without changing the system
state, the hypervisor is able to provide access to computing resources at a low level. The
hypervisor can allocate computing resources, such as disk space, CPU, and memory, as well as
networking. Hypervisors are fully capable of secretly monitoring, introspecting, and interacting
with VM guests with complete transparency, which can be immensely useful for cloud
forensics. However, most hypervisors fail to expose APIs at a level sufficient for fine-grained
introspection that can be customized and remain transparent (Poisel, Malzer, & Tjoa, 2013).
Thus, CSPs have to start implementing forensic services at the management plane or hypervisor
kernel level to help resolve the majority of the challenges being highlighted.

Cloud Forensics - Acquisition
While reading this section of the research and moving forward, one must keep in mind
the unblemished distinction between acquiring data for incident response purposes and
performing digital forensic acquisition in order to pursue a litigation. The focus of this research
is the latter one. NIST affirms that the “identification, collection, and preservation of media can
be particularly challenging in a Cloud Computing environment” (NIST Cloud Computing
Forensic Science Working Group, 2014, p. 8). Most existing methodologies and frameworks
assume a tool capable of collecting and preserving the needed data, while maintaining chain of
custody until delivered to court. With traditional digital forensics, one of the challenges has
been seizure and imaging of physical discs; this is not possible with cloud forensics. As
(Dykstra, 2013a) argues, physical seizure may be difficult for many reasons, such as that
multiple tenants may have data on one physical drive, or that one tenant's content could be held
by many hard drives. Also, that the data would be stored in disk-arrays and not individual disks
is a very high possibility. Imaging of media could be impractical in a cloud and having only a
partial image could be called into question legally as not being whole and complete. In addition,
the disk drives could be spread out over many geographical areas, such as on different countries
or continents (Dykstra, 2013a; Miranda Lopez et al., 2016, Simou et al., 2016).
Dykstra writes that two possibilities exist for data acquisition with cloud forensics. First,
the forensic examiner could collect it remotely, and second, the CSP could furnish it to the
examiner. According to Dykstra, if forensic examiners had access remotely to the compromised
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server operating system (OS), then they could potentially collect evidence in a couple of ways.
1) They could install a forensic tool to remotely acquire evidence; or, 2) the VM could be
suspended or stopped and then subjected to offline analysis. All this effort, however, assumes
a great deal of confidence and trust in the hypervisor, the host OS, the hardware, and the guest
OS; in this case, it would provide evidence that is not only whole but with full integrity. It
assumes no omissions, no mistakes, and no tampering (Dykstra, 2013a). Alternatives for
forensic acquisition include Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs), the cloud management plane
forensics, and Forensics-as-a-Service.
While it might be possible to collect data remotely from IaaS public cloud deployments
using some of the existing tools today, there is no methodology or standardized process to
perform such a sensitive task. If attempted, the process would have to be based on the forensic
practitioner’s personal understanding of the investigated cloud platform; there is no document
to be followed to repeat such acquisition if requested in courts of law. In 2014, the Scientific
Working Group on Digital Evidence published a document to help guide forensic examiners
acquire data from live systems (SWGDE, 2014). The document focused on defining order of
operations and types of data to be acquired from a computer, and finally addressed the possible
limitations and the negative implications of systems’ state changing due to live acquisition.
While this publication did not explicitly refer to public cloud deployment or IaaS environments,
it is still applicable when it comes to imaging memory and collecting volatile data from virtual
machines deployed in the public cloud.
The same organization published a document entitled “SWGDE Best Practices for
Computer Forensic Acquisitions,” which gives practitioners high-level guidelines on how to
carry out a successful and court-grade forensic acquisition and evidence preservation (SWGDE,
2018a). The document is focused on forensic acquisition from computers/servers and attached
storage media, and it gives recommendations on each one of the possible acquisition types:
physical, logical, and targeted acquisition (SWGDE, 2018a). While this document does not
mention the keyword “cloud” anywhere and does not constitute a defined methodology, it can
be applied partially in the case of IaaS acquisitions because the document includes high-level
guidelines and recommendations to follow when capturing any computer system (Storage &
Memory).
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In September 2020, as this dissertation was being written, SWGDE published a
document that directly addresses forensic acquisition when it comes to the cloud services
providers. The SWGDE (2020) best practice document is considered a very exceptional
document, and it contributes greatly to the knowledge base of cloud forensics and the DF
community. At the beginning of this research, there was no such document in the literature that
explicitly guided the forensic examiner on acquiring data from public clouds. The authors of
the best practice document did not focus on a specific cloud service model, but rather
generalized the scope to cover all of the possible service and deployment models. The document
approaches forensic efforts from a legal perspective and shares various possible methods of
acquiring forensic data, such as asking the CSP to furnish the data, exporting the data using
native cloud tools, using exposed APIs and commercial DF remote agents, and finally physical
seizing the cloud hardware (SWGDE, 2020). The document splits the acquisition process into
three main phases and provides high-level guidelines on what should be done in each phase:


Prior to acquisition phase
o Identify the CSP, data sources, data types, timeline, and utilized services.
o Ask the CSP legally to preserve the data sought.
o Identify and choose which acquisition methodology will be used.



During acquisition phase
o Document all evidentiary data.
o Acquire all attached media, local and in the cloud.
o Confirm the acquisition methodology can produced the required data.
o Acquire the data with the selected methodology.
o Take photographs/screenshots of the relevant data if unable to acquire data.



After acquisition phase
o Calculate integrity hash values for acquired data.
o Verify that the executed acquisition was able to acquire all required data.
o Document the whole process using the organization defined policies
o Document any received media from the CSP.
o Store all acquired data following the organizational policies (SWGDE,
2020).
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These three best practice publications from SWGDE are excellent starting points to
performing forensic acquisition in the public cloud. The documents also provide high-level
guiding principles to govern the DF processes, such as how to perform live acquisition, define
OOV, acquire data from computers and storage, and addresses public cloud investigations.
While the information in SWGDE, 2020 is the most relevant to the research question, it still
leaves a gap about how to carry out each one of the proposed phases. SWGDE, 2020 argues
that the process can be taken directly with the CSP, or without the CSP, and attempt to acquire
the data. The described procedure is very high level by design, and it keeps a lot of room for
the forensic practitioner to make their own decisions. The procedure does not have default
processes to fit small businesses or organizations that do not have policies and standards to
follow when it comes to digital forensics. The document omits chain of custody and physical
personnel who performed acquisition or interacted with the digital evidence or forensic data.
The process also lacks reference to the cloud metadata, and it doesn’t discuss the possible types
of data that can be acquired from a CSP. Each type of data can require a different acquisition
mechanism, and there is not a single selected mechanism of the described methodology that can
capture all sought data. These excellent recommendations from SWGDE thus act as a basis for
the present research and are enhanced and motivated to address IaaS deployments in the public
cloud realm.
While there are a plethora of models, methodologies, and procedures related to the
overall lifecycle of digital forensic evidence, few resources go into detail about how the process
should be followed to provide optimized results. There are only guidelines and instructions
provided by the various DF software vendors on how they think the process should be carried
out. While cybercrime investigations usually vary by which methodology or tool can be used,
and each case can be very different, having a common ground or methodology to follow is
efficient and advantageous. It is crucial for the forensic analyst or examiner to put a plan
together to determine how they will approach each case before attempting to perform any task.
That said, regardless of which process is being followed, the anticipated outcome is
expected to be forensically sound, and, if litigation is expected, it must be able to stand in courts
of law. Appendix A presents the various acquisition methodologies and procedures encountered
during literature review. Only the live acquisition and logical collection phases of the
methodologies has been captured in Table 14. The literature shows that almost all of the
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encountered methodologies do not go into the details of how the forensic practitioner should
approach the cybercrime scene, and they leave it up to the individual organization incident
response policies. This might be a possibility, but assuming that all small and large
organizations have a defined cloud forensics or digital forensics policies, and procedures is not
realistic.
Another significant problem highlighted in the literature is the post-acquisition
examination. Some disk images acquired from cloud platforms cannot be forensically validated
or rendered not traditionally operable. This in itself could pose a substantial legal challenge,
which could ultimately frame the evidence as intangible. With traditional digital forensics, a
hash of the intact physical hard drive can confirm that a copied disk is the same as the original.
This is not always possible with cloud forensics, and in court the lack of data integrity could
cause results to be rejected (Dykstra, 2013a). Within the acquisition phase of traditional digital
forensics, data are to be acquired in such a fashion that both authenticity and integrity are
maintained. Though impractical for cloud forensics, often this constitutes the use of a write
blocker, thereby ensuring that nothing else is written to the disk. Imaging software is to be used,
providing either a bit-for-bit image or a logical image made from active files and directories. In
order to provide assurance with regard to the integrity of the collected data, it is essential that
hashing be employed. Different solutions attempt to address data integrity at a stage prior to
collecting the data, such as FROST; some SaaS forensics tools, such as Kumodd and Kumofs,
as developed by Roussev, et al.; Cloud FaaS; and Almulla's snapshot-based forensics
framework.
Because cloud data storage is decentralized, located in multiple jurisdictions, some legal
issues arise that are very difficult to address and can create challenges when commonly issued
search warrants are pursued. With the warrant, it is necessary to identify a particular place where
the evidence is located. That may not be possible with cloud forensics. Even if a warrant is
granted, there could be an issue in maintaining chain of custody because of the multiplicity of
jurisdictions, differing procedures, and the use of proprietary hardware and software (SWGDE,
2014). Another legal challenge is the availability of cloud forensic acquisition tools that have
been proven to acquire data in the cloud that meet the legally required rules for a specific
jurisdiction. While it can be argued that some existing tools that are used today collect data
from traditional computers or servers can be reused in the cloud, few tools are natively designed
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with the cloud in mind. Thus, the court could challenge a lack of tools certified for the cloud.
Accordingly, legal requirements for forensically sound evidence also remain nebulous.

Cloud Forensics - Laws and Regulations
Throughout the work investigated here, researchers agree that the reason for the
existence of almost all of these challenges is ultimately legal (laws, regulations, and court
compliance and acceptance). Miranda Lopez et al. (2016) and Dykstra (2013a) reached a similar
conclusion after evaluating two hypothetical use cases of criminal activities in cloud computing
settings. In their draft publication regarding cloud forensic challenges, NIST has highlighted 65
challenges, 33 of which fall under legal or architecture categories. The drive behind performing
digital forensics in the first place has always been uncovering criminal behavior and presenting
them to their respective authorities (NIST Cloud Computing Forensic Science Working Group,
2014). The collected evidence must follow certain rules to be admitted at a trial level if litigation
takes place. If there is no litigation, then the collected information/data/evidence does not need
to be authenticated against any federal rules or regulatory body standards. Thus, most
challenges are not categorized under cloud forensics, but rather are dispersed among cloud
incident response frameworks and corporate security policies.
Researchers have found that the largest US-based IaaS-offering CSPs—AWS, GCP,
and Azure—have published basic guidelines on how to technically acquire a copy of virtual
assets or media, such as acquiring a raw image of a virtual machine storage or a copy of the
volatile memory. Neither the CSPs nor their competitors have published information related to
acquiring evidence that can be admissible in court. The abovementioned CSPs have made
available some blog posts and whitepapers about how to proactively automate incident response
(threat mitigation) in their respective service offerings. These write-ups have focused mainly
on processes related to anomaly detection and log correlation and targeting organization’s
incident response and security policy teams (Building a Cloud-Specific Incident Response Plan,
2017; Data Incident Response Process | Documentation, 2018; rkarlin, 2018). One recent
publication showed how acquisition could be accomplished in public clouds using the CSPexposed APIs; the researchers focused on Amazon Cloud (AWS) and successfully acquired full
disk and memory images using the provided API calls, as well as some third-party tools (Orr &
White, 2018).
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The same CSPs have provided information on their websites about how law
enforcement agencies, attorneys, or private investigators could approach them for search
warrants or subpoenas (Amazon, 2015; Law Enforcement Requests Report – Microsoft
Corporate Social Responsibility, 2018; Orton, Alva, & Endicott-Popovsky, 2013). Though this
information is helpful, it is absolutely up to the CSP to decide what data they can share, what
they can share partially, and what they can reject sharing (Amazon, 2015; Evans, 2017). The
CSP’s decision about what type of data to provide is dependent on many factors, such as their
understanding and compliance with governing laws, regulations, and common service
provider’s privacy practices.

Research Gap
After reviewing the literature over the past decade related to cloud forensics—including
the challenges that have been voiced and the solutions proposed— the researcher believes that
for these proposed solutions to be effective, the CSPs must perform architectural changes to
their underlying hypervisors or cloud engines to allow for native forensic capabilities and
expose the appropriate API calls. The other option is for the legal community and legislators to
start creating a different set of acceptance criteria for cloud-generated digital evidence, taking
into consideration the limitations that exist today. Arguments are also made for new laws and
regulations to govern the public cloud space to allow for more control when it comes to law
enforcement agencies (LEAs) interactions. Alqahtany et al. (2015) explains the challenging
nature of demonstrating the integrity of cloud-based evidence in court in such a manner that it
can be admissible without being contested. This can be due to the number of different
stakeholders involved in the data preservation stage. While some researchers have highlighted
the legal challenges to cloud forensics, they have been addressing all challenges together at a
high level, with no focus on specific challenges (Dykstra, 2013a).
The few practical solutions proposed for cloud acquisition have always argued for the
involvement of the CSP in order to adjust the cloud architecture or allow external interfaces
direct access to the cloud infrastructure. The reviewed literature does not mention the use of the
existing digital forensic acquisition tools to perform acquisition in the public cloud.
In the present research, the gap between cloud forensic acquisition and the U.S. court
system has been closely examined, and a forensically-sound methodology to prove the collected
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data’s authenticity is proposed. The methodology inherits its main structure from the various
international work groups (SWGDE, IOCE, and IETF), standards bodies (NIST, ISO2700), and
U.S. federal rules and regulations (FRE, FRCP, Daubert). The proposed methodology extends
the existing knowledge base of digital forensics to encompass public cloud IaaS deployments.
The focus of this research is to deliver indubitable and highly admissible forensic evidence to
the U.S. courts. Further, the goal is to allow the same methodology to be extensible, and thus
easily applicable to any other court system or corporate incident response policies.
While there is less focus on the existing commercial forensic tools, some existing opensource and well-known digital forensic acquisition tools have been tested against public cloud
IaaS resources. Some newly made available means of collecting forensic data from public
clouds have been tested, such as applications programming interfaces (APIs) exposed by the
various CSPs, as well as some of the most recently developed cloud forensic gadgets. In the
present research, two hypothetical scenarios are carefully crafted to mimic realistic forensic
investigation cases in IaaS deployments. The existing forensic acquisition methodologies and
best practices are tested against the forensic cases, then the newly developed methodology,
IPCFA, is attempted. The focus of this research is to maintain the authenticity of the collected
forensic evidence, meet U.S. courts requirements, and help pass the Daubert test using a
uniquely developed rubric to execute and validate the proposed methodology.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Overview
This research is grounded in Design-Science Research (DSR) and adheres overall to all
design science guidelines as outlined by Hevner et al. (2004). Hevner et al. (2004) assert that
design science is concerned with the process of discovery through artifacts that have been
created in order to address certain problems. Design science can be very productive, allowing
for new and useful knowledge to emerge from the creation of an artifact. That knowledge can
then make a significant contribution to the collective knowledge of the cybersecurity discipline.
The authors proposed a framework that consists of seven guidelines to “assist researchers,
reviewers, editors, and readers to understand the requirements for effective design-science
research” (p. 82). Hevner et al. (2004) does not provide any explicit information about the order
in which the following guidelines should be followed, so in this research the chronological
order was followed as it produced the intended results.
Table 5 - DSR Guidelines from Hevner et al. (2004)

Note. Reprinted from “Design Science in Information Systems Research” by Alan
Hevner, Salvatore T. March, Jinsoo Park, and Sudha Ram, retrieved from
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alan_Hevner/publication/201168946_Design_Sc
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ience_in_Information_Systems_Research/links/5405d4670cf23d9765a75fc2.pdf.
Copyright 2004.

Design as an Artifact
According to Barrett (2018), digital forensics as a discipline is “lacking the tools,
published processes, and guidance for proper acquisition of digital evidence in cloud computing
environments” (p. 1362). Thus, this research proposes a digital forensics acquisition
methodology to help investigate cybercrimes related to the IaaS Public Cloud service model to
complement most of the published digital forensic models. The methodology sheds light on the
use of the existing digital forensic acquisition tools as well as the newly made available tools
from the various CSPs. It helps fill the gap temporarily until CSPs provide support for reliable
cybercrime investigations and upgrade their cloud-means to a forensic-aware cloud
architecture.
Researchers have provided adequate starting points for cloud forensics as relates to
acquisition. Zawoad et al. (2016), in their proposed Open Cloud Forensic model (OCF), provide
directions for CSPs on how to perform reliable, continuous forensics acquisition. Alqahtany et
al. (2016) proposed a novel cloud forensic methodology and covered the acquisition process in
great detail. In both scenarios, the caveat is the dependency on CSPs to support the proposed
solutions. In this research, the proposed methodology, IPCFA, does not involve the provider
and is composed of multiple phases, aiming to ensure the integrity, authenticity, and the
operability of the collected data and the produced evidence. Legally, this means fulfilling FRE
901 (Rule 901, 2011) and FRE 902 (Rule 902, 2011) and successfully navigating the Daubert
standard (Ryan, 2009a).
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FRE 902(11)
FRE 901(a)

FRE 902(12)

FRE 901

FRE 902

FRE 902(13)

FRE 901(b)(1)
FRE 902(14)

Cloud Evidence Authenticity
Daubert
Standard

Figure 6 - Digital evidence and U.S. courts – Digital evidence admission map
Maintaining the integrity and authenticity of collected forensic data are the first two
imperative requirements for court-admissible evidence generation. A third factor is the
operability of the collected data, which refers to the ease of analysis and examination using
commonly available and trusted forensics examination tools. The most critical aspects of
forensically-sound evidence are reliability and completeness; if they are questionable, the
evidentiary value is significantly weakened (McKemmish, 2008). According to Orton et al.
(2013), “decisions in court cases rely on the authenticity and reliability of the evidence
presented” (p. 186).
In the proposed methodology, the first requirement is to address the integrity problem
by applying continuous integrity checks throughout the execution of process, starting with
forensic server creation, and moving throughout various phases to the transfer of the collected
data back to the forensics server. The second requirement, authenticity, which is related to
maintaining a trusted and unbroken chain of custody, is mostly addressed by making the
platform owner executing the process save the collected data directly to the final analysis
destination to avoid creating untrusted copies. The same two requirements should be met by
following FRE 901/902 to provide authentic evidence. Operability, the third and final
requirement, is achieved by making sure the extracted data is always relevant, complete as
relates to the request, and tool-agnostic.
Table 6 - Artifact Requirements Summary
Methodology Requirement

Sub-requirements
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Maintain the integrity of the
acquired data
Maintain the authenticity of the
acquired data

-

Maintain simple and trustful chain of custody

-

Adhere to FRE 901 and FRE 902

-

Withstand or moot the Daubert test

Generate reliable and operable
forensic data

-

Generate complete and uncorrupted data

-

Collected data must be certainly examinable

Problem Relevance
According to Hevner et al. (2004), a problem is the variance between a goal state and
the current state of a system”. The present research attempts to benefit the digital forensics
community by helping practitioners acquire forensic data from public cloud instances, while
having the confidence that it will be admitted and trusted in the U.S. courts of law. The security
of organizational data in the public cloud is a shared responsibility, and distinction in the level
of accountability is determined by the type of service model chosen. In an IaaS model, the
responsibilities of the CSP and the consumer are weighted as equally important, which has
significant impact on security. This shared security responsibility model brings a lot of
challenges in how cybersecurity incidents are handled in the public cloud, specifically how
digital forensics can successfully take place.
Though telecommunications companies have to comply with federal laws—such as the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), which permits law
enforcement agencies to use wiretaps—no such law exists for dealing with CSPs (Dykstra,
2013a). Access to direct authentic evidence collected by law enforcement officers is not an
option when dealing with incidents in the public cloud. Traditional DF acquisition
methodologies and techniques are by design not probable in cloud environments. The challenge
is to innovate new and/or extend existing acquisition methodologies or processes that continue
to comply with federal and civil laws and preserve the authenticity and integrity of the collected
evidence, thus gaining the credulity of expert witnesses, jurors, and judges. Based on the
existing literature review, and the published methodologies, techniques, and procedures, there
are no formally written and adopted methodologies for acquiring forensic evidence from public
clouds, more specifically from IaaS instances. There are numerous research papers focusing on
SaaS deployments and how to investigate such crimes, while IaaS has always been overlooked
and thought of as if the existing digital forensics tools and methodologies could be applied.
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The only publication that directly addresses public cloud digital forensics is the SWGDE
Best Practices for Digital Evidence Acquisition from Cloud Service (2020), which provides a
very good starting point for cloud practitioners. The SWGDE best practice document does not
have default processes to fit small businesses or organizations that do not have policies and
standards to follow when it comes to digital forensics or incidents response. The document
omits chain of custody and physical personnel who performed acquisition or interacted with the
digital evidence or forensic data. The process also lacks reference to the cloud metadata and
does not discuss the possible types of data that can be acquired from a CSP. Each type of data
can require different acquisition mechanisms, and no single mechanism of the described
methodology can capture all sought data. Yet this document serves as a base for the technical
aspects of this research that is then enhanced and focused to address IaaS deployments in the
public cloud realm.

Design Evaluation
The designed artifact of the research is a methodology, IPCFA, which includes
numerous procedures to be followed and executed to achieve the desired results. Two
hypothetical scenarios (cases) with a validation rubric are proposed. One scenario is
hypothetically walked-thru while the second scenario will utilize an observational case study to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed artifact. According to Peffers et al. (2007), a case
study can be used to demonstrate the use of the artifact to solve one or more instances of the
problem. According to Ramirez, Mukherjee, Vezzoli, & Kramer (2015), using a scenario-based
scholarly form of evaluation “helps to challenge existing assumptions and to identify novel
lines of inquiry” (p. 70). The authors also argue that scenario-based evaluations can help
produce research that is interesting, rigorous, and actionable (Ramirez et al., 2015). Choosing
to validate the IPCFA in multiple public cloud service providers is essential to exhibit the
independence of the proposed methodology that it is applicable to any CSP.
Following DSR guidelines by Hevner et al. (2004), the designed artifact evaluation in this
research falls under Observational Design Evaluation Methods. The proposed methodology is
evaluated in terms of functionality, reliability, and usability as relates to core requirements,
which are integrity, authenticity, and operability, of the collected data. These evaluation criteria
meet Hevner et al. (2004)’s definition of a well-developed artifact that is “complete and
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effective when it satisfies the requirements and constraints of the problem it was meant to solve”
(p. 85). In this research the main constraints are the lack of involvement of the CSP during data
acquisition and that the data collected should be able to satisfy the Federal Rules of Evidence
as well as supports the plaintiff withstand the Daubert test. Two hypnotical scenarios (use cases)
are assumed in two different and well-known CSPs—AWS and Azure. The IaaS deployments
selected for the scenario are very common and have a high probability of a large number of
implementations among large enterprises as well as small businesses today. The following two
scenarios are used to evaluate the existing digital acquisition methodologies versus the proposed
methodology:
Scenario #1 – Amazon Web Services (AWS use case):
Dakwa LLC is an online agricultural wholesale venue that allows importers, exporters,
and direct buyers to buy, bid, and pay online for crops and raw oils. They are hosted in the
public cloud and utilize various IaaS components such as virtual machines, databases, and
network services. They have been set up to accommodate large spikes of traffic by utilizing
native features of public clouds such as auto-scaling groups to meet the demand during large
auctions or right before harvest sessions. Their cloud platform is set up as a 3-tier architecture
to provide modularity, scalability, and high availability.
J0anneB, a hacker who was hired by a buyer transacting on Dakwa LLC platform, to
dictate the competition and derive more revenue. J0anneB is very well versed in exploiting
public cloud architectures, tools, and environments, and tends to exploit areas that are
emerging such as productions pipelines. She also uses automation techniques of deploying and
maintaining web applications and systems. She successfully launches her indirect attack and
gains access to the transactions database, for which she is able to adjust many factors related
to auctions and place bids for a long period of time, thus the buyer is able to deceptively make
more financial gains. Some buyers and sellers have noticed the behavior and determined it is
not normal, raising concerns to the company. The company now seeks to fix and investigate a
fraud case, bring case to justice, and demand financial paybacks.
Assumptions:
-

IaaS is hosted on Amazon Cloud (AWS) and is consuming IaaS native resources.
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-

The environment consists of six EC2 instances (two web servers, two application
servers, two RDS servers). All servers are part of auto-scaling groups and load balancing
pools.

-

Infrastructure and code deployments are mostly through pipelines and various DevOp
processes. There is no use of serverless or function-based applications.

-

Dakwa LLC has an IT security department but they lack digital forensics expertise, thus
they decided to hire an attorney to bring forensic experts along to investigate.

Scenario #2 – Microsoft Cloud (Azure use case):
Oba7 is a hacker who sells distributed computing CPU cycles to underground
communities for cryptocurrencies miners, DDoS attackers, and other malicious-intended
purposes. He is an expert in utilizing exploit kits to infect legitimate websites with potential
high traffic to distribute malware to visitor’s workstations. His malicious code renders to
regular webpages, gets downloaded behind the scenes onto clients’ workstations, and then
executed to connect back to Oba7’s command and control server. He was able to acquire the
Azure Public Cloud account information and credentials of Zool Corporation, which owns and
operates a small-town casino. The hacker accessed the associated cloud account and used the
readily available computing and storage resources to allow anonymous buyers to borrow
resources in exchange for cryptocurrency. The buyers pre-transfer the cryptocurrency amount
that translates to the desired hours/resources to be borrowed, then come to the website, place
a single text file with the transaction hash and few other encrypted details, and leave. Oba7
utilizes the power of automation and ephemerality of resources available in the public cloud to
automatically obliterate all relevant text files right after being accessed and downloaded to the
local workstation. Thus, the virtual machine and the storage are always in a clean state or even
do not exist.
Zool Corporation’s accounting department noticed a major increase in their recent
cloud utilization bills. They reached out to the CSP and complained that they have been over
overcharged for several months. The CSP advised the corporation to review their accounts and
their utilization trends in order to reduce their resources consumption. The corporation is
determined to investigate their cloud account misuse, find the root cause behind their overages,
and attempt to legally ask for settlement.
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Assumptions:
-

IaaS is hosted on Microsoft Cloud (Azure) and is consuming IaaS native resources.

-

The environment consists of six virtual machines (three web servers, three application
servers, two Azure SQL servers). All servers are part of availability sets and are behind
load-balancers.

-

Infrastructure and code deployments are mostly through pipelines, scripts, and various
DevOp processes. There is no use of serverless or function-based applications.

-

Zool Corporation has a cloud security analyst’s team, but they lack digital forensics
expertise, thus they decided to hire an attorney to bring forensic experts along to
investigate.

An observational case study will be conducted on the Azure scenario for demonstration
purposes, while the AWS scenario will only be hypothetically walked through and compared
to various existing recommendations and DF processes from the following publications:
1. Internet Engineering Task Force (RFC#3227) (Killalea & Brezinski, 2002)
2. Capture of Live Systems (SWGDE, 2014)
3. Best Practices for Computer Forensic Acquisitions (SWGDE, 2018a)
4. Best Practices for Computer Forensic Acquisitions from CSPs (SWGDE, 2020)
5. FRE 901 - Authenticating or Identifying Evidence (Rule 901, 2011)
6. FRE 902 - Evidence that is Self-Authenticating (Rule 902, 2011)
7. Daubert Standard (Ryan, 2009a)
Given the above resources, a small focus group will be carefully assembled in order to walkthru the AWS hypothetical scenario and provide all the steps required in order to collect
forensically-sound data to support the Dakwa LLC case. Assembling a small focus group is
important to understand the capabilities of the current practitioners in the market and determine
any application gaps. They will be instructed to follow the SWGDE (2020) acquisition process
in addition to their expertise and personal knowledge of U.S. legal systems. In order to recruit
five highly skilled digital forensic practitioners with legal and public cloud practical knowledge,
the following selection criteria are required:
-

A U.S.-based and currently practicing digital forensics senior examiner with more than
five years of practical experience.
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-

A holder of valid and relevant U.S. technical and legal digital forensics credentials
(education, certified training, experience).

-

Practical understanding of the federal and state rules of evidence and their applicability
to digital forensics.

-

Working knowledge of digital forensics expert witness legislations and U.S. court
systems.

-

Working knowledge and valid credentials of working with the existing public cloud
ecosystem (hands-on with architecture, deployment models, and service models).

The main task of the forensic investigation is to adhere to the above-mentioned resources
and to provide the projected steps taken to acquire cloud forensic information that can be used
to generate court-sound evidence. The acquired cloud forensic data and process must prove
integrity, authenticity, and operability. After both hypothetical cases have been attempted with
the existing methodologies and procedures from the common body of knowledge, the newly
proposed methodology will be executed, and the results compared to the outcome of previous
attempts. The following investigative outcomes are expected from the collected data:
-

Determining the chronology of the attack.

-

Identifying the source and scope of the impact of malicious activity.

-

Uncovering the origin of the attack and tie back to possible entity.

-

Enabling the client to prosecute the attacker(s) and suspected buyer in courts of law.
According to the University of Texas, a rubric is a “scoring guide used to evaluate

performance, a product, or a project” (Build a Rubric, 2017, p. 1). A rubric is a criterionreferenced assessment tool (O’Reilly & Cyr, 2006). In this research, a customized Admissibility
Likelihoods Rubric (ALR) is developed from the federal requirements for digital evidence and
the digital forensic acquisition best practices from the various institutions, technological
standards, and regulatory bodies. The added value of this rubric is that it bridges the gap
between the legal requirements and technological requirements, and thus simplifies the decision
making from technological perspective.
The rubric presented in Table 7 is used to evaluate the results of executing the
methodology and validating the generated data authenticity, thus determining the probability of
being accepted as admissible evidence in the U.S. judicial system. The levels of performance
used in the rubric are Trustworthy, Doubtful, and Untrustworthy. Each performance level has
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been assigned a score. These performance levels are not meant to determine actual admissibility
in U.S. courts, but rather acts as trusted probability vector indicating whether the court is more
or less likely to accept the evidence. They also provide a clear indicator if the forensic
methodology followed can withstand defense scrutiny. ALR evaluation is based on the overall
scope of admissibility probability out of 90 possible points. This evaluation is subjective; thus,
no given score value can determine 100% admissibility in a trial. The highest the number of
points on ALR predicts a high level of trust in the forensic process and the generated evidence,
thus a higher chance of admissibility in federal and state courts. The opposite is also true: if the
ALR score is low, the lesser the chance that evidence will be rendered admissible.
Table 7 - Digital Evidence Admissibility Likelihood Rubric (ALR)
Criteria

1) Adopted a structured
and published
forensic acquisition
method or process

2) Forensic acquisition
practitioner certified
abilities

3) Trustworthy
capturing of the
whole acquisition
process

4) Provided casesupporting artifacts

Trustworthy
Doubtful
(6-10)
(2-5)
General/Legal
A structured
Acquisition
acquisition process
process has been
has been followed,
followed without a
and it is a tested and reference to
published process.
published
processes.
Acquisition
Acquisition
performed by
performed by
documented,
undocumented but
certified, and
knowledgeable
knowledgeable
examiner.
examiner.
The acquisition
The acquisition
process was
process was
captured and can be captured but cannot
clearly referenced to be clearly
examine and verify referenced to
or repeat each step
examine and verify
of the process, if
some steps of the
required.
process.
All evidenceSome evidencesupporting logs and supporting logs and
events from all
events from
platforms were fully various platform
captured and
were captured or
preserved properly. fully captured but

Untrustworthy
(1-0)
No acquisition
process was
followed or
referenced.

Acquisition
performed by
inexperienced and
undocumented
personnel.
The acquisition
process was not
captured or was
unclearly captured
and cannot be
reproduced.

No evidencesupporting logs and
events were
captured nor
preserved properly.
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5) Very well
documented and
validated chain of
custody

6) Used trusted
acquisition tools

7) Data is captured in
operable format

8) Utilized secure and
immutable evidence
storage

9) Validated the
captured forensic
data

not preserved
properly.
Chain of custody
has been partially
documented but
not covering all
phases of the DF
process.

Chain of custody
has been fully
documented
throughout the
acquisition,
preservation, and
access processes.
Data acquisition
The tools used are
The tools used are
tested and trusted
trusted, but the
(compiled from
trust has not been
trusted source),
validated and
CFTT report is
documented prior
available, or a well- the execution.
known tool was
used whose
integrity is validated
from vendor or
maintainer.
Data is captured and Data is captured
saved in raw or
and saved in a
known format and
proprietary format
can be examined
that is widely used.
using common and
The data can be
trusted tools.
examined using
few proprietary
tools.
Storage is defined,
Storage is defined,
sterilized, secure,
secure, and isolated
isolated, and
with limited
immutable with
network and
limited network and account access.
access.
NIST-approved
NIST-approved
hash algorithm
hash algorithm
value calculated for value calculated for
all the captured
some of the
evidence data files. captured evidence
All hashes
data files. Some
comparisons were
hash comparison
accurate.
values were
accurate.

Chain of custody
has been poorly
documented or
completely
undocumented.

The tools used are
not well-known
and their integrity
were neither
validated nor
documented.

Data is captured
and saved in a
format that is not
commonly used.
The data cannot be
examined using
trusted tools.
Storage is not
defined or is
partially defined
and is not isolated
or secured nor
immutable.
NIST-approved
hash algorithm
value not
calculated for the
collected evidence
files, or incorrect
values were
returned during
hash comparison.
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As rubrics by design are objectively deriving the evaluation and grading of the objective
are usually matched with the pre-defined objective of each criterion. The ALR consists of nine
criteria. Each one has been derived from the core requirements that enhances the admissibility
of digital evidence in the U.S. Court system.
1) Adopted a structured and published forensic acquisition method or process
Article VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs expert witness testimony
requirements. FRE 702c and FRE 702d (Rule 702. Testimony by Expert Witnesses, n.d.) both
require the expert witness to apply a defined methodology to the artifacts presented to provide
facts. Thus, using a pre-defined methodology to perform the digital forensic acquisition is an
important factor in providing a reliable testimony in courts of law. While attempting a forensic
acquisition based solely on personal knowledge of the matter might be sufficient in some
situations, this is ultimately not a reliable approach if a trial is expected.


This criterion receives ten points if the forensic examiner has followed a published
methodology that addresses the acquisition nature of the specific case. The steps
taken to achieve the desired goal must be documented prior to executing the
observed methodology.



Five points are given if a methodology that has been followed is not published to
the knowledge base or has been adopted from another form of acquisition that is not
directly applicable to the investigated case environment. If the examiner created and
followed their own acquisition process, it is up to the court to determine if the
acquisition process followed can be used to generate sound evidence. The court
might invoke a Daubert pre-trial testimony of expert witnesses that thus can be
challenged in court.



The lowest number of points—one point—is expected if the forensic practitioner
did not follow any process neither published nor created for the purpose of the
referenced acquisition. This weakens the credibility of the derived evidence,
diminishing its value in court significantly. Furthermore, it renders the evidence not
compliant with Federal Rules of Evidence 702c and 702d.

2) Forensic acquisition practitioner-certified abilities
This is another essential criterion that revolves around solidifying the credibility of the
collected evidence as well as enduring the probable Daubert expert witness testimony. If
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the acquisition is carried out by a court-appointed expert or by law enforcement agency,
this requirement is automatically satisfied prior to hearing by following FRE 602 and FRE
706, but in this case the forensic process is carried out by private investigators. When
entering into a trial, judges usually determine the credibility of expert witnesses by
executing the Daubert test (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
1993). Prior to a Daubert pre-trial, all experts presenting evidence in the court must submit
a summary report that includes their analysis and findings. This report is shared with both
parties, which allows for cross-examination of witnesses. The submitted report must follow
the FRCP Rule 26 (2015), which explicitly requires the report to include subject matter
expertise of the witness, experience, education, special trainings, industry certifications,
publications, and similar cases in which the expert testified in the past four years; this is not
an exhaustive list of qualifications.


The full ten points are possible if the acquisition was performed by a digital forensic
expert who has previous relevant and in-depth experience in the subject matter.
Having served as an expert witness in similar cases adds greater trust to the expert
testimony. Experience must be documented and verifiable such as authored
publications, court-case appointment letters, training certifications, employment
duties and assignment letters, and formal relevant education diplomas.



Five points are awarded if the expert has knowledge and experience but is not
properly documented and verifiable; thus, the expertise can be disputed. This also
applies to experts who are new to the U.S. court system and have limited or very
recent digital forensic knowledge.



If the acquisition was performed by an inexperienced and/or completely
undocumented examiner, then the lowest score is given.

3) Trustworthy capturing of the whole acquisition process
Making the case stronger, admissible, and indubitable is the main driver behind this
criterion. While the DF acquisition process can take long hours or days depending on the
case, being able to show a great amount of transparency in the forensic process can be very
rewarding when evidence is presented in courtrooms. While it might not be possible to
capture the whole process of a very large file being copied between drives, showing the
initial and finish state of the transfer with timestamps is possible, and this makes a
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difference. Judges, juries, and defense attorneys having a clear understanding of how
evidence was collected can remove a lot of questions and help the trial move forward.
The referenced publication does not qualify the type of notes if it is written or recorded
or in any other format, but it emphasized on the detail level of the notes and explicitly
requires notes to be detailed to a point where the whole process can be duplicated just by
following the provided notes. According to the National Institute of Justice special report
(U.S. Department of Justice; Office of Justice Programs; National Institute of Justice, 2004),
taking very detailed notes of the acquisition process from start to finish is crucial to having
complete case information that is presentable in court. When looking at digital forensic
evidence requirements from an international perspective, the task force formed between
SWGDE and IOCE (2000) approved the recommendation of having detailed documentation
of all actions taken during the acquisition process.


Ten points are awarded if the acquisition is documented with detail that allows for
inspection of each step of the process as well makes it possible to reproduce the
whole process and the expected results. This can be done with written notes,
screenshots, screen recording, or a combination of methods as long as the results
provide a full capture of the process.



Five points are awarded if the documentation process does not capture the complete
forensic acquisition. This can be due to some acquisition steps being omitted or
notes not having enough detail to carry out the process based on the provided notes
only.



If the acquisition process was not documented at all, or was documented at only a
very high level, then the instance receives one point.

4) Provided supporting case artifacts
This criterion encompasses two types of supporting artifacts: the first includes artifacts
that support the acquisition process itself; the second supports and ties evidence back to a
claim. While all provided data and evidence can be argued upon in a court setting, having
supporting information about the presented data can be the differentiator between relevant
and admissible evidence and inadmissible and rejected evidence. In IaaS acquisition cases,
the main data sources are the network, the disk drives, and the ephemeral memory storages
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such as RAM. Collecting data duplicates from these sources can be done in many ways and
can be documented.
Providing information that is originally generated by software and processes used
during the acquisition process can have a very high value in courts. Important artifacts that
are always overlooked are metadata about all forensic data and evidence. The most recent
change in Federal Rules of Evidence and the introduction of FRE 902 (Rule 902, 2011)
provides guidance for self-authenticated information that can be admitted in courts without
further investigation. FRE 902(11) states that electronic records generated by systems or
electronic processes can be considered self-authenticated. The same applies to the second
case where logs, events, or metadata generated during the investigated activity are collected
and provided to support the advocated claim. Being able to provide supporting logs to
validate IP activity on the network, for example, is one way of providing self-authenticating
evidence.


A full ten points are awarded if supporting artifacts such as logs, events, and any
other auto-generated information are captured, preserved, and provided alongside
the documented acquisition process. Also, it is required that any extracted evidence
has supporting artifacts to validate the claimed evidence.



The second highest number of points (up to five points) is given if supporting
artifacts are generated for some processes or evidence, but not for all important
forensic or acquisition tasks. Also, the same number of points can result if all
artifacts are captured by not preserved properly.



One point is awarded if no supporting artifacts are captured or presented in
conjunction with the forensic process documentation and the collected data or
evidence.

5) Very well documented chain of custody (CoC)
Chain of custody is the heart of the whole forensic process, and without it any collected
data loses its evidentiary value. Maintaining a complete, clear, and undoubted CoC by
ensuring that any and every action taken during the forensic process is documented
contemporaneously is crucial. According to NIST SP 800-101, the most important
information to include is “each person who handled the evidence, the date/time it was
collected or transferred, and the purpose for any transfers” (Jansen & Ayers, 2004, p. 67).
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While the information required is considered for all types of forensic evidence, digital
evidence requires more information to be documented in order to be complete. Additional
information includes the collection method, storage location and type, transport medium,
integrity checking hashes for each item, and access tracking and purposes.


This criterion receives a full score if the CoC is provided, and it has all the
information required in order to assure the evidence integrity from collection to
presentation at the trial without skipping any part of the forensic process.
Information about the creation and preservation of the CoC itself is included as well.



Five points is given if the CoC is provided, but it has minimal information about
personnel, evidence collection, transport, and access, or the CoC is not
comprehensive and has a few gaps in one or more of the forensic process phases.



1 point is given if the CoC is not documented or provided or was provided but not
documented properly, such as with missing dates, personal information, or process
information.

6) Used trusted acquisition tools
The DF process usually involves executing a plethora of tools starting from case
initiation and management going through acquisition and all the way to presentation
software. While all involved tools share the same importance in the process, the acquisition
tools are thought of as the most critical tools to consider as they are used to collect and
generate the actual evidence for the investigated case. According to NIST Computer
Forensics Tool Testing Program – CFTT (Allen, 2017), law enforcement agencies are
severely lacking computer forensic tools that are trusted to generate reliable data. The
program was established in order to provide a testing methodology and a database to
categorize tools, their functions, and the quality of the generated results. Tools that are
tested and validated under CFTT are considered credible and can generate the intended
results if used properly. Each tool has a corresponding report that shares all the details of
applying the CFTT testing methodology. While the NIST database does not have tools that
are designated for DF in the IaaS public cloud, some listed tools can be re-used in the
context of IaaS investigations. While trust in the well-known tools is presumed, this trust
can still be challenged in courts of law, thus it is very important to come ready with
defensible arguments about any and all tools used throughout the forensic acquisition.
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The highest score (ten points divided equally amongst all tools) is given if the tool
used during the acquisition is either 1) compiled from known good source code and
hash values that are tracked before and after execution; 2) the tool is certified with
CFTT and has a valid and relevant report, and the hash values of executables are
validated; 3) the tool is well-known to the forensic community with a verifiable
vendor or maintainer and executable hash values. Some other tools not designed for
forensic analysis such as web browsers, remote access scripts, graphical-user
interfaces, command-line interfaces, and direct API callers that require
authentication must be validated by proving authenticity of the connection and the
access granted.



Five points (divided equally amongst all tools) can be achieved if a tool is trusted
per the previous criterion, but the trust is not validated before executing the tool, or
the authenticity of non-forensic tools was not captured and documented.



One point (divided equally amongst all tools) is given if the forensic examiner
utilized tools that are not well-known and not trusted,

7) Data is captured in operable format
Digital evidence might be the deciding factor in a criminal case, but if it has not been
stored and preserved in appropriate format it becomes unusable (Garfinkel, Malan, Dubec,
Stevens, & Pham, 2006). In the context of IaaS forensics, one might think data formats are
more of a concern when collecting disk and memory images, but appropriate storage and
preservation matters for all relevant collected data. In public cloud forensics, the acquisition
is logical, thus a lot of metadata is acquired alongside disk and memory images. Metadata
is one of the most important aspects of acquiring data from the public cloud, as it contains
most of the fingerprinting information that can be referenced at any stage during the
investigation. All collected data must be operable, and disk images need to be complete and
verifiable; the same applies for memory images, individual files, and screen captures.
Without DF data in the right format, extracting quality and court-sound digital evidence is
unmanageable.


The highest score is given if all collected files are stored in their respective operable
formats, and they can be examined to the fullest. The stored files must be verifiable,
complete, and electronically fingerprinted.
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The middle score is given to data that has been collected in uncommon formats that
are still operable using uncommon or questionable tools and techniques. The data
still needs to be verifiable in order to maintain integrity.



The least score is given if the data collected is not operable by any trusted means as
well as not fingerprinted, and no hashes are calculated when the data was generated.

8) Utilized a secure and immutable destination for captured data
This criterion is a major differentiator between authentic and trusted forensic
acquisition, and a doubted acquisition. Forensic data is fragile and unstable by design, and
thus brings a lot of debate in federal or state courtrooms (Dykstra, 2013a). Being able to
demonstrate that the acquired data has not been changed and could have not been changed
since it was saved to the storage media is a vital winning argument during a trial. Evidence
doubts from the defendant can range from questions about the sterilization of the storage
media all the way to the appropriate use of write blockers to attain credible forensic data.
The native architecture of cloud computing opens opportunities for digital forensics
examiners to utilize the elasticity, modularity, and security functions of the cloud to attain
a high level of evidence preservation until prosecution date.


The highest score is given if the forensic data is stored in sterile, secure, isolated,
and immutable storage. While all these aspects are very important, immutability
(single write, multiple reads) is the one that is emphasized as it can stand both the
authenticity and integrity arguments in courtrooms. This can be thought of as having
the originals stored securely, while copies can be made for investigation and
analysis.



The second highest score can be awarded if the evidence is stored in a secure storage
that is not isolated nor immutable, but the security of the storage can be verified,
and the integrity of the files can be maintained. This can be argued in court and can
be accepted as evidence, but it can also lead to evidence dismissal.



Storing forensic evidence and data in shared storage media that cannot validate the
integrity of all files receives the lowest score possible.

9) Validated the integrity of the captured forensic data
This criterion has been touched upon within multiple criteria within the ALR. Having
authentic evidence means the evidence was collected in a trustworthy way, persevered until
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presentation with no alterations (NIST Cloud Computing Forensic Science Working Group,
2014). The Advisory Committee behind FRE 902(14) describes the process of the “digital
identification process” as the utilization of special software to compare the hash values of
two documents. This process can render the document authentic in court. The committee
also states that the new rule is flexible enough that it allows “certifications through
process[es] other than comparison of hash value, including by other reliable means of
identification provided by future technology” (Federal Rules of Evidence, 2017, p. 14).
While this statement opens the door for other means of validation such as witness testimony,
generating and authenticating and evidence with a hash value is the ultimate means of
identification today.


Up to ten points is given if forensic data collected can be identified and validated
using a hash algorithm that is approved by NIST, such as SHA-1, SHA-2, or SHA3.



The second highest score can be awarded if most of the data collected can be
identified using a hash algorithm that is approved by NIST such as SHA-1, SHA-2,
or SHA-3. Moreover, most evidence files must have correct hash values when
compared during trial.



The lowest score is given if hash values are not calculated, or a non-approved hash
functions is used, or the hashes are calculated but do not match evidence original
hash values during trial.

While there seems to be a lot of overlap between the various criteria proposed in the
ALR, each criterion is centered on specific qualities of the captured forensic data that supports
the admissibility claim of the presented evidence. Similarly, the proposed evaluation and
validation scenarios, while they are fictional, describe deployments and cybercrimes that are
ubiquitous today. The focus of executing the proposed methodology is two-fold: first is to
perform the forensics acquisition using various existing and new tools and techniques following
pre-defined steps defined, and second is to apply the ALR to evaluate the overall admissibility
probability if evidence is to be presented in a U.S. court. Digital evidence can always be
challenged in court, and so the disposition is to provide evidence that is systematically sound
enough to be assumed highly authentic and comprehensively provocative to be disputed.
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Research Contribution
When compared to other prevalent research methodologies such as natural or social
science, design science research tends to be more specific on the expected outcome and
contribution of the research. According to Hevner et al. (2004), there are three possible
outcomes expected from DSR grounded research, which are the “novelty, generality, and
significance” of the designed artifact. Any given artifact of design science research must meet
one or more of these three outcomes. Furthermore, the artifact should be developed to address
a specific problem in a business environment not previously resolved; this can be done by
expanding on an existing knowledge to resolve a problem or use existing knowledge in a new
and innovative way to resolve a problem (Hevner, 2004).
In this research, the artifact is a practical methodology to acquire court-admissible
digital evidence from public cloud IaaS deployments. The three major requirements that makes
this research significant and novel to the cybersecurity community are the following: 1) It helps
enterprises and small business forensic teams in acquiring court-admissible forensics data from
the major public cloud IaaS deployments; 2) No involvement of the cloud services providers
throughout the DF process is required; and 3) The acquired data and evidence meets almost all
U.S. governing rules and regulations related to digital evidence. The methodology builds on the
existing knowledge base of digital forensics (models, methodologies, mechanisms, and tools)
and extends the knowledge to include DF acquisition in public clouds IaaS environments,
expands best practices for acquiring U.S. court-admissible digital evidence, and, as a byproduct
of this methodology application, sheds light on the capabilities and limitations of the existing
DF tools as well as the not-so-popular in the digital forensic community, the cloud-native
Application Programmable Interfaces (API).

Research Rigor
Research rigor in design science “provides past knowledge to the research project to
ensure its innovation” (Hevner, 2007, p. 90). Rigorous research is highly dependent on the
researcher performing a deep and thorough literature review of the past knowledge base related
to the researched topic, which helps to guarantee the research outcome is a design science
research and not a routine design (Hevner, 2004). Furthermore, Hevner et al. (2004) argue that
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the application of rigorous methods should be applied in both the construction of the artifact as
well as the evaluation. In this research, rigor is addressed in both phases.
Prior to the design of the artifact, the preceding research and knowledge base related to
digital forensics methodologies, models, and technical procedures are thoroughly investigated,
studied, and categorized. Then, the same is performed for cloud forensics in order to address
challenges and proposed solutions presented by researchers as well as the cybersecurity
community. During the construction of the artifact, the knowledge acquired from the past
knowledge base is considered; in this case, this includes the various methodologies of how
digital forensics is being conducted today and of how the digital data and digital evidence are
being acquired.
The proposed methodology inherits the existing digital forensics methodologies, best
practices, and available tools of acquiring evidence from non-cloud-based environments. It is
an improvement to the acquisition phases proposed by the following researchers, standards
organizations, and governance organizations, to enable public cloud DF acquisition:
-

Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE, 2018b)

-

Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE, 2020)

-

Internet Engineering Task Force (RFC#3227) (Killalea & Brezinski, 2002)

-

NIST special publications (Kent et al., 2006)

-

U.S. Department of Justice special reports (NIJ, 2008)

-

An integrated conceptual digital forensic framework for cloud computing (Martini &
Choo, 2012)

-

Digital Forensics Processing and Procedures (Watson & Jones, 2013)
While there are a lot of publications deliberating and trying to address digital forensics

from different perspectives, authors of the abovementioned publications propose
recommendations and procedures to acquire forensically-sound data from electronic media
while keeping the possible legal challenges in mind. According to the literature review, besides
the recent SWGDE, 2020, there is no other work published that guides forensic examiners or
incident responders on how to address acquisition in public cloud related cases. Adams (2013)
too includes a small section discussing acquisition from cloud environments but does not go
into the details of how the acquisition could take place taking into consideration the elastic
nature of cloud computing resources. The authors of RFC#3227 (Killalea & Brezinski, 2002)

53
were able to create the most relevant process to perform a trusted forensic acquisition that the
new methodology proposed in this research builds upon. The artifact in this research, IPCFA,
expands on these methodologies to accommodate cloud computing cases, more specifically
public cloud IaaS-related investigations. The new methodology proposed in this research takes
into consideration possible limitations of performing forensic investigations in the realm of the
public cloud today.
The proposed methodology correspondingly stems from the knowledge base of digital
forensics models, methodologies, and procedures. The evaluation consists of a scenario to be
executed; the methodology is applied and the outcome captured, then validated against the
metrics composed in specially-designed rubric that encompasses all best practices of DF
acquisition as well as the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence (Federal Rules of Evidence, 2017).
Included are the extra metrics, guidelines, and recommendations produced and validated while
experimenting with public cloud acquisition throughout this research process.

Design as a Search
Design science is naturally iterative, and iterations of search are inevitable to solving
problems in information systems. Solving a problem following DSR requires utilizing all
available resources (means) to construct the desirable solution following the presented
constraints (ends), while navigating the uncertainty in the environment (laws). As means, ends,
and laws are refined and made more realistic, the design artifact becomes more relevant and
valuable (Hevner, 2004).
The proposed methodology, IPCFA, is motivated by performing digital forensic
acquisition in the public cloud, and more specifically in two of the major public clouds available
today, Amazon’s AWS, and Microsoft’s Azure. Yet, it can represent neither all possible CSPs
nor all possible incidents that could occur in the realm of public cloud. The intent of this
research is to address incidents related to their IaaS compute engines where forensic data can
fundamentally reside on the host, memory, attached disk images, CSP logs, and other security
logs. The methodology is generic by design to apply to as many existing CSPs as possible and
to allow for future adoption and alterations to fit various other use cases. The same limitation
applies to the deployment models of the public cloud, as this research only attempts to solve
digital forensics challenges related to Infrastructure-as-a-service deployment. The proposed
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solution is modular and consists of numerous phases to allow for future research extensibility,
modification for adoption, and unit testing.
The research question has been formalized after performing significant literature review
and technical experiments related to cloud forensics. The design starts by performing a search
on the relevant knowledge base to determine all accessible resources (means) that can be
utilized to facilitate solving the presented research problem. The global footprint of public
clouds is looked at, more specifically their presence and adoption in the US, and their published
work is analyzed to understand what they offer in terms of digital forensics capabilities,
subpoena request abilities, and their openness and cooperation with law enforcements. All the
encountered DF federal and international rules, models, methodologies, theoretical
publications, commercial and open-source tools, and techniques are considered part of the
resources that the research builds upon to develop the methodology. This phase of the search
helps determine the initial direction for which the search efforts is focused to solve the problem.
After all the means have been determined and categorized, the next step is to search
constraints, limitations, and effectiveness of the possible solutions proposed by the digital
forensics research community in the literature (ends) that might help solve the same problem
presented in this research. The final goal is to solve the problem, navigate the existing
limitations, and come up with a working solution that satisfies the constraints. The constraints
examined are related to the Cloud Services Providers’ terms of service related to subpoena, the
data exposed via API calls, and various data sources and granularity levels provided by the CSP
for customers. The other major set of constraints that limit this research design is the U.S.
Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as privacy rules that govern personal identification
information exposure. On the technical side, the limitations are to perform the acquisition
without involving the CSP, to avoid changing the forensic data by the invoked forensic
acquisition tool or technique, and to ensure the data collected gets transmitted securely to the
destination, the forensic examination workstation.
While the U.S. federal and civil rules governing the admission of digital evidence in
courts appear straightforward, in actuality they are not; and all aspects of the digital forensics
case can be challenged during a litigation (laws). All produced evidence can be argued not
trustworthy, and the mechanism for acquiring evidence can be tested with assessments such as
the Daubert standard. The natural workflow of trials and their uncertainties bring challenges
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when attempting to solve problems related to digital forensics in the cloud. In this research, the
final solution must stand up against the Daubert test, and the produced evidence is designed to
become self-authenticated to an extent in order to attain trustworthiness of U.S. court systems.

Communication of Research
As with other information systems related artifacts, the technical solution is just a part
of the big picture, and understanding the surrounding issues related to processes, standards,
governance, and other relevant laws and regulations is key to the successful implementation
and practicing of the matured artifact. The technical specifics of the proposed solution are
detailed and broken down into various phases to ease its implementation and facilitate easier
adoption. While this research is heavily focused on constructing the practical methodology
itself, the big picture of the problem and the existing challenges related to performing successful
digital forensics in the public cloud are explained with reference to the new methodology.
The evaluated and generated DF processes, skillset, recommendations, and other
required knowledge are highlighted and focused on in order for organizational leadership teams
to determine how and why they can adopt the newly developed artifact, and how it differs from
the existing solutions. The research and associated artifact will be published and made available
via the Dakota State University Beadle Scholar system. This initial publication will make the
research available to all 550+ Institutions that use the Digital Commons Network. The intent
for this research is to make it available on as much as possible of the online digital libraries to
be available in the global knowledge base of digital forensics.
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CHAPTER FOUR
IPCFA - IAAS PUBLIC CLOUD FORENSIC ACQUISITION
The technical details and internal deployments of the various public clouds might differ,
but they all still share the same high-level characteristics, and almost all offer IaaS. In IaaS, the
owner can customize and start up virtual machines (computing instances) and containers
(computing pods), install the desired applications, harden as needed, permit the necessary
communication flows for inbound and outbound access, and manage the lifecycle of the created
instances. The proposed acquisition methodology assumes there is a need to acquire as much
forensic data as possible to extract court-sound evidence that supports the litigation claim. The
investigation involves one or multiple compromised virtual server(s) that is part of an IaaS
environment. The investigation could be led by the owner or a delegate of the affected platform
incident response team, while keeping in mind that litigation is always an option. The core
concepts that make up the guidelines for the proposed methodology (IPCFA) are depicted in
Table 8.
Table 8 - High-Level Guidelines for IaaS Cloud Evidence Acquisition
Principle
1) Digital seizure

Description
When possible, preserve evidence source, and isolate the
server to a secure location where the only permitted
access is from the forensic examiner workstation; in order
to minimize additional changes and lessen the impact on
the investigated server, the server must be isolated to a
secure location.

2) Iterative collection

Expect cycles of collection because case-relevant data
may be located in many places in the cloud environment.
While the collected data may be analyzed on the forensic
server, additional data might be required to construct a
timeline or uncover a relevant event.

57
3) Secure data transfer

If data transfer is required, transfer the data using the
appropriate transfer mode for the file type (binary/ASCII).
This makes sure the data is transferred bit by bit without
losing information. The file transfer should be encrypted
or local between the forensic workstation and the
examined server/destination storage.

4) Audited Acquisition

Capture all commands (log/output) throughout the process
of the acquisition on the forensic workstation. These logs
are provided alongside the collected evidence as proof of
the acquisition process followed for documentation
purposes. This step is crucial to assure the integrity of the
process.

5) Trusted forensic tools

Use tools compiled from the source prior to being used,
capturing the calculated executable hashes via the
continuous auditing mechanism, or tools that are well
known and trusted within the community (preferably
certified under NIST CFTT) or natively provided by the
provider authenticated interface. The authenticity of the
tools used must be validated and captured via a
continuous integrity mechanism.

6) Data and evidence
integrity

Calculate the generated output files hashes after the
execution of every one of the required tools on the
compromised server. The hash value must be captured and
referenced via a continuous auditing mechanism.

7) Data and evidence validity

Check all collected evidence with analysis tools to
validate the hash value, the completeness of the acquired
data, and the possibility of gathering the needed
information from the collected data. This is important
because collected data can be corrupted, inoperable, or
irrelevant to the ongoing investigation (for the purpose for
which it was generated).
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8) After-the-fact integrity
checks

Once files have been transferred to the forensic server,
check the hashes for all collected files against the original
values. If confirmed, then forensic examiner can carry on
the forensic analysis.

9) Immutable storage

Save all artifacts generated from the acquisition process
directly on a write-once read-many storage. This
requirement helps ensure the integrity of all artifacts and
evidentiary data throughout the forensic lifecycle.

10) Near-event forensic
examination and analysis

Store evidence near where the data was collected, and
perform as much as possible of the forensic examination
in an isolated network on the investigated public cloud.
Since the incident occurred in the public cloud and data
acquisition took place in the public cloud, it makes sense
to isolate the evidence in order to avoid mishandling of
the evidence. This measure also helps greatly to reduce
the amount of data that must traverse the network between
the customer network and the cloud services provider
network. This requisition helps reduce the chain of
custody.

The proposed methodology, IPCFA, has three major phases: initiation, execution, and
closure. Each phase is composed of multiple processes to be executed. Each phase supports one
or more of the guidelines in Table 8, indicating how this phase can be executed to help generate
forensically sound evidence. Some of the proposed phases might be labeled as optional or
iterative, and they should be determined as required or discretionary during the preparation
phase of the forensic process. Iterative means this step can be re-executed in the future to collect
more relevant data, as the investigation progresses. The order of execution of these phases is
highly dependent on the type of incident, the purpose of the investigation, and the cloud
provider-enabled capabilities. The specifics of each phase are listed in detail as follows:
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1. Initiation phase
1.1. Stand up a forensic server
Why? A trusted forensic server contributes to the authenticity claim of the generated
data by making sure the forensic workstation is built from a trusted and pre-built image
with all required tools pre-installed. This step also involves setting up security policies,
forensic accounts, isolated networks, and relevant storage. This removes any distrust
related to where the collected forensic data are being sent and saved for analysis.
How? Collecting data directly and securely saving the data to the forensic workstation
with immutable storage can add further credibility to the acquired data’s integrity and
confidentiality. The forensic workstation needs to be instantiated from a pre-configured
and hardened cloud image in an isolated network with separate security policies and
rules. Appropriate access needs to be given to allow only the forensic examiner’s remote
machine to connect to the specific required ports to operate on the workstation. The
whole process of setting up the forensic workstation and enabling the required restricted
communications can be scripted and automated to be executed seamlessly when needed.
In some instances, the cloud platform might offer cross-account storage and volume
mounting; in such cases, it is recommended to initiate the forensic workstation in a
dedicated account to avoid inquiries about the overall security of the account running
the compromised instance.
1.2. Enable continuous integrity monitors
Why? Enabling continuous integrity monitors supports the authenticity claim of the
evidence by ensuring the complete transparency of the acquisition process as a whole,
including the collected data and the forensic examiner actions and interactions with the
various tools. It also plays a vital role in ensuring unquestioned chain of custody.
How? This phase sets the stage for the whole process, so it must be executed properly.
As one of the major sub-phases in this methodology, it has direct impact on the
authenticity, thus the admissibility, of the acquired data. When the preparation phase
of the chosen digital forensics model is complete (that is, the forensic examiner is
identified and furnished with an appropriate and secure workstation, the forensic data
sources have been identified, required documentation has been approved and prepared,
the preferred tools to perform this acquisition have been chosen, and the forensic
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examiner is ready to collect and acquire data), then this phase of the methodology
begins.
It is not a default behavior for all public cloud components to generate and keep
logs, thus giving the consumer various options to which logs to collect and how and
where to store them. As logging in the public cloud is shared responsibility, it is
important to make sure to enable logging if not already enabled on the Cloud Console
or management plane and cloud audit/action logs before engaging in the acquisition
process. While there are many measures that can be taken to maintain the integrity of
evidence, enabling audit logs on the forensic workstation or server is one of the easiest
to implement and present in courtrooms.
No matter which tools the examiner decides to use—browser, command-line,
or proprietary tool—all supplied commands and interactions must be captured and
recorded properly. Audit logs capture all actions taken by the examiner during the
examination timespan (commands entered, clicks, processes executed, exit codes, and
more). In an audit log, each log line is timestamped to the second using the local time
zone of the examiner’s computer. This helps jurors and judges reference specific log
entry during the trial. By having audit logs enabled on the cloud and in the forensic
workstation with timestamps, fewer doubts can arise about any generated or autogenerated piece of information or data during the process.
A secondary measure that can significantly support the evidence to withstand
scrutiny in courtrooms is to properly take clear screenshots of critical outputs and
artifacts. The screenshot must show the generated artifacts, the timestamp, as well as
any calculated hashes. These screenshots later can be referenced later in courtrooms
and tied together with audit logs to enhance the integrity and validity of the acquisition
process.
1.3. Authenticate the forensic tools
Why? Authenticating the forensic tools contributes to the authenticity claim of the
generated data by ensuring the integrity of the forensic acquisition tool used throughout
the process. Using authentic cloud-native tools to generate the forensic evidence helps
validate the authenticity of the evidence without the need for expert witness in
courtrooms.
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How? Many commercial and open-source digital forensic tools can be used for the
collection and acquisition phases of the investigation. Trust in these tools is based on
common-use or community feedback, and the collected data have always been thought
of as trustworthy. This leaves an open area for the defendant to question the authenticity
and accuracy of the tool used. This setup in the methodology establishes trust in the
forensic tool and removes possible ambiguities related to the integrity of the tool. To
achieve full trust in a tool, there are two possible procedures to be followed. If scripts
are to be used, the first option is applicable: the source code is analyzed to determine
the security of the source code, and then it can be compiled, and hashes calculated for
the generated executables. If a community-approved or a commercial tool is used,
where the source code is not available to download, the second procedure applies: the
tool should be downloaded from a trusted provider repository and paired with a
calculated hash provided by the vendor/developer/maintainer of the tool. Once the tool
has been installed or unarchived, the hash of the binaries should be compared to ensure
that it is a match with the one provided by the vendor, proving the authenticity and
integrity of the tool.
If one of the above-mentioned procedures has been followed, the tool can be
formally used in the forensic investigation with less doubt about its integrity and the
integrity of the generated data. For some non-traditional and newer tools, such as the
public cloud management consoles, these procedures might not be applicable. Most of
the CSPs furnish their customers with at least four possible means to access and operate
their cloud environment: a browser-based console, a command-line console, a list of
exposed APIs, and finally a software development kit console (SDK). In the case of a
browser-based console, the authenticated account used as well as the digital certificate
of the website should be validated and captured before executing the forensic
acquisition. In the case of a command-line console, the access keys used to authenticate
to the CSP should be validated and compared against the ones recorded on the browserbased console. Access keys should also be validated when interacting with the CSP
via direct API calls or through an SDK. Following such validation schemes can help
remove concerns about the integrity of tool and its generated data, suppressing possible
further scrutiny in court.
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1.4. Capture the architecture and metadata
Why? Capturing the architecture and metadata contributes to the authenticity claim of
the generated evidence by ensuring the validity and consistency of data sources and that
the investigated digital asset matches the identified data sources during the preparation
phase of the forensic investigation.
How? The amount of consumer independence and the level of automation differentiate
the cloud computing environment from traditional computing farms. Most of today’s
cloud deployment follow a process called DevOps, where developers and operators
come together to streamline product development and delivery. DevOps involves setting
up a cloud environment with multiple automated tasks that can start from creating the
virtual machine all the way to decommissioning it. This process and others can occur
without any human intervention. There are also processes in the middle that perform
many tasks on the virtual machines or virtual networks to adapt to changes or workloads.
Crucial to the success of the investigation is that the customer cloud architecture is
captured and analyzed. This sometimes requires reading documentation and talking to
DevOps team members and cloud architects to understand the full scope and possible
impact of the investigation; it helps greatly to setup appropriate OOV.
Metadata about a VM hosted in a cloud environment provides data about the
virtual machine or resource that uniquely identifies it. Documenting the investigated
instance VM metadata, such as region, hosted zone, hostname, IP address, MAC
address, instance ID, launch date, signature, associated security policies, auto-scale
groups, access groups, routing groups, and any other connected attributes is vital before
starting forensic engagement. Another important factor to be documented is the time
difference between the systems and the forensic server (time-drift). These
characteristics help determine how to execute the next phases of the methodology as
well as confirm the identity of the target. Without capturing metadata, determining
appropriate order of volatility to prepare for a successful acquisition is not possible.
Metadata need to be captured via a screen capture tool (or the continuous integrity
process) and saved as an image or acquired via the cloud API, in a location where the
image can be viewed at its final destination. The saved metadata file should have its
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hash calculated and saved. The same information needs to be documented in the
investigation track book or the case document, including the calculated hash.
1.5. Define order of volatility (OOV)
Why? Referencing the metadata and all possible data sources determined during the
preparation phase, order of volatility should be defined to optimize the collection and
acquisition of relevant evidence. This helps ensure the completeness and correctness of
the acquired evidence.
How? Determining the appropriate sequence for interacting with volatile data is crucial
to supporting a digital forensic case. Since the focus in this research and the target for
this methodology is IaaS environments, which are mainly constituted of compute,
storage, and network resources, following OOV as defined in the Internet Engineering
Task Force RFC 3227 would suffice the initial volatility imperative for a Windows- or
Linux-based server. In the public cloud context, a secondary volatility order that needs
to be taken into consideration is the logging retention defined by SLA or in agreement
with the cloud provider architecture. Logs and possible data sources with shorter
retention periods or log rotations (such as network traffic) need to be captured before
logs with longer retention and rotation timespans (such as console and account audit
logs). This part of the volatility order differs per the organization’s contract with the
CSP, and the default data retention values vary between CSPs. Thus, the order of
operations for the next phase of the methodology is affected by the outcome of this subphase of the methodology.

2. Execution phase
2.1. Volatile data acquisition (Optional, iterative)
Why? Volatile data acquisition contributes to the operability and completeness of the
acquired data and supports the generation of the foreseen evidence to defend the
claimed contentions. Though acquiring ephemeral data might not be required for the
investigated case, this is completely dependent on the preparations phase and the
volatility order defined in the previous phases. Thus, if offline investigation is required
or preferred, all volatile data are lost and there are no other means to recover them as
related to this instance.
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How? The prior defined OOV should be followed. By design, all computer programs
are loaded to the RAM or physical memory-like structure before being passed on to the
CPU (or cache registers beforehand) to be processed. A complete image of the physical
memory should be taken, which includes information not limited to the current running
processes but also including any allocations of memory spaces, network and
communications statistics, passwords, cryptographic keys, unencrypted data, and also
some hidden data. While it can be argued that performing this memory acquisition
might have negligible impact on the investigated server, it is strongly recommended
that this acquisition occur remotely without logging onto the investigated virtual
machine to avoid state changes and possible objections during trials. Further, it is
recommended that the acquisition is performed from the cloud-native API call or
command-line tools; if that is not possible, then it can occur by utilizing pre-installed
forensic remote acquisition agents or tools. If neither option is available, then it can be
accomplished from within the investigated machine while documenting all system
changes during the course of the acquisition process. The collected image must be
transferred directly to the forensic workstation immutable storage, with hashes
calculated and captured via the continuous integrity mechanism.
2.2. Digital Seizure (Optional, iterative)
Why? As in a traditional forensic investigation, seizing the actual evidence is a very
important step of the process. While actual seizure of the digital device or data sources
is not possible in the public cloud, it is possible to isolate the investigated instance into
a dedicated, separate, and secure network while following the pre-defined OOV. This
limits the potential harm from propagating into the network, helps remove any
maintained or undetected unauthorized access, and assists in maintaining the machine
state during the various acquisition phases. In some instances, cloud providers furnish
customers with some ephemeral storage options to be attached to their compute
instances instead of the regular block and persistent storage; in such cases if the VM
gets shutdown or terminated, all associated data is lost, not only the commonly known
volatile information. This makes digital seizure and live acquisition the only options
for constructing an appropriate case. Console access should be granted specifically to
the forensic workstation. This sub-phase contributes directly to the preservation phase
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of the digital forensic model, as well as to ensuring the integrity of the data source and
the trustworthiness of the acquired data. This sub-phase plays a vital role in the incident
response effort of an organization.
How? One of the major selling points of cloud computing—and especially public
clouds—has been always the elasticity (hitless scalability and dynamic high availability
operations) of resources. In IaaS deployment, virtual machines or any other type of
compute resources hosted in the public cloud are part of scaling groups that provide
greater accessibility and workload adaptability. They can also be set up behind traffic
load balancers to allow for high availability and load distribution. In such scenarios, if
an instance is compromised or being investigated, then the auto-scaling function can
change the instance metadata and sometimes the internal configuration parameters. If
the investigated VM/server falls under this scenario, it should be removed from scaling
groups before commencing the actual acquisition. If the examined instance is behind
load balancers, it should also be removed from the load balancing group to deny the
active network traffic from reaching the server. Instance metadata should be checked
before and after the removal from these groups to reconfirm the investigated instance
identity.
2.3. Non-volatile data acquisition (Iterative)
Why? Non-volatile data acquisition contributes to the operability and completeness of
the acquired data and supports the generation of the foreseen evidence to defend the
claimed contentions. The disk image is an exact (bit-by-bit image) of the server or
instance storage that contains all persistent data saved on the disk. Though live forensic
investigations can take place and some relevant or volatile information can be extracted,
the disk image might still be needed as a reference at a later stage in the process or might
need to be examined further to acquire more relevant data or evidence supporting data.
How? Most of the investigations involving a workstation and servers require a full disk
image to be investigated by a forensic examiner or to be sent to be processed by
specialized software for analysis. As referenced in the literature, the common
methodology of acquiring disk images is by seizing the disk, attaching write-blockers
to the disk drives, and attempting to perform a bit-by-bit copy of the disk. In a public
cloud environment, a partially similar approach might be possible, by taking a snapshot
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of the running instance-associated disk volumes and sending them directly to the
forensic workstation. This process can be executed and automated via the cloud-native
API calls and CLI or GUI interfaces. While the generated disk duplicates might not be
in raw format, they can be mounted with read-only permission in an isolated
environment, and then, if required, raw format images can be produced using the
traditional imaging techniques and tools. The complete acquisition process must be
captured via continuous integrity processes. Metadata about the snapshot as well as the
produced raw image files (if any) must be captured and saved immediately following
the completion of collection process, and hashes are calculated for the metadata
captures.
2.4. Collect supporting artifacts (Iterative)
Why? Collecting supporting artifacts contributes to the operability and completeness
of the acquired data and supports the claimed arguments and the produced evidence.
Cloud-generated audit logs or events related to network traffic flows, security tools, or
any underlying infrastructure logs are invaluable to the success of digital forensic
investigations. Especially with audit logs, the key is to answer special questions such
as who did what, where, and when. Other important data to collect is DevOp tools and
gadgets that service the suspected cloud instance.
How? Though sometimes collecting RAM and disk images can be enough to identify
the thumbprints and fill the gaps in a cybercriminal case involving IaaS deployments,
collecting supporting information to complete the picture of how the attack happened
is also worthwhile. In IaaS, other components in addition to the compromised server
itself can often generate valuable logs. Audit logs and event logs from load balancers,
security managers, antivirus software, web application firewalls, web proxies, network
firewalls, cloud account management consoles, and other related logging facilities
should be collected and downloaded to the forensic workstation. The logs to be
collected can be defined during the preparation phase of the forensic investigation,
when data sources are identified. It is important to plan on collecting relevant logs after
checking the SLA document.
The period of retaining logs and events can be from one week to two years,
depending on the contract signed by the CSP and the customer. A copy of the logs
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should be downloaded directly in the forensic instance, dating back as far as deemed
necessary for the investigated case. Saving the logs in raw text format, if possible, is
recommended; sometimes the CSP allows the logs to be downloaded directly from the
cloud instance management interface or the command-line interface.
Some of the main reasons’ businesses are moving to the cloud is to utilize
DevOps mechanisms to automate workloads and ease deployments of their software
products. Thus, during forensic investigations it is very important for examiners to take
a quick look at the mechanisms, code, and gadgets being utilized to make sure there is
nothing hidden there. Almost all of the actions that can be done via the cloud console
can also be done in a more efficient faction from the cloud native DevOps tools as well
as in various integrations with the open-source DevOp tools. Data related to DevOps
should be captured by downloading involved code or taking screenshots of the cloud
console of the automation dashboards. This data acquisition process must be captured
via the continuous integrity mechanism; hashes for all of the downloaded or created
files must be calculated, and the byte size and last modified timestamp of each file must
be noted.

3. Closure phase
3.1. Complete the continuous integrity process
Why? Completing the process for continuous integrity contributes to the overall
integrity of the collected data as well as the forensic methodology followed. This step
helps ensure that a very short and limited chain of custody is produced, as all
information and supporting documents reside on the same immutable storage.
How? At this point in the investigation, the actual acquisition and collection of data is
completed and documented. Hash values should be computed for all of the generated
and produced log files and screenshots. These files and hash values should be stored
directly on the forensic workstation.
3.2. Validate the collected data
Why? Validating the collected data contributes to the operability and completeness of
the collected data. The data have been collected and saved on the forensic workstation.
The last step in the methodology is validating that the data have been captured properly
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and are readable by the various digital forensic tools. The acquisition is now complete
and is passed along to the forensic examiners to continue the analysis.
How? The necessary data have been collected according to a prepared list of data
sources; this includes, but is not limited to, physical memory image, disk image, and
cloud account and underlay logs. All logs and screenshots should be checked for
readability and accuracy. All log files should be opened in a text editor to validate the
readability of the files’ contents. The collected artifacts such as disk, memory, cloud
logs, systems logs, and account access logs should be loaded into the selected forensic
examination tool to validate the content and operability of the data files.
As it is crucial to understand the various environments that are used to execute the
methodology, Figure 7 is a swimlane flowchart depicting the various environments that can act
as a reference for forensic acquisition processes. The first environment is the forensic examiner
workstation, where all initial tasks take place, and it is used to connect to the cloud portal. The
second environment that should be ready is the security environment. The security environment
is in a separate cloud network or account, with limited and controlled access for the forensic
and incident response team only. This account is used to host the forensic server and the
connected immutable storage. The third environment is labeled as a production, and this one
refers to the network segment or account where the incident took place, or where the suspected
virtual machine resides. Depending on how the methodology is being adopted, and the required
evidence, a fourth environment might be required, which is the quarantine or the logical seizer
environment. This environment can be used to isolate the suspected instance if necessary.
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Figure 7 - IPCFA Proposed Flowchart
Assumptions
IPCFA was designed with today’s rules and regulations in mind and applied to the
existing leading public cloud providers to demonstrate its efficacy. This makes it subject to
changes related to both public cloud computing ecosystems and relevant U.S. federal rules and
regulations that govern digital evidence. Examination of the history of federal rules of evidence,
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federal rules of civil procedures, and the Daubert standard shows that continuous amendments
and improvements occur. In the past three decades, these changes have transpired for numerous
reasons such as gaps found in rules, inconsistency observed between rules, and overall
enhancements and amendments due to new use cases or relevant legislations. While there are
many amendments for every rule of federal or civil procedure, which is normal, not all changes
are equally impactful. For example, FRE 902 was amended eight times between 1987 and 2017,
but only two amendments are considered impactful improvements (Rule 902, 2011).
Yet over a similar timeframe, major changes to the computing world have taken place.
In 1990 the WWW was invented, seven years later cloud computing was defined, and in 1999
Salesforce offered the first form cloud services (SaaS). In 2006 AWS was launched as the first
public cloud provider to revolutionize the traditional datacenter and server hosting paradigm
and offer IaaS, initially. So, this clearly shows the advancement in technology that can take
place within a short time. Furthermore, the pattern of improvement and amendment to
technology is likely to continue. Thus, it is probable that legal changes will be necessary in the
future. Such changes can affect the applicability of IPCFA as described in this research. Table
nine captures regulatory and technical assumptions that are critical to the successful application
of IPCFA.
Table 9 - IPCFA Future Application Assumptions
Assumption
Federal Rules of Evidence are the relevant regulations for

Category
Regulatory

evidence admissibility in U.S. courts
FRE 902(13) and 902(14) are active, and the definition of self-

Regulatory

authentic evidence is unchanged
Daubert standard is the relevant expert witness challenge, and its

Regulatory

content is unchanged
Public CSPs offer APIs to operate (create/update/delete) the

Technological

hosted IaaS recourses such as compute, storage, network, and
other core services elements
Public CSPs offer APIs to execute remote commands on the
hosted IaaS components

Technological

71
Public CSPs offer APIs to collect logs and metrics about the

Technological

hosted IaaS components
Public CSPs offer multiple storage access granularity levels (read,

Technological

write, write-once-read-many, write-append)
Public CSPs offer different types of storage to accommodate the

Technological

various use cases (binary data, OS data, file shares, archive data)

Recommendations
Each IaaS deployment might have a different set of corporate or compliance body
policies governing all aspects of security and incident response. They may differ on such items
as how the instantiated systems must be hardened, what security tools must be installed, and
what logging and auditing processes and configurations need to be enabled and applied.
Establishing a strong hardening baseline that helps enable forensic capabilities for each instance
before being approved to go into production is imperative. Furthermore, and before engaging
with the CSP, it is vital that the contract states the appropriate Service Level Agreement (SLA)
terms that permit the customer to investigate cybersecurity incidents on their deployed
platforms and promote cloud forensic readiness. Below is a list of recommendations and
preconditions that, if met, can conceivably contribute to yielding a high level of trustworthiness
in executing the proposed methodology. The list has been constructed from many resources
based on experienced researchers and skilled practitioners, as well as the researcher’s
understanding and experience performing forensics in the public cloud throughout the tenure
of this dissertation (Building a Cloud-Specific Incident Response Plan, 2017; SWGDE Best
Practices for Digital Evidence Collection, 2018; Gonzales et al., 2007a, 2007b; Grobler & von
Solmes, 2009; Kent et al., 2006; Killalea & Brezinski, 2002; Orr & White, 2018; Simou et al.,
2016; Stone, 2015; SWGDE, 2014, 2018; Watson & Jones, 2013).
Table 10 - Recommendations for Cloud Forensic-Enablement
Cloud Forensics Recommendation
Have a well-documented digital forensic process. This
can be part of the incident response policy and
procedures, but it needs to cover the complete the

Technology

Policy



SLA
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forensic investigation/evidence lifecycle. The required
training and expertise of the forensic examiners should
also be covered under the same policy.
Establish logging requirements for cloud platforms
(compute/server, network, or storage) and set the
severity level, timestamp format, and retention and









rotation periods. Define where else logs should be sent
(event correlation tools—SIEM).
Pre-define set of corporate-approved tools to be
installed as part of any instance deployment in the
cloud platform, which includes forensic-enablement
tools.
Build a forensic playbook that describes procedures to



be followed as part of the corporate incident response
procedures and policies.
Enable logging and auditing in the cloud environment
(all pipelines, compute, network, and storage









instances) by corporate policy.
Enable consistent time synchronization among all
systems within the private cloud zone or region.
Establish training requirements for staff members
handing security incident response and digital



forensics. Make sure staff has active and valid
certificates pertaining to their specialty.
Ready forensic server image (forensic acquisition and
analysis tools, cloud API command-line tools) and
version it for all deployed CSPs. This includes
processes on how the IR team obtains the required
access to be able to carry all of their required
investigations’ tasks.
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Acquire and document from the chosen CSP a clear



process guiding how law enforcement agencies can
approach the CSP for information requests.
Ensure that the SLA clearly defines the timeframes
and mechanisms for the CSP to notify consumers



about data breaches or security incidents to the
consumer platform or the cloud underlay
infrastructure.
Define with the CSP which logs from the underlay
infrastructure can be exposed during forensics



examinations, if requested, what the request process
will be, and how long the log retention periods.
Describe the types of logs to be maintained regarding
the deployed IaaS cloud and the retention periods for
each type of log. Specify recoverability after deletion













options for each type of log.
Define ownership of the data residing in the corporate
cloud instances and any derivatives of it.
Define data storing location(s) by agreeing with the
CSP on the corporate authority to decide where all the
data is stored for the deployed environment (country,
state, and jurisdiction).
Clarify the process of retrieving encryption keys from
the CSP (if required or lost) and capture any



limitations to data decryption.
Define data-volatility recovery options (elastic autoscaling groups and resources). What type of data can
be recovered for each type of the ephemeral resources,
and what are the associated time constraints?
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CHAPTER FIVE
DEMONSTRATION
To demonstrate and validate the proposed methodology, two use cases were crafted.
The use cases cover common aspects of highly probable cybercriminal activity that could
involve the public cloud. The first scenario (Case #1) assumes a public cloud deployment that
was deliberately compromised (that is, a criminal act takes place in the public cloud), and in
the second scenario (Case #2) the public cloud deployment is used as a means to compromise
other non-cloud-based components (in other words, the criminal act takes place outside the
public cloud). Both cases assume investigation conducted with probable litigation, thus; U.S.
courts evidence admissibility requirements are kept in mind. In these scenarios it was assumed
the victims would want to perform their own investigation and forensic exanimation, utilizing
their in-house resources or hiring external forensic investigators to validate their claims before
reaching out to law enforcement. The collected data are expected to meet the following
investigative goals:
-

Determine the chronology of the attack.

-

Identify the source and scope of the impact of malicious activity.

-

Uncover the origin of the attack and tying it back to possible intruder, if any.

-

Enable the client to prosecute the attacker(s) in courts of law.

The forensic examiner (the researcher) has thirteen years of experience in the field of
information technology and cybersecurity (M.Sc, CISSP) and network and operating systems
(CCNP, CCDP). Experienced with cloud computing, the examiner has three years of technical
hands-on performing digital forensic acquisition in the various major public clouds. All
qualifications are documented and provided, including diplomas, employment letters of duties,
and professional certifications. The examiner is familiar about the international, federal, and
state rules and regulations of digital evidence. The same examiner (the researcher) performs
acquisition in all presented scenarios.
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Hypothetical application of SWGDE 2020 – AWS use case
The forensic examiner prepares for acquisition by obtaining all information related to
the incident, possible data sources, deployed IaaS architecture, cloud account information, and
possible timeline of the attack. The input to the forensic examiner is the story from the case
described in Chapter Three, the architecture of the platform and how it works, the key personnel
who manage the environment, and any other relevant information such as which security or
best practices are implemented. The examiner documents all the information in their
workstation. They create a folder named “Case001 - Dakwa LLC.” The examiner creates an
Excel file (logbook) or relies on another case management tool with all possible evidence
resources that might be vital to be acquired and presented for analysis. As this is a sub-phase of
the whole forensic processes; this logbook can be a part of a larger logbook documenting the
whole process. At this stage all steps are to be followed on SWGDE (2020) while relying on
the focus group examiner’s knowledge and expertise. The following steps resample the
combined steps proposed by the focus group examiners walk-thru of the Dakwa LCC
acquisition:
1. Steps to Take Prior to acquisition
This phase of recommended process corresponds to the preparation phase of the
many available DF models. Based on the case information, the examiner needs to
authenticate to the AWS environment where the incident is suspected. The examiner has to
confirm the architecture and metadata provided by the team and check scaling groups, load
balancers, networks, databases type and setup, policies, and make sure permissions are in
place. Based on this review, the examiner can then determine the best path for acquisition
and the type of data to be collected, as well as how it can be used to extract evidence to
support the claim. The examiner can determine whether it will be required to have some
volatile data and disk images of the suspected VMs (snapshots or raw disks), access logs,
database audit logs, database transactions’ logs, and events logs from the account console.
AWS logging facilities to be collected by the examiner include CloudTrail, CloudWatch
Logs, RDS (Relational Database Services) Logs, GuardDuty, and Security Hub logs. It is
important to document all collected screenshots, accesses, and data sources touched in a
logbook.
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Based on the above information, the examiner can decide on the best acquisition
mechanism, and in this case, it is a combination of cloud native data export tools (cloning
or snapshots) and other well-known DF tools (open source or commercial). The examiner
must be very familiar with the AWS architecture and available tools and integrations. The
destination media must be prepared according to best practices. The examiner could decide
to have a local media or a remote media on the cloud itself (AWS S3 bucket) with readonly capabilities and good size to be able to fit all possible data to be collected. Some of the
tools the examiner can prepare in this phase include but are not limited to EnCase
Enterprise, AWS_IR (Incident Response), AWS_CLI, AWS Browser Console, and
Margarita Shotgun.
The acquisition location in this case is virtual, and acquisition can be performed
from a trusted and secure environment such as the examiner’s workstation with appropriate
credentials. There are no physical servers to seize or preserve; all servers are logical. The
examiner is furnished with all diagrams and information about the setup of the virtual
private cloud where Dakwa LLC hosts their platform. As the examiner is working directly
with the company; any encryption keys can be provided.
2. Steps to Take During acquisition
The second phase of SWGDE is to execute the selected methodology and use the
designated tools to collect the needed forensic data. The examiner begins by preparing an
electronic notebook to document all the processes with actions, timestamp, data source, and
data type. Photographs and screenshots are also taken to support the written notes. The
examiner cannot avoid the need for volatile data that might reside on the suspected VMs;
thus, live acquisition is required. The examiner determines the appropriate OOV, such as
RAM, running processes, network connections, system settings, and storage media. The
examiner can launch AWS CLI from their workstation and acquire a lot of information from
RAM such as hidden processes, network stats, encryption keys, and other relevant data by
running a tool like AWS_IR or Margarita Shotgun to collect memory dumps of the
suspected VMs.
The examiner has the option to take snapshots or clone the VMs, and while these
are considered a full disk image, they do not include RAM or volatile data. The examiner
cannot turn the VMs off, as some data might be required from the volatile memory. When
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it comes to the database, since AWS RDS is being used, the examiner can execute a SQL
dump tool such as Mysqldump to obtain a complete snapshot of the database. Amazon RDS
runs on EC2 as well, so the examiner can decide to just take snapshots of the RDS VM
instances instead. Some data need to be collected manually from the actual environment
setup, such any existing proxy setup and the use of a Content Delivery Network (CDN) and
network configuration. All collected snapshots can be downloaded to the forensic examiner
workstation and saved.
If the organization has a policy regarding how chain of custody needs to be
documented, then the examiner follows it. In this case, the company does not have a chain
of custody specific policy. The examiner documents chain of custody following SWGDE
recommendations and notes at least the following: the full name and signature of the person
keeping the forensic data, the full name and signature of the person receiving the data, the
date of data transfer, the purpose of the data transfer, and the method of the data transfer
(SWGDE, 2018a). The examiner might decide to deliver the case directly to the forensic
workstation used for analysis and examination for evidence extraction; this makes fewer
entries into the chain of custody logbook, which can be beneficial for the court case.
3. Steps to Take After acquisition
The examiner collects disk images of VMs, database dumps, and volatile
information in different files, saves them into the designated media, and calculates hashes
for each file right after acquisition. This acquisition can take place by executing the disk
imaging tool directly from AWS CLI, or via indirect SSH access using AWS Systems
Manager. The same can also be done by taking snapshots of the attached media of the EC2
instances, basically snapshotting the EBS (Elastic Block Storage) volumes and cloning the
VM. The hash algorithm used to maintain the integrity of the acquired files is SHA-128
which is one of the approved hash functions by NIST. The hashes are written to the
notebook.
The examiner reviews all acquired data to make sure they cover all possible sources
of relevant evidence. Dakwa LLC does not have their own policy about documentation of
forensic cases; thus, the examiner follows best practices. The examiner documents in a
logbook all outputs from the tools used and makes sure to document any errors and explain
how they were overcome. All calculated hash values are documented referencing the
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relevant output files. The generated document contains the following information: a unique
assets identifier, source of evidence, case number, acquisition type, hash values for each of
the acquired data, photos of evidence, examiner full name, acquisition date, errors
encountered, and any other additional information that are relevant to the acquisition
(SWGDE, 2018a).
Table 11 - ALR for SWGDE 2020 Application – AWS Walk-Thru
Criteria

1) Adopted a structured
and published
forensic acquisition
method or process
2) Forensic acquisition
practitioner certified
abilities

3) Trustworthy
capturing of the
whole acquisition
process
4) Provided casesupporting artifacts

5) Very well
documented and
validated chain of
custody

6) Used trusted
acquisition tools

Trustworthy
Doubtful
Untrustworthy
(6-10)
(2-5)
(1-0)
General/Legal
(5) Process followed SWGDE, which is
recent and not
tested, but
recommended.
(9) Examiner
abilities are
certified, but the
examiner has no
previous court
involvement.
(9) The process is
captured on notes
and screenshots.
-

(5) Few supporting
artifacts are
collected, while not
required by
SWGDE.
Preservation is not
discussed.
-

(9) CoC is
documented, not
mentioning DF
process or stage of
documentation.
Data acquisition
(5) While the tools
used are known,
validation and
authentication are
not discussed.

-

-

-
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7) Data is captured in
operable format

8) Utilized secure and
immutable evidence
storage

9) Validated the
captured forensic
data

(9) Data has been
captured in operable
and known formats.
Data is not
validated.
(6) Storage is
defined and secure.
Isolation and
immutability are not
addressed.
(10) SHA-128 is
calculated for all the
captured evidence
data files.

-

-

-

Hypothetical application of IPCFA – AWS use case
Along the same lines, we can apply the methodology proposed in this research to acquire
forensic data from the Dakwa LLC AWS environment. The story from the hypothetical was
taken as an input and how the platforms work, and the deployment architecture were captured.
All relevant management and access data was captured. The examiner documents all the
information in their workstation. They create a folder named “Case001 - Dakwa LLC.” The
examiner creates an Excel file (logbook) or relies on another case management tool with all
possible evidence resources that might be vital to be acquired and presented for analysis. As
this is a sub-phase of the whole forensic processes, this logbook can be a part of a larger logbook
documenting the whole process. The following tasks can take place to generate court-sound
evidence.
1. Initiation - Stand up a forensic server
The forensic examiner requests a new environment to be created that is dedicated
for this forensic case. The account needs to be isolated: it must not reside on any of the
common networks and must have a security policy to allow it to access the suspected
environment components; nothing is allowed to access any resources in the environment.
Then in the created environment the examiner attaches a S3 (Simple Storage Services)
bucket to be used to upload the forensic workstation image and another immutable storage,
which could be S3 or Glacier, depending on the configuration. This immutable storage is
used as a destination for all forensic data as well as the various log sources. The image of
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the forensic servers is converted into an AMI (Amazon Machine Image) and installed on
the AWS dedicated environment as an EC2 instance. The immutable storage is attached to
the forensic server. During this demonstration, any time the examiner is saving forensic data
to the forensics storage, it can be assumed that the save is to immutable storage, unless
otherwise stated.
The various forensic tools are uploaded to the S3 bucket attached to the forensic
server instance, then downloaded into the server. Tools include a web browser, EnCase
Enterprise with agent, putty terminal emulator, AWS_IR, AWS CLI, AWS Console, LiMe,
or MargaritaShotgun, and all prerequisites’ packages and libraries. Tools should not be
installed at this stage, but binaries should be validated and made available to be installed
after the continuous integrity mechanism has been deployed and activated. Usually with
expert forensic examiners, they will have their tools integrated into a forensic server image
that is ready to be deployed when the need arises. At this stage the forensic server is set up
securely and ready to conduct the forensic investigation; for this hypothetical scenario, it is
assumed to be a Windows 2016 server. The last step in the process is for the examiner to
document the metadata information for the forensic server/EC2, attached S3 buckets, group
policies, and permissions applied in the investigation logbook.
2. Initiation - Enable continuous integrity and logging
The examiner enables AWS CloudWatch and Cloud Trail logs on the forensic server
and for the environment with logs to be sent to immutable storage. The forensic EC2
instance is set up with time-synchronizing protocol to be in the same time zone as the
suspected environment. The examiner installs a screen capture tool with imaging and videorecording abilities. The tool is set up to capture artifacts with timestamps and location
tracking and configured to send the captures directly to a designated folder in the immutable
storage hierarchy. The last tool to be installed and/or enabled is an event- or activitytracking tool on the forensic server that captures all clicks and commands and saves the
output directly on the immutable storage. If the tools capturing a command-line session, the
output can be extracted at the end of the session and sent directly to the immutable storage.
In this case the forensic server is Windows based, thus we rely heavily on these tools
to capture mouse clicks and pop-up actions. The commands and other information are
captured by the screen capture tool. Throughout the next steps in this process, it is assumed
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the screen capture tools are enabled and available, and the generated logs/events are being
sent to the immutable storage. The examiner validates this ability before moving on to the
next phase. Any screen capture file should have its hash calculated and be saved right after
the screen has been captured. The same information needs to be documented in the
investigation logbook or the case management document, including the calculated hash.
3. Initiation - Authenticate the forensic tools
Coming into this phase, the forensic server is being monitored and is auditable, so
it is ready to commence operations. The available forensic tools are installed and configured
under monitoring provided by the continuous integrity and logging processes initiated in
the previous phase. Before installation, the integrity of tools downloaded from vendors
repositories must be validated by comparing the hashes provided by the vendors to the
actual hashes calculated on the forensic server. If the hash matches, it must be logged in
screen capture and saved. The screen capture should show the hash on vendor’s website as
well as the calculated one. For example, this can be applied to the browser and the
commercial forensic tools, for example. The same process can be applied to open-source
tools, with an additional step of reviewing the available source code for possible unintended
features or security flaws. When possible, open-source tools are compiled from sources
based on the maintainer’s recommended settings. This applies especially to AWS native
and related tools such as AWS_CLI, AWS_IR, and AWS SDK. All tools must be set up
with logging enabled and with a default output to a folder on the immutable storage.
In this scenario, three of the main forensic tools that must be indisputable are the
command-line or terminal emulators, the internet browsers, and the AWS_CLI and its
components. The command-line emulator is used for most cases to execute commands
directly on the cloud relying on some other tools, such as AWS_CLI, thus it is important to
use a reliable, authentic, auditable, and community-recommended terminal emulator. As
most cloud providers provide a web console to administer cloud resources, such as AWS
Console, browsers play a vital role in cloud forensic investigations as the majority of the
work is carried out by the examiner using the browsers to collect data and validate the cloud
setup. Finally, the cloud-native tools provided, in this case AWS_CLI and other dependent
tools such as AWS_IR tools, rely heavily on configuration files that contain cryptographic
certificates, key pairs, or credentials; thus, it is important these tools are set up properly and

82
functioning as intended. All these tools, configuration files, certificates, and keys must be
captured during this phase to show the appropriate ones are used to connect to the suspected
instances with appropriate policies and authorization.
4. Initiation - Capture architecture and metadata
While the Dakwa LLC team has already provided the architecture of their platform,
it is recommended to capture the actual setup directly from the AWS cloud console right
before starting the forensic acquisition. In this case, the examiner authenticates the AWS
console and attempts to capture the status of infrastructure deployed, that includes the
automation and DevOps processes, the interactions between components, the virtual
network IP schema, the network flows and policies, access management, and any other
enabled capabilities. Then the focus is on the investigated instances, which includes
networks, virtual machines, and databases. The VPC network information and information
such as all egress and ingress point of the VPC is captured; this includes public IP ranges,
private IP ranges, VPN gateways, transit gateways, and VPC peering.
The examiner takes a screen capture of the metadata of each EC2 instance that is
part of the suspected platform. Information in the capture includes but is not limited to the
AWS region, hosted zone, hostname, and attached storage, types of storage attached, size
of storage, IP address, MAC address, instance ID, launch date, signature, associated security
policies, auto-scale groups, access groups, and routing groups. Partially similar metadata is
captured for the attached RDS MySQL Database instances. The examiner calculates the
integrity hashes for each screen capture taken or documents generated and saved on the
immutable storage. These hashes are also saved on the logbook. At this point the Dakwa
LLC cloud architecture is known to the examiner and documented. The information about
how the environment components are working together is clearly understood.
5. Initiation - Define order of volatility (OOV)
Referencing the metadata and all possible data sources suggested during the
previous phases, the examiner attempts to put together the best possible course of action.
Taking into consideration the OOV proposed by SWGDE (2018b) as well as the one
proposed by (Killalea & Brezinski, 2002), the examiner puts together a recommended OOV.
The three major sources of volatile data are the memory images of all involved EC2
instances that host the applications and the RDS databases, the data located in any attached
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instance stores, and the swap files. The following actions take place, from top-down, to
guide the rest of the acquisition process:
1. Acquire full memory dumps from all EC2 instances.
2. Acquire all data located in the instance stores (Ephemeral storage) attached to the
EC2 instances.
3. Acquire all data located in swap files of the EC2 instances.
4. Acquire full disk images for all EBS/EFS attached to the EC2 instances.
5. Acquire full copies for all attached S3 buckets in the environment.
6. Capture any existing automation, deployment, or delivery code that can be located on
AWS CodeCommit, CodePipeline, CodeDeploy, or other DevOp tools.
7. Capture the existing network configurations, security policies, groups, and rules.
8. Export account and services logs & events that are setup to send logs to CloudWatch,
CloudTrail, GuardDuty, and AWS Security Hub.
9. Export other logs that are setup to log locally, this can be any or all the VPC Flow
logs, ELB logs, S3 bucket logs, CloudFront access logs, and RDS logs.
6. Execution - Volatile data acquisition
Following the defined OOV, the examiner has three volatile data sources: RAM,
instance store, and swap files. The best scenario for acquiring memory images is remotely
without running or attempting to execute the tool from within the compromised instance.
The examiner executes a memory dump tool such as MargaritaShotgun which uses SSH
keys to connect to an EC2 instance and dump the raw memory into a file. This tool can be
executed straight from the forensic server command-line, and the generated file can be
named properly and saved directly to the immutable storage. The same process can be
executed using AWS Systems Manager, which allows one to invoke remote commands over
SSH via AWS APIs at the remote host without having to authenticate to the host. Once the
snapshots/disk images have been collected, integrity hashes are to be computed and
documented via the continuous integrity tools as well as the logbook.
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The second type of volatile information that the examiner needs to capture is any
data that is stored on EC2 attached Instance Store volumes. This can be done in multiple
ways. The examiner can use the AWS CLI to provision a clean EBS volume with disk size
that is equivalent or larger than the Instance Store that is targeted; then they can copy the
data into the newly provisioned EBS volume. Another option that is easier if the instance
store happens to have few files is to use AWS CLI to copy all files and directories directly
to the forensic server immutable S3 bucket. We assume the examiner has chosen to use the
second option and has copied all files into a dedicated and pre-defined folder in the
investigation S3 bucket.
The last type of volatile data is the swap files, which might contain very important
information since it is an extension to the memory. Swap files are captured as part of the
disk image acquisition. Once the copies have been made, integrity hashes are to be
computed and documented via the continuous integrity tools as well as the logbook. At this
stage it is unknown to the examiner which one of the EC2 instances has been compromised,
thus the examiner collects volatile information from all involved servers.
7. Execution - Digital Seizure (if possible)
Usually performing digital seizure and isolation is a task for the corporate incident
and response team when possible, but in this case the corporation does not have an IR team.
It is also not easy to isolate all involved VMs from the network, as they are production, and
it is not yet determined which VMs are involved or all of them have been compromised.
Thus, this step is not executed yet.
8. Execution - Non-volatile data acquisition
Following the defined OOV, the examiner collects disk images from all involved
EC2 instances and their attached storage volumes. The examiner collects volume
information about each EC2-attached EBS volume, then uses the AWS CLI to attempt to
perform API calls to create snapshots of the EBS volumes and send them directly to the
forensics S3 bucket. This operation captures disk images, including swap files that are
usually stored under the root home or other directories on the associated disk. Sometimes
swap files are also created and saved on Instance stores; in that case they are captured as
part of the non-volatile acquisition phase. If swap files are stored on another attached EBS
volume, then a snapshot of that storage volume is captured. The same mechanism can be
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used to duplicate data stored in any attached S3 buckets, saving the data and sending it
directly to the forensic storage.
The same operations can be done remotely utilizing AWS APIs calls or AWS
Systems Manager to execute Linux native disk images tool such as dd. With dd, the output
is 100% raw disk image, which can be read by many digital forensics analysis tools,
including community, open-source, or commercial tools. In this investigation, the examiner
only takes snapshots, as they can later be attached to EC2 instances for examination. If there
is a need to have raw images, they can be recreated from the snapshots as well. The examiner
calculates the integrity hashes for each screen capture taken or documents generated and
saved on the immutable storage. These hashes are also saved in the logbook.
9. Execution - Collect supporting artifacts
In this phase of the methodology, the remaining items from the predefined OOV are
collected. The examiner attempts to log in to the suspected environment using a web
browser and authenticates to the AWS Console. The examiner makes sure they are visiting
the appropriate console by checking the SSL certificates of the visited URL before
authenticating. Then authentication takes place, and the examiner captures the SSL
certificate information, console URL, account number, and username information via the
continuous logging mechanism, which automatically saves this output to the forensic
storage. Henceforth, all work is done via the web console and can be commenced via the
established, authenticated, and encrypted session.
The examiner navigates to the AWS CodeCommit page (source control), and
downloads/clones all existing repositories that should contain CloudFormation YAML or
JSON code that might be used to automate the deployment and delivery for products and
infrastructure components. The same code can also be used to execute any AWS SDK API
functions to perform any changes to the environment.
The next section that the examiner attempts to capture is any configured or setup
Codebuild projects. AWS CodeBuild allows end users to compile and build infrastructure
components from source code that is stored in an S3 bucket or other repositories. The
examiner screen-captures existing projects and the content of each project. Then delivery
pipelines listed under AWS CodePipeline are captured in a similar manner. The last
component of the automation to be captured is the AWS CodeDeploy configurations, which
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might contain instructions to automatically deploy an application or a bundle of
applications. This completes the acquisition of all DevOp and automations code that might
be relevant to the incident.
The next data that need to be captured are the network and security configurations.
While most of this data is likely to have been captured during the metadata and architecture
captures, in this phase the examiner validates the data provided by the customer via console
access. The examiner uses the AWS Console to navigate to the following network
configuration areas and validate the existing setup against the information provided during
the metadata and architecture capturing phase, capturing any differences: route tables,
prefix list, internet gateways, carrier gateways, NAT rules, DHCP options, VPC peering,
VPC endpoints, Elastic IP addresses, DirectConnect interfaces, transit gateways, and VPNs.
The same approach is taken to validate security configurations and settings from the
following areas: identify and access management (IAM), logging and monitoring, Security
groups, Network ACLs, VPC Flow Logs, and Route53/DNS. At this stage the examiner has
validated all network and security configurations and settings, capturing any differences.
The examiner next attempts to capture all possible logs in the environment that
might contribute to solving the investigation code questions. This phase is highly dependent
on which log facilities are enabled and being used. From the previous step, assuming the
environment is set up properly and the main log facilities are enabled, the examiner exports
logs directly to the forensic S3 bucket for the past 30 days from the following log facilities:
AWS CloudWatch, CloudTrail, GuardDuty, VPC Flow Logs, and Security Hub. These are
the main locations where logs are getting aggregated from EC2, RDS, IAM, Automation
tools, CloudFront, load balancers, and other enabled cloud services or systems. Some other
logs are captured as part of the EBS snapshots if they are saved on local facilities on EC2
instances. It is very important for the examiner to notice the retention of logs during the
previous step in order to determine how far back to go in each one of the log facilities.
10. Closure - Complete the continuous integrity process
Reaching this phase in the process means the examiners are confident that they have
collected all needed data to generate the sought-after evidence. The examiner navigates to
the immutable storage to make sure every collected file has its hash value calculated. If a
file is found without a corresponding hash value, a hash value is calculated and saved. All
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hashes should be calculated using SHA-128 or greater. The examiner then stops all running
screen capture tools as well as any scripts that were executed to capture keyboard input
during the forensic process. The final logs from the screen capture tools are moved to the
immutable storage and their hash values calculated and saved.
11. Closure - Validate the collected data
The examiner reviews data sources and makes sure all sought-after data has been
captured. The examiner opens each collected file using the respective analysis tool to
validate content, ensuring it is appropriate and not empty or corrupt. All collected logs and
screenshots are opened for readability and accuracy. A similar approach is taken by the
examiner to review the collected disk and memory, where the images are loaded into
examination tools to validate content, timeframes, and data availability.
Table 12 - ALR for IPCFA Application – AWS Walk-Thru
Criteria

1) Adopted a structured
and published
forensic acquisition
method or process

2) Forensic acquisition
practitioner certified
abilities

3) Trustworthy
capturing of the
whole acquisition
process

4) Provided casesupporting artifacts

Trustworthy
Doubtful
(6-10)
(2-5)
General/Legal
(2) Process
followed IPCFA,
which is not
published or tested
yet, but is
structured.
(7) Examiner
abilities are
certified, but
examiner has no
previous court
involvement.
(10) The process is
captured on notes,
screenshots, and
screen video for
multi-process
operations.
(10) All possible
events and logs for
the cloud platform
are captured.

Untrustworthy
(1-0)
-

-

-

-
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5) Very well
documented and
validated chain of
custody

6) Used trusted
acquisition tools

7) Data is captured in
operable format

8) Utilized secure and
immutable evidence
storage
9) Validated the
captured forensic
data

(9) CoC is limited
to logbook
initialization, then
all original forensic
data resides in the
immutable storage.
Data acquisition
(9) Most tools are
cloud-native; thus
authenticity and
authentication has
been validated
before execution.
(9) Data is captured in operable and
known formats.
Data is validated.
(10) Secure,
immutable storage
is used to store all
forensic data.
(10) SHA-128 is
calculated for all
captured evidence
data files.

-

-

-

-

-

Demonstration of IPCFA –Azure use case
The initial input to the forensic examiner is the story from the Azure case described in
Chapter Three. The examiner documents all the preparation information in their workstation
and creates a folder named “Case001 - Dakwa LLC.” The examiner creates an Excel file
(logbook) or relies on another case management tool, listing all possible evidence resources
that might need to be acquired and presented for analysis. Since acquisition is a sub-phase of
the forensic procedure, this logbook can form part of a larger logbook documenting the entire
process. The examiner is then is furnished with a copy of IPCFA to be followed to collect data
that can aid in the investigation of the intrusion. The examiner’s task is to acquire authentic data
from the fictional Zool Corporation cloud environment and make it available for analysis in a
forensic server. During the preparation phase of the investigation, the examiner is briefed about
Zool Corporation, its cloud architecture, and management philosophy. The department head
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and senior engineer provide an architecture diagram of the production environment where the
incident took place. They provide the following information to the examiner:


The IT team consists of eight engineers: two DevOps (sysadmin, OS, storage,
automation), one DB admin (SQL servers), two NetOps (network, automation), and
two SecOps (security, audit, incident response), and a team manager.



The platform is designed following Microsoft N-tier architecture (N-Tier
Architecture Style - Azure Application Architecture Guide, 2018), which allows for
scalability, modularity and high availability. The platform is designed as a 3-tier
application (Figure 8).



Zool has two environments, production (prod) and development (dev). Dev is a
replica of prod, with minor changes related to security policies. All infrastructure
components of a single environment belong to a single Azure resource group to
allow for ease of deployment, maintenance, and monitoring. The incident took place
in the production environment.



The production environment consists of four different subnets using private
addresses: management (automation and bastion virtual machine), web (web
servers), app (application servers), and db (database servers).



The IaaS platform consists of six Linux CentOS 7.2 servers (web/app virtual
machines), and two Windows 2019R2 servers (Azure SQL virtual machines), all in
availability-sets and different availability zones. This ensures each virtual machine
is in a separate fault and update domain. The first three Linux servers are dedicated
for the web interface and located in the DMZ network, which is accessible from the
Internet. The remaining three Linux servers run the Casino management system
(CASM), which also allows bidders to play, book tables, and bid on live events
online. The two Windows servers run on Azure SQL Database systems that hold all
the application and financial data.



All servers are split among three zones hosted in Azure East U.S. Datacenters. This
provides additional fault tolerance and meets the corporate 99.5% SLA goal.



The Azure SQL Servers are hosted in two different zones and active replication is
established between them. The databases are set up with Always-On architecture,
so both can transact simultaneously.
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All incoming traffic is load balanced between the three front-end webservers via
prod-frontend-lb; then all traffic from the webservers is load balanced between the
three application servers via prod-backend-lb. All traffic from applications servers
targets the active/standby SQL servers directly.



All infrastructure is deployed using infrastructure-as-a-code (IaC), utilizing Azure
PowerShell. All applications, software updates, and OS updates are managed via
DevOp and automation processes that are hosted in a bastion virtual machine hosted
in the production environment (prod-mgmt subnet). Access to all IaaS components
is only permitted from the bastion machine, thus no direct access is permitted.



Network Security Groups (NSG) are deployed to allow only the required application
flows between the various IaaS components; other traffic is implicitly denied.



Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is adopted to manage authentication, auditing,
and accountability of team members; all actions are logged; and access is only
permitted to specific areas of the cloud platform. This is enforced by the SecOps
team.



Azure Security Center agents are installed in all virtual machines, and all logs are
aggregated and sent to the security center. Network Security Group (NSG) flow logs
are enabled for network traffic actions. Azure Monitor is enabled to all resources in
the prod resource group.



While the department has a set of information technology-related policies, there are
no policies related to incident response, e-discovery, or data retention.



Since the last occurrence of the incident, all engineers have changed their Azure
Portal logon credentials and created new private keys for the API authentication.



Zool suspects the jump server to be compromised; thus, they have decommissioned
the old one and created a new one from scratch in order to mitigate the unknown
access to the platform.



Zool still notices from time to time that the production environment is using more
resources than expected, for which they incur extra unplanned charges. They suspect
there is some unauthorized activity taking place in their environment.
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Figure 8 - Zool Corp. Production Environment
Prior to engagement, the examiner should be ready to perform acquisition in the various
public cloud providers. Being prepared includes but is not limited to having a cloud-agnostic
or cloud-specific forensic server image with all needed tools to perform acquisition and
analysis. The forensics image must be in the examiner’s Azure account, AWS account, and
GCP account for minimum coverage. The examiner should have knowledge of at least the
various cloud components of the major public clouds that make up the IaaS environment.
Automation and DevOps scripting knowledge and experience are also very useful for the
examiner to have. With all this knowledge and these tools available, and while anticipating
direct interaction with Zool Corp staff, we attempted to follow the IPCFA methodology to
collect the sought-after data from the emulated IaaS deployment:
1. Initiation - Stand up a forensic server
The examiner requested from the corporation IT staff to create a dedicated virtual
network to accommodate the investigation. The environment would have no access to any other
virtual networks and would have no roles associated with it. The corporate engineers furnished
us with a new virtual network “prod-secure”. The examiner already has an Azure account with
a forensic image ready for deployment with all tools and gadgets needed to perform a digital
forensic acquisition and analysis. All tools are located in a folder called “DFIR” and are to be
authenticated, then installed when continue monitoring is enabled. The image is in the
examiner’s Azure account image gallery. The examiner shared the images with the Azure
subscription of Zool Corporation by granting them read-only permissions to the image disk.
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The examiner provided the Zool Corp. team with an Azure API-based script that
automatically deploys the forensic image (Windows 10 Pro - generalized) in the new, dedicated
environment. The script also creates the immutable storage utilizing Azure blob storage with a
legal hold and timer-based policies, allowing for blob append operations. Furthermore, it
creates an Azure file share to be mounted directly by the forensic server in order to perform
other operations in copies of the collected data. The script then connects the immutable blob
storage to the VM using NFSv3.0 protocol. This allows for all files being written to the
immutable storage to be unchangeable once written and closed, while allowing for new files to
be added/copied into the storage. This is basically a cloud write-blocker.
The examiner asked the team to add an NSG to allow access out from this new forensic
server to the zoolprod environment on service ports for DNS, SSH, TLS, and RDP. This is
accomplished via VNet (virtual network) Peering to allow inter-vnet traffic between the prodsecure and the Zoolprod VNETs. Opening these ports enables the forensic servers to have direct
access to the IaaS environment to perform the various acquisition operations. The same NSG
rules are applied on the opposite side to allow for connection establishment. The examiner’s
workstation public static IP address is the only access permitted on the newly deployed server.
At this stage the forensic server has been deployed, and the examiner can access it remotely.
This completes this sub-phase of the process, and the forensic server has been initiated
successfully.
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Figure 9 - The forensic server deployment architecture
2. Initiation - Enable continuous integrity monitoring and logging
Since the whole acquisition process is executed from the forensic VNet and resources
group initiated in the previous sub-phase, all actions should be logged and referenceable. The
following tasks have been executed on the forensics resource group components to enable
logging, auditability, and action cross-referencing:


Created an Azure Log Analytics workspace in the forensics resource group and
enabled Azure Monitor.



Enabled logs for Azure Key Vault and saved the logs container on the same
forensic storage. Enabled Azure Monitor for Key Vault.



Installed Azure log agent on the forensic server and enrolled the forensic server to
be monitored by Azure monitor and log analytics. The agent captures all logs from
the forensic server and sends them to the Azure Log Analytics.



Enabled Azure Monitor for the Azure blob storage and Azure file share in order
to capture read, write, and delete actions as well as all authenticated and
anonymous access. All logs are sent to the forensics Azure Log Analytics
workspace and Azure Monitor.
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Enabled NSG flow logs to have true visibility on all network activities that traverse
the VNet. These logs operate at Layer 4 of the OSI model, and they record all
traffic in and out of an NSG. All logs are sent to the forensics Azure Log Analytics
workspace.

Azure Monitor

Figure 10 - Azure Monitor logs and metrics
After enabling comprehensive logging in the cloud forensic environment, additional
continuous integrity monitoring measures and software packages are included as part of the
forensic server image. Azure Monitor Agent is installed on the forensic server and reports all
logs to Azure Monitor. The installers for Greenshot and OBS Studio are also included in the
forensic server image. Both are open source, lightweight, and feature-rich screen capture
software tools.

Figure 11 - Capturing all actions on Azure Cloud Shell
3. Initiation – Authenticate the forensic tools
The forensic server contains a folder with a plethora of digital forensic tools for acquisition,
analysis, and presentation. The examiner puts together a list of tools that might be needed for
this acquisition and validates and installs them. While the examiner’s list might include all
needed tools, at any point during the investigation the examiner can go back to the tool
repository and check out other tools following the same process. The examiner initially preselected the following tools to be used for the acquisition:
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Provided scripts for disk, memory, and logs acquisition (open source)



Greenshot: Screen image capture software (open source)



OBS Studio: Screen video capture software (open source)



Mozilla Firefox web browser: Azure secure web portal access (open source)



azCopy: Tool that copies data between forensics VM and the immutable storage



Windows Powershell: Powershell interpreter (native)



Python27: Tool that executes Python-based scripts to facilitate the acquisition
process



Volatility: Memory analysis tool (open source)



MobaXterm: Bash shell emulator to execute Linux commands and scripts



Notepad++: Code editing, log reviewing, and diff tool

The examiner connected remotely from their workstation to the newly initiated forensic
server via Remote Desktop. Before installing any of the selected tools, the installer file hash is
captured, any certificates or public keys fingerprints attached to executables are recorded, and
the version of the software is logged. The content for all scripts is reviewed, and hash is
calculated and saved. All hashes and certificates are saved to the Azure Key Vault dedicated as
part of the forensic environment. The examiner then installed each selected tool and captures
software versions after each install. Timestamped screenshots are taken and saved to the
forensic storage showing the authentication of each tool. At this point all acquisition tools are
installed and ready to be launched.
4. Initiation - Capture architecture and metadata
Under a video capture, the examiner begins by launching the Mozilla Firefox browser
and browsing to the Microsoft Azure portal. The examiner opens the website identity, website
certificate, and website encryption protocol section before proceeding with the logon. Once
these actions are validated and captured, the examiner attempts to login to the portal using his
personal credentials. After successful authentication, the examiner changes the directory to
assume the role assigned to them on the Zool Corp. subscription. Now the examiner can see
and interact with all resources within Zool Corp. environments. The examiner opens Azure
Cloud Shell, switches contexts to Powershell, and enables session logging to a file that saves
directly to the forensic storage. The examiner first executes a command and a screen image
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capture of the status and identity information of immutable storage that is crucial during this
investigation. Then, the examiner uses Azure Powershell to execute a set of commands to
retrieve the following: Azure subscription information, virtual network, resources groups, all
resource groups, network topology (capture from GUI), storage topology, and finally Azure
DevOps repositories’ structure and profiles.

Figure 12 - Zoolprod topology generated from Azure portal
5. Initiation - Define order of volatility (OOV)
Once the examiner scrutinizes the data collected in the previous sub-phase, the
architecture of the zoolprod environment becomes clear; data location and the sizes and types
of storage containers, log retention periods, and virtual machines are identified. The examiner
established and presented the proposed OOV to the client to review, explaining the actions that
will be taken and their impacts, if any, to the production environment. The examiner proposed
the following OOV to collect data to support the investigation:
1. Acquire full memory dumps from all virtual machines.
2. Acquire volatile information from Windows VMs (processes, connections ... etc).
3. Acquire full disk images for all storage attached to the virtual machines.
4. Acquire full copies for all attached blob storage in the environment.
5. Capture all existing automation, deployment, and delivery code in Azure DevOps.
6. Capture the existing network configurations, security policies, groups, and rules.
7. Export 90 days (when possible, Azure monitor default is 30) of cloud logs from
Azure Activity logs, Azure Monitor, Azure Analytics workspaces, and Azure
Network Watcher logs.
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8. Export logs from virtual machines—from Windows using Azure Diagnostics
storage and from Linux via Azure Monitor agents.
6. Execution - Volatile data acquisition
Following the defined OOV, the examiner attempted to collect a complete memory
dump from all VMs within zoolprod environment, this includes all Linux and Windows VMs.
IPCFA recommends performing the acquisition with the least interaction with the VM as
possible, while interaction with the VM sometime is not avoidable, the examiner tried to utilize
the cloud console to remotely execute lightweight tools on the VMs to perform the memory
dump, then transferred the dump to the immutable storage. For Linux VMs, the examiner
created a simple Azure Powershell script that connects to the VM via the cloud backplane
console (Using Azure Cloud Shell), load LiMe, compiles it for the specific kernel, and execute
it. Once the dump is ready, the script automatically calculates the SHA-256 of the collected
image and transfer the generated raw image from the VM to the immutable storage. The
collected hash values are stored directly onto Azure Vault dedicated on the forensic
environment.
The same line of thought is followed for the Windows VMs utilizing Winpmem.exe. The
applications used to dump memory have been chosen due to their light interaction with the VM
processes, and their direct functionality of only dumpy the full memory of the VM. Due to the
nature of memory sharing of the public cloud, acquiring memory images is one of the areas that
public cloud providers usually restrict access to it, and it requires customers to open support
cases in order to retrieve memory dumps from their own VMs.
The examiner moves to the next step of collecting additional volatile data from the
Windows VMs, as this data will be automatically captured on the Linux memory dump, but not
the Windows. The examiner tweaks the script Invoke-LiveResponse Powershell from (Green,
2018) and injects it directly on the VM via Cloud Shell to collect information from both
Windows VMs such as: running processes, network connection, routing table, Kerberos tokens,
logon session and more. The collected file then transferred to the immutable storage after its
hash value gets calculated and stored. This process is executed under the continuous integrity
monitoring via executing OBS video capturing to show the whole process then the video files
are saved to the immutable storage.
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Figure 13 - Collecting data remotely from Windows VMs on Azure
7. Execution - Non-volatile data acquisition
While collecting disk images from IaaS deployment is possible using any of the
traditional forensic tools available today, it requires a lot of attention to the integrity and
completeness of the collected images. IPCFA recommend generating complete disk image
while performing the investigation close to the source, so in this case the forensic examination
will take place on Azure; thus, it made sense to generate images that can be examined in Azure
environment. Collecting images that are native to the cloud means the image can be used to
create a new VM, a replica of the suspected VM, for investigation. It also means we can
generate raw images if required, as it is basically going to be a matter of covering the mage
from a custom image to raw image, which can be done using a lot of the community tools.
The examiner prepared a simple script that uses the Azure Powershell API and Cloud
shell to execute and create snapshot of the disk image of each one of the VMs. When the disk
image is created, the script will calculate its hash value, save the hash value to a dedicated and
encrypted Azure Vault, and then save the collected image to the immutable storage. If the VMs
were encrypted while in production, encrypted keys can be passed to the script to be used for
decryption of the VMs to be able to collect snapshots, and the same keys can be used later to
encrypt the snapshots at rest.
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The next data to be collected based on the defined OOV is to download blob storage
content that are attached to the VMs, and in this scenario there was no blob storage used, only
managed disks, which were captured as part as the snapshots. Then capturing automations tools,
logs, pipelines, and code archive. This data was captured partially already when the
management VM snapshot was taken, as it is their automation server. What is missing is to
capture via Greenshot some images of the Azure DevOps origination settings, projects,
pipelines, and repos. While it is possible to download repos locally, some organizations will
not allow external resources to download their private code, if any. As far as capturing network
topology, NSG, NAT, Route tables, and other Azure configuration items, these items were
covered initially during the architecture and metadata capturing phase of IPCFA, so it is not
needed to be captured here again, unless some data was missed. All these processes are executed
under the continuous integrity monitoring via executing OBS video capturing to show the whole
process then the video files are saved to the immutable storage.
8. Execution - Collect supporting artifacts
Based on the input from Zool Corp team, and the architecture that has been captured,
all logs are being sent to Azure Monitor and Azure Log Analytics. This includes Azure Activity,
operating systems logs, and all other application logs configured on the VMs, such as Syslogng driven logs and Windows custom-events. In all large public cloud providers, these logs
usually can be accessed via the Web Console, Command-line console, and API calls. This is
the case in Azure Cloud. The examiner invoked simple API calls to Get-azlog and GetAzureRmOperationalInsightsDataSource to check the volume and type of logs available, then
based on that a small script is written and invoked to send all output to multiple files in the
immutable storage blob. Once the files have been written, the hash values are calculated and
saved to the Azure Vault. This process is executed under the continue integrity monitoring via
executing OBS video capturing to show the whole process. The generated video files are saved
to the immutable storage.
9. Closure - Complete the continuous integrity
Once this phase is reached, that means the actual acquisition and collection of data is
completed and documented. Thus, any running continuous monitoring mechanism must be
turned off. The examiner navigates to the immutable storage to validate that all files have been
stored and they do have data and not empty files. The examiner matches the number of files on
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the immutable storage with the number of hash values calculated and saved in the key Vault.
Once all is validated, the examiner and under OBS video monitoring, turned off the Azure Shell
running command-line capturing tool, calculated its hash, and sent the last file to the immutable
storage. At this stage the actual collection process has been concluded. If any of the phases
needs to be repeated for any reason, the continuous monitoring will need to be enabled first;
then the desired phase can be re-executed.
10. Closure - Validate the collected data
This is the phase where the collected data is validated to either be passed to the next
examiner who will perform the analysis, or if the analysis will be carried out by the same
examiner who completed the acquisition. The examiner starts by opening each screenshot and
video captured to validate it is readable and operable. Then they open the collected log files
using Notepad++ to check if the log files contain logs messages with timestamps that are
readable. The examiner executed Volatility against the collected memory dumps and attempted
basic operations to make sure the memory dump is functional and not corrupted. The last check
was for the examiner to spin up test VMs from each collected disk image and be able to browse
the VM content. Once all these steps have been taken, the forensic data is ready for analysis
and to continue the rest of the digital forensic process as would with non-cloud acquisition.
It is important to note that this demonstration focused on following IPCFA to acquire
IaaS related forensic data from Azure but did not focus on specific set of tools or technologies.
The demonstration also did not go into data analysis to extract evidence, as that is not the goal
behind IPCFA; rather the goal is to collect the intended data from CSP involvement and to
maintain the integrity and authenticity of the collected data until it is presented in courts of law.
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CHAPTER SIX
DISCUSSION
In this design science-based research, we examined the applicability of the existing
digital forensic tools and acquisition techniques in acquiring U.S. court-admissible evidence
from IaaS deployments in the public cloud. The literature showed a lack of cloud-specific
forensic tools and scholarly work related to acquisition processes and methodologies. The
published document from SWGDE (2020) that sheds light on acquisition from public cloud
providers was the only valid reference that directly addresses cloud forensics. This section of
the research focuses on presenting the findings and results stemming from the demonstration
and validation of the proposed artifact that attempts to solve the research question.
As discussed in Chapter Three, the core requirements to determine the artifact’s
effectiveness are the following: 1) maintaining the integrity of the acquired data and providing
a trusted, simple, and short chain of custody; 2) maintaining the authenticity of the data by
adhering to FRE 901/902 and withstanding the Daubert test in courts; and finally, 3) generating
operable, non-corrupted forensic data that is easily examinable using commonly available tools.
The artifact should also encompass the functionalities required to acquire forensic data and
should generate reliable results while being practically useable and cloud-agnostic. These
requirements and some of the most stringent qualities for digital evidence for U.S. court
admissibility have been merged to produce the ALR. Because ALR describes the most
important factors that contribute to digital evidence court admissibility, it has been used to
quantify the effectiveness of the executed digital forensic methodology or process.

Core Requirements
Ensuring the integrity of the evidence and the whole forensic process is crucial to a
successful forensic acquisition operation. Failing to document a step can render the whole
lengthy process unreliable. This makes the digital chain of custody the center of the forensic
process. While the SWGDE 2020 publication does not include any direct reference to chain of
custody, it references another publication (SWGDE, 2018b) that sheds light on how to
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document chain of custody. The 2018 publication only states that chain of custody should be
documented to include personnel information when evidence is transferred from one person to
another (SWGDE, 2018b), then references another publication for more details. This cross
reference, while useful, does not make the SWGDE cloud acquisition process clear or complete
since it relies on a document not created with the complexity of the cloud environment in mind.
IPCFA, on the other hand, takes another approach in order to guarantee a trusted chain of
custody and data provenance: IPCFA recommends chain of custody to be as short as possible
by acquiring the forensic data and sending it directly to secure storage that is read-only. Then
as many copies can be made as possible for investigators, judges, or any third party who might
be interested in validating the integrity or authenticity of the collected evidence. This new
methodology eliminates the need for a long and complicated chain of custody, limiting it to the
forensic examiner, who maintains access to the secure storage and documents who received
access for what reason. All this access can be maintained electronically via private keys and
tokens, thus there is no need for actual documents, as access logs can be extracted from the
Role-based Access Control system.
IPCFA adopts the industry standard for validating the integrity of any electronic file,
which is the hash fingerprint. The hash fingerprint is almost an integral part of any digital
forensic investigation and is always looked for in connection with chain of custody. Throughout
the various phases of IPCFA, the forensic examiner is asked to calculate hash values for every
evidence file they collect as well as for any supporting files. IPCFA recommends calculating
hash values using approved algorithms and automating the calculation when possible, saving
all hash values directly to sterilized and immutable storage while capturing the actual
fingerprinting process via continuous integrity monitoring. While the SWGDE publication does
direct the practitioner to calculate hash values of the acquired data, it does not refer to an
approved hash algorithm from NIST, for instance. Computing hash values comes in the final
step of their proposed three-step acquisition process, which is not appropriate for such a
paramount requirement of the forensic process. SWGDE does a great job referencing
organizational policy use, in the cases where that exists, as well as emphasizing reaching out to
CSPs to see if they are willing to investigate the allegation.
The next major requirement for the artifact is to generate authentic evidence and in case
the evidence’s authenticity or the expert’s testimony is challenged, to help pass a Dauber
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hearing. Confirming the authenticity of electronic evidence usually entails validating the claims
associated with the evidence, and this can be done in multiple ways. IPCFA includes two
possible authentication mechanisms. The first one is authenticating a piece of evidence by
validating its integrity and authenticating its source, and the second is calling an expert witness
(FRE 702) to independently authenticate the evidence.
The heart of the proposed methodology is the utilization of the cloud management plane
to produce the needed forensic data, thus making sure all data that has been produced or
captured is either generated by an electronic system (FRE 902(13)) or has been copied from an
electronic device or storage medium (FRE 902(14)). In both cases the generated evidence is
considered self-authenticating based on the most recent amendment of Federal Rules of
Evidence 902 and has a great chance of preventing the defense from pursuing a Daubert hearing
(Federal Rules of Evidence, 2017). Nevertheless, the defense can still ask for a Daubert hearing
to challenge the methodology used to acquire to the claimed evidence. This is usually the case
if there are multiple methodologies that can be followed to generate the evidentiary data. In this
case the authenticity claim of the evidence produced by the expert witness is challenged via
Daubert standard.
The Daubert test is one of the toughest legal challenges the defendant can use to cast
doubt on the validity of the expert’s testimony, possibly disqualifying it altogether. So, the best
way to defeat the Daubert test is by avoiding it completely, which, admittedly, is not always
possible. According to FRE 702, a witness may qualify as an expert on the basis of educational
and experiential qualifications in a general field closely related to the subject in question (Rule
702. Testimony by Expert Witnesses, 2011). For those cases when expert witness testimony is
challenged by Daubert, the Supreme Court has identified five non-exclusive important factors
to assess the testimony. Though these factors have been delineated, in Kumho Tire Co v.
Carmichael, the court said all five factors “do not all necessarily apply in every instance in
which the reliability of scientific testimony is challenged” (Michaels, 2008). According to
Michaels (2008), federal courts have also taken the position that the Daubert test should not be
followed a checklist and was “relying instead on the ability of federal judges to properly
determine admissibility” (p. 16).
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All these factors have been taken into consideration during the IPCFA design; the
methodology requires an experienced, certified, and documented forensic examiner to execute
it. The methodology also gives the examiner control over the process by predefining OOV, and
the steps required to generate the evidence and document each step rigorously. This helps make
the process regeneratable by the court or any other expert witness. The aim behind the
methodology, by design, is that once it gets published, it gains acceptance by the forensic
community, thus meeting Daubert’s second requirement, which mandates a peer reviewed and
published methodology. In contrast, none of the expert witness-related scenarios were
incorporated into the only existing cloud forensic recommendation document from SWGDE.
The last core requirement for the artifact is that it must be able to generate operable
forensic data that is not corrupted and is easily examinable using commonly available tools.
While having operable forensic data is a moot point if evidence generation is required, IPCFA
makes sure there is a written reference to be followed. IPCFA requires all generated data to be
checked for operability before moving to the next phase of the digital forensic process. This
includes reviewing data for operability, correctness, content types, and readability. In SWGDE
2020’s recommended process, data validation is required only when data is furnished by the
CSP, and this is during the acquisition phase. After acquisition, there is no reference to data
validation or correctness checks.

Current Knowledge
Before attempting the walk-thru of the hypothetical use case, a small, focused group
was assembled of highly skilled digital forensic practitioners. Initially it was planned to have a
focus group of 10 certified examiners, but due to the high level of expertise needed and the
broad range of other requirements, the group contained only five highly accomplished experts.
All were provided with the reference documents from Chapter Three (SWGDE, FRE, Daubert)
and the AWS hypothetical scenario, and were asked to provide their walk-thru step by step in
three to seven pages in a finalized read-only PDF document. Table 13 shows the credentials
and qualifications of the focus group members.
Table 13 - Credentials of the Formed “Existing Knowledge” Focus Group
Member

Experience

Qualifications
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1

2

20 Years

10 Years














3

18 Years

4

16 Years

5

9 Years















B.Sc. – Computer Systems and Networking
M.Sc. – Information Systems and Assurance
CISSP - Certified Information Systems Security
Professional
GCED - GIAC Certified Enterprise Defender
GCFE - GIAC Certified Forensic Examiner
AWS CSA - Certified Solution Architect
AWS CSS - Certified Security Specialist
Microsoft Certified Azure Engineer
Ph.D – Cybersecurity, incident response
frameworks
SAFA - SANS Advanced Forensics Analyst
CEH - Certified Ethical Hacker
CDPSE - Certified Data Privacy Solutions
Engineer
CompTIA Security+
BSc - Criminal Justice
M.Sc. - Computer Forensics
U.S. court expert witness experience
California Criminal Investigations Instructor
Certified High-Tech Crime Specialist
B.Sc. – Computer Science
Certified Cyber Threat Management
CompTIA Security+
Microsoft Certified Azure Engineer
B.Sc. – Management Information Systems
CISSP - Certified Information Systems Security
Professional
U.S. court expert witness experience

An analysis of the feedback-captured output from the focus group participants shows
that while many common steps were taken and common tools used to acquire the required data,
discrepancies were also found. Almost all practitioners attempted to use cloud-native tools and
AP calls to collect logs and disk images. Three proposed the use of commercial tools to acquire
memory images, and two proposed the use of open-source tools designed for AWS memory
acquisition. While tools and data sources were common among the examiners, each participant
followed a different starting and ending point in the collections process. Furthermore, only two
of them mentioned chain of custody without stating how it would be securely and accurately
maintained. Very basic attention was given to capturing additional logging information to
support the evidence claims.
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None of the practitioners addressed important admissibility arguments related to issues
such as write blockers when copying snapshots, specifications for evidence and forensics data
storage, or data transfer and access to examiners for examinations. While all practitioners were
furnished with the SWGDE process to follow, the SWGDE provides only high-level guidance;
major differences were clearly observed in the routes taken by each examiner to satisfy the need
for court-soundness. This behavior contributed to inconsistent data being collected with missing
FRE requirements, resulting in the collection of forensic data that might not yield forensicallysound evidence if presented in courts of law. This very short focus group study supports the
contention that the field lacks a common practical methodology for cloud forensic acquisition,
an important gap in the digital forensic knowledgebase shown in the literature.

ALR Comparison
This section of the discussion focuses on showing the strengths and weaknesses of both
SWGDE’s recommendation and IPCFA’s methodology in acquiring forensic data that can lead
to generating court-sound evidence based on the ALR criteria. This comparison is based on
hypothetically walking-thru the AWS investigation scenario presented in Chapter Three first
following SWGDE best practices, and then following IPCFA methodology.
1) Adopted a structured and published forensic acquisition method or process
SWGDE’s Best Practices for Digital Evidence Acquisition from Cloud Service
Providers (2020) is a published document that includes a structured process to be followed to
collect forensic evidence from cloud providers. Thus, in this important criterion it wins with no
doubts. Because IPCFA is yet to be published, it could not receive the full points as SWGDE
did, but rather received partial credit for providing details and a structured approach for the
acquisition. Keeping in mind that this criterion stems from Daubert’s standard five factors, it is
very important for the process to be published or adopted by the forensic community, which is
not yet the case for IPCFA.
2) Forensic acquisition practitioner certified abilities
The full points for this criterion are awarded to both SWGDE and IPCFA as both
acquisitions were performed by researchers with their credentials, qualifications, and
experience documented before the beginning of the forensic process. Both SWGDE and IPCFA
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explicitly mention the importance of capturing the digital examiner’s credentials and
experience. The full points were not given due to the examiner’s lack of real-life court
experience and not serving as an expert witness before.
3) Trustworthy capturing of the whole acquisition process
SWGDE recommends for notes to be taken during the acquisition process, and when
notes are not possible to be taken, screenshots and photographs are to be taken in lieu. This is
indeed a very important point mentioned in the recommendation, but the recommendation lacks
direction on how to maintain these photographs and guarantee their integrity in order to support
the integrity of the collected evidence. IPCFA calls for a similar approach to be taken, but it
replaces the notes with images and video captures that are saved directly into immutable storage
with their hash values calculated. Capturing these hashes is very important as these videos and
images can also be challenged during court sessions. IPCFA gets the higher points due to
maintaining the integrity of the captured images.
4) Provide case-supporting artifacts
Section 6 of the SWGDE publication provides an overview of the possible acquisition
methodologies that can be used during the “acquisition” phase of the process. While the
acquisition process methodology chosen might be case-dependent, the publication does not
mention the need to acquire any supporting data, leaving it completely up to the practitioner to
decide what data might be needed. In the case of traditional forensic investigations, the
supporting data might be very minimal or nonexistent, but in cloud environments it is
paramount to authenticate any claim of evidentiary data as well as its method of access,
collection, or transferal. The application of SWGDE on the AWS hypothetical case walk-thru
shows some logs being collected and stored to support the evidence’s existence, but no proper
preservation and integrity checks were enforced as they are not recommended by the published
process. The opposite applies to IPCFA where the methodology mandates specifically the types
of supporting logs and data that must be captured as part of any IaaS acquisition in the public
cloud. IPCFA also shows the possible sources of supporting data when applied to the AWS
case. IPCFA scores the highest score on this criterion while SWGDE gets the second score.
5) Very well documented and validated chain of custody
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IPCFA addresses the chain of custody by shortening the length of it, only initializing it
at the beginning of the process and leaving the rest to be automated via the role-based access
control imposed on the immutable storage that logs all access, timestamps, and types of
operations. While this is not the known methodology of documenting chain of custody, it is an
updated method that can be accepted in courts if expert witnesses are able to testify to the
trustworthiness of electronically produced CoC. On the other hand, SWGDE does not mention
CoC in its 2020 publication, but refers to its 2018 forensic acquisition best practice document,
which recommends that the examiner maintain chain of custody for all collected forensic
artifacts. For this criterion, SWGDE gets the highest score, but not the full score as this
recommendation is not directly included in its cloud forensics document. IPCFA gets a very
close score to SWGDE as it describes the importance of CoC in cloud acquisitions and provides
an unconventional and shorter CoC.
6) Used trusted acquisition tools
This is another area where SWGDE lacks guidance on how the examiner attempts the
acquisition using the various type of tools (open source, commercial, well-known /tested, and
cloud-native). There is no motion of forensic tools authentication at all in SWGDE, while the
publication does mention the use of cloud API as a possible data acquisition venue. In IPCFA,
tools are categorized, the authentication process of each type of tool is presented, and
recommendations are proposed—and followed during the AWS case walk-thru. IPCFA also
recommends using tools that are approved by NIST for the specific acquisition media, when
possible. IPCFA scores the higher score in this section, while SWGDE gets the middle score
due to missing tool authentication, which is a possible court hearing showstopper.
7) Data is captured in operable format
Both SWGDE and IPCFA recommend capturing the data in operable format, and both
attempt the same when tested against the AWS use case. While SWGDE does recommend
obtaining the data in raw format as well, it does not recommend or propose a data validation
step. Thus, data can be generated in a well-known format, but when examination is attempted,
it might be corrupted or inoperable. Both IPCFA and SWGDE get equal points for this criterion,
as IPCFA generates disk images that are operable in AWS, but not raw formats (raw can also
be generated from the AWS images when needed via any forensic tools such as dd), and
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SWGDE is missing data validation steps while collecting data in both raw format and AWS
images.
8) Utilized secure and immutable evidence storage
SWGDE recommends evidence preservation and storage to be in sterile, secure, and
isolated storage, which is the common requirement for digital evidence storage and a best
practice. While this might be enough in the case of traditional forensics, as well as in some
cloud forensic cases, access and evidence access beyond the documented chain of custody is
very difficult to attest to. Having a storage system that is read-only is invaluable to show that
the data saved in this storage is not editable after storage. Immutable storage makes easy the
presentation of evidence as authentic as the evidence has the appropriate integrity checks and
thus is very difficult to be contested. IPCFA clearly states the storage of the digital evidence
should be immutable and auditable, thus removing any questions relevant to preservation of the
collected forensic artifacts. IPCFA gets the full points in this area, while SWGDE comes
second.
9) Validated the captured forensic data
This criterion focuses on validating the integrity of all collected forensic data before
closing the acquisition phase of the forensic process. While this might seem normal to any
forensic practitioner, SWGDE does not mention validation after complete acquisition takes
place—the examiner might be calculating hashes on the fly for all sought-after evidence files
but might miss a file or a few files due to the use of a combination of various acquisition
techniques. This might be what a defense attorney is looking for—a single evidence file that is
missing its hash value during a developing court session that can be called inauthentic and
inadmissible. Furthermore, SWGDE does not mention or recommend hash algorithms that can
be used, as there are many that are outdated and no longer considered secure. On the other hand,
IPCFA recommends the use of hash algorithms accepted and tested by NIST. Both IPCFA and
SWGDE score high scores, but IPCFA gets few points more due to the level and specificities
of validation it requires.
SWGDE is indeed a recent and very valuable document that sheds light on cloud
forensics and provides a process to be followed by practitioners to conduct investigations in the
realms of cloud service providers. It is broad by design to allow examiners to define their own
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processes and follow organizations’ documented processes and procedures, which works well
for larger organizations and corporations. In the case of smaller organizations that do not have
applicable policies and procedures, the examiner bears the responsibility to define a process
and follow it, hoping to generate authentic and court-admissible evidence. IPCFA fills in the
gap, and proffers recommendations, ideas, and strategies for practitioners to keep legal
evidence-generating in mind from the beginning of the process. In this very short,
unconventional, and hypothetical comparison, IPCFA shows several advantages over the
SWGDE publication, and IPCFA scores an overall higher ALR value when taking into
consideration the challenging nature of cloud evidence.
Table 14 - ALR Comparison: SWGDE 2020 vs. IPCFA
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)

Criteria
Adopted a structured and published forensic acquisition
method or process
Forensic acquisition practitioner certified abilities
Trustworthy capturing of the whole acquisition process
Provided case-supporting artifacts
Very well documented and validated chain of custody
Used trusted acquisition tools
Data is captured in operable format
Utilized secure and immutable evidence storage
Validated the captured forensic data

SWGDE IPCFA
5
2
7
9
5
9
5
9
6
9

7
10
10
9
9
9
10
10

IPCFA Demonstration
During the demonstration, we did not focus on the forensic evidence extraction and
analysis process, but rather focused on the acquisition of cloud forensic data to demonstrate the
use of IPCFA in an observational case study. Usually, once the data has been acquired, the
forensic analysis process can progress in much the same way as it would for non-cloud
investigations. The demonstration focused on exploring the various cloud tools that can produce
forensic data that can be considered acceptable in courts of law. The use of these tools in
conjunction with IPCFA allowed us to generate forensic data that can be thought of as
admissible due to its integrity, authenticity, and ease of delivery to examiners and judges, if
needed. The demonstrations involved building a sandbox to simulate the investigated
environment, as well as creating a forensic server image and hosting it in a different account
that is assumed to be owned and operated by the external forensic firm. A set of scripts were
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created to simplify the build and tear down of the sandbox environment to accommodate
multiple tests and to fix issues encountered during the acquisition process.

Figure 14 - Code snippet to initiate the POC environment
The demonstration attempted to shed light on the various public cloud tools and
mechanisms available for the forensic practitioner to use to simplify the acquisition process.
While most API calls and the made-available interfaces are cloud-specific—in this case Azurespecific—all public cloud providers have similar interfaces created for various reasons. Some
cloud providers might offer more or less powerful and useful API calls. For instance, the
Snapshot API call that allowed us to clone a VM disk has been created for disaster and recovery
purposes, and that has nothing to do with digital forensics or investigations. The same applies
to the rest of tools used in this demonstration. These unconventional tools are very effective in
capturing digital evidence from public cloud deployments as long as they have been executed
while keeping the integrity and authenticity of the collected data in mind.

Figure 15 - Code snippet to calculate hash values
We have found that the possibility of creating storage that is immutable until certain
conditions are met is a feature of almost all of the major public cloud providers, and it is indeed
a beneficial feature when it comes to cloud forensics. This feature allows for a cloud storage
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blob to become the most secure storage for digital evidence when it is bundled with role-based
access control and enabled audit logs. Having storage that can be accessible securely over the
internet with specific access control lists is invaluable. This allows for access based on what
Microsoft called SAS tokens (Shared Access Signature), which enables an investigator to
access, read, or copy the evidence remotely and securely under audit. The access can be granted
under

many conditions

including

number

of

access

times,

allowed

operations

(read/copy/download), and access expiration token.

Figure 16 - Code snippet to create immutable storage
Actual collection was straightforward, from collecting disk images using the Azureprovided API calls to obtaining various auditing and server logs. Azure does not provide an
API to interface with hosted virtual machines’ memory, and explicitly asks forensic examiners
who want to capture memory dumps to submit an Azure support case and ask for memory dump
for a specific VM. Other cloud providers such as AWS and GCP are the same; we were able to
overcome this limitation by injecting a memory extraction tool like LiMe (Linux Memory
extractor) into the VM command-line and execute the extraction tool with the immutable
storage designated as a remote destination. This method prevents the direct logon and
interaction with the virtual machine to run the memory dump tools manually. This was possible
by utilizing the Azure run-command API calls, which allows for the VM admin to execute
remote commands on the virtual machines if locked out or unable to login to the machines for
any reason.
While the application of IPCFA in this context was on a hypothetical case, it showed
that a great deal can be accomplished in the realm of IaaS public cloud deployments when it
comes to digital forensics. The application of IPCFA sheds light on the various capabilities of
the public clouds that enable forensics investigators to capture authentic forensic data more
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easily than expected. The proof-of-concept deployment (zoolprod), while experimental, is
indeed representative of a major deployment highlighted by public cloud providers today—that
is the, “3-tier architecture” IPCFA was carried out successfully in the Azure context and was
able to generate forensically-sound data that meets the U.S. federal digital evidence rules as
well as the best practices recommended for an authentic digital evidence. All this was done by
utilizing cloud subsystems and components to generate the data copies; thus, it can comply with
FRE 902(13). All generated data including logs and disk images were directly logged and
captured from system commands during the generation process. The use of scripted API calls
would make the application of IPCFA in any cloud provider a replicable process that could be
re-executed anytime to validate evidence claims and attest to the effectiveness of the
methodology.

Implications of Practice
This research has touched upon numerous areas related to the technological and
regulatory aspects of cloud forensics. These areas affect all stakeholders involved in the forensic
process, from large and small businesses and cloud services providers to forensic examiners
and practitioners, court staff, and policymakers.
In the past decade, large organizations and enterprises have been proactively preparing
for the worst, putting comprehensive incident response frameworks and policies in place. An
integral part of incident response activities is the handling of digital forensics evidence.
Standards and regulatory bodies such as NIST SP800-86 (Kent et al., 2006), RFC 3227 (Killalea
& Brezinski, 2002), and ISO 27043:2015 (ISO, 2015) have published guidelines and standards
to provide organizations with formalized processes and governance activities to reinforce their
cyber resilience. While these standards have substantially helped organizations to enable
forensic practitioners to better respond to security incidents requiring digital evidence, the
standards do not address cloud forensics.
The present research provides recommendations for organizations of any size on how
to enable cloud forensics from the technical, legal, and organizational points of view. The
delivered artifact educates the technical team on the specifications and processes of cloud
forensics. It also provides the technical and legal knowledge needed for more efficient
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discussions between the legal and technical sides of the organization. If integrated into one of
the above standards, the artifact can help fill in the gap of cloud forensic readiness in
organizations and enterprises.
While cybersecurity enhancements have always seemed to revolve around large
businesses, organizations, and enterprises, hackers have begun to realize that they can
destabilize large businesses by compromising the weak cybersecurity of small businesses. A
small business can act as a doorway for attackers to be able to gain a foothold in larger
organizations, as small businesses are always behind when it comes to cybersecurity (Rebner,
2019). According to the Cyber Readiness Institute (Josue, 2020) only 40% of the small
businesses that participated in a survey performed in late March 2020 have implemented any
kind of cybersecurity-related policy. Yet, even without established cybersecurity policies,
which are the foundation for any cybersecurity efforts, small businesses are still leading the
industry in the adoption of public cloud services (Lava, 2020). The present research addresses
the cybersecurity needs of small businesses by providing them with useful guidelines for
addressing cloud forensics. These guidelines recommend having an incident response policy
that encompasses digital forensic efforts, explain the legal side of digital forensics in terms
easily understood by typical IT admins, and propose IPCFA as a practical methodology that
can be adopted as part of the business’s incident response processes and procedures. IPCFA
promotes a cost-effective forensic acquisition process by abstracting the legal terms so the
digital evidence can be acquired by the local IT staff with appropriate background.
The lack of formal standards among public cloud providers makes the work of forensics
practitioners very unpredictable. To investigate an incident in the public cloud today, the
forensics examiner must have detailed knowledge about that specific cloud provider’s
platforms, architecture, and offered services; otherwise, the examiner will not be able to
successfully extract sufficient forensic data to provide court-ready evidence. While it might
seem that providers offer very similar services—for instance, IaaS components are similar—
there are no standards or documents that guide the examiner on how to approach any cloud with
confidence. IPCFA proposes those generalized procedures, offering a starting point for
examiners to undertake cloud forensics in any public cloud provider with confidence. While
IPCFA is high level, it still provides low-level details to help the forensics examiner make
correct decisions and allocate appropriate data sources. In addition, this work also sheds light
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on the importance of utilizing cloud-native tools and APIs to acquire data for a forensics case;
this is one way that public cloud services providers can change their platform to be forensicallyenabled without changing their architecture. Exposing more APIs to the end users and allowing
them to collect data from the various data sources (volatile, non-volatile, and supporting data)
helps remove a lot of the burden and challenges related to cloud forensics today.
In cloud forensics, one challenge is the lack of relevant literature for the court staff
(Grispos et al., 2012; Simou et al., 2016). During a trial, an expert witness can present evidence
that has been collected from a cloud system with the possible challenge of having to explain to
jurors what cloud computing is and how the witness generated the evidence without
confiscating a physical device. In addition, jurors and judges might not be able to make an
informed decision without understanding the concept of cloud forensics and how it differs from
traditional digital forensics. In Australia, Adams et al. (2013) proposed a digital forensic model
that can be easily explained in court. It uses UML diagrams and textual representations to
address court staff, making the forensic process clear so judges and juries can make informed
decisions.
The present artifact and its research, including IPCFA, can benefit court systems by
preparing trial staff for litigations involving cloud computing or cloud evidence, more
specifically the rapidly adopted public cloud computing model. This work provides a simple
breakdown of the differences between traditional forensics and cloud forensics as well as an
explanation of those differences. This research also provides IPCFA with a flowchart that
represents the various stages of the acquisition process and where each process takes place.
This can be coupled with one of the digital forensics models that puts some emphasis on cloud
forensics such as Martini and Choo (2012), creating a useful resource to the average juror who
is usually an individual from the general public who might not have heard of or used cloud
computing in a business context. Furthermore, the research provides attorneys with the means
to prepare for trials and cover their bases with respect to their claimed evidence. If ALR is
executed prior to the court date, attorneys can get a reasonable probability of how court-ready
their evidence is.
While this research focused on forensic acquisition carried out by the plaintiff or
delegated third party, law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and policymakers can also benefit from
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this study. LEAs can adopt and use IPCFA just as a civilian forensic practitioner would.
Moreover, having a documented process to follow to perform the acquisition can make a big
difference in the effort required to train and prepare forensic practitioners. The lack of
standards, procedures, guidelines, and certified tools related to cloud forensics should also
encourage LEAs and policymakers to dedicate more resources to fill the gap in this area. This
research also informs policymakers about the current gap between digital forensics and cloud
forensics in terms of legislation and digital evidence rules. While federal rules of evidence do
apply to cloud evidence, these rules should be reviewed and refined to address the cloud as a
possible source of forensic data as well as cloud chain of custody in order to better articulate
how to legally handle and authenticate cloud evidence.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
This research aimed to study and identify which digital forensic tools and acquisition
techniques are applicable for court-grade evidence acquisition from IaaS deployments in the
public cloud. By analyzing the existing digital forensics models, processes, best practices, legal
requirements for digital evidence, available digital forensic tools libraries, and published
guidelines from the largest public cloud providers in the US, we conclude that there is a dearth
of structured methodologies and processes to guide practitioners in digital forensic
investigations in the realm of public clouds, including IaaS. We have also concluded that there
is no lack of non-volatile data forensic acquisition tools to for IaaS, rather the opposite, as cloudnative tools makes the acquisition simple, effective, and efficient. This research proposed an
IaaS Public Cloud Forensic Acquisition (IPCFA) practical methodology to acquire sound
forensic evidence from public cloud IaaS deployments. IPCFA provides direction and guidance
to digital forensic investigators who have cases involving IaaS public cloud environments.
IPCFA translates the legal needs into technical strategies and tools in order for them to collect
data considered admissible in courts of law.
The proposed methodology enables small organizations and private investigators to
pursue a cloud forensics case while not jeopardizing the authenticity of the collected evidence.
It enables the extraction of court-grade evidence without going through the cloud service
provider. Based on the native tools available from the public cloud providers and the existing
digital forensic tools, we suggest it is possible to execute a forensic acquisition in an IaaS public
cloud environment, and it can be comparable to a physical acquisition of servers from a
datacenter. We recommend following a structured methodology, such as the proposed IPCFA,
that addresses all possible evidence admissibility issues related to evidence authenticity and
integrity.
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Research Limitations
Although this design-based research developed a useful methodology for obtaining
court-admissible evidence, the research performed does have limitations. The original proposal
and scope of this research was to develop a practical methodology for IaaS acquisition in public
clouds and to validate the methodology by sharing it with experts in the field. The validation
was planned to start from the design phase by sharing the expertise, capturing feedback, and
adjusting the artifact accordingly until reaching acceptance from the experts. The last bit of
validation was planned to simulate the methodology application in a real court case to show its
effectiveness. The validation strategies had to change in response to developments during the
research process as well as the limited access to resources. The validation shifted to an
observational case study instead, which is not a strong evaluation methodology.
Recruiting experts with specific criteria to perform a Delphi study or form a focus group
was not successful. The candidate pool was not strong enough; there were not enough digital
forensics, cloud, and practical legal knowledge experts to form strong opinions and receive
sound feedback to validate our work. Testing the methodology on past cases was not achievable
during the research timeframe due to our limited access to previously archived forensic cases
that involved public cloud or IaaS. While there have been some potential cases, access to the
complete data behind these cases was not available to us so a genuine and effective comparison
could not be created.
More changes to the scope of artifact validation and verification were introduced due to
the publication of SWGDE's Best Practices for Digital Evidence Acquisition from Cloud
Service Providers (2020). SWGDE (2020) came with acquisition recommendations that were
very close to the ones proposed by IPCFA phases and the suggested processes; thus, ALR was
created, and the Azure experimental case study was introduced. While the Azure case study
focused on the technical application of IPCFA and observed the outcome, ALR integrated the
various legal requirements for admissible evidence in U.S. courts of law and connected them to
the technical processes followed and executed by forensic examiners during cybercrime
forensic investigations.
As the researchers do not have the practical legal experience nor professional exposure
to the U.S. court systems, we have relied heavily on the limited literature to highlight the
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connection between the technical and legal requirements of digital evidence admissibility, and
thus generated the ALR to quantify technical decisions toward court admissibility. While the
ALR might not be the sturdiest strategy to perform such an exercise, the literature shows no
other tool or mechanism available today that attempts to provide a weighted probability of
digital evidence admissibility.

Future Research
Continuation of this research would be beneficial to the digital forensic community;
thus, addressing the limitations provide a starting point. Applying more rigorous evaluation
methodologies to IPCFA such as a well-assembled focus group study or a Delphi study would
help address any gaps that might have missed with the observational study, solidifying the
generated artifact. Another opportunity to extend this research is to reframe the proposed
artifact to address any drastic changes underlying technical and legal assumptions.
Looking forward, expanding on IPCFA to encompass the other cloud services model
would be beneficial to the digital forensics’ community. While the literatures show some
research exists in the areas of cloud storage and SaaS, the focus has been on the tooling and
technical collection only. Adding the legal aspects to such research will help address the gap
we have today between investigations in the public cloud realm and our court system, which
demonstrates the real value of digital forensics versus corporate incident response practices.
IPCFA expansion can also be on the ALR front, as it can be extended and hardened to be able
to produce a very strong and accurate probability about digital evidence admissibility into the
U.S. Court system.
While it was a coincidence that IPCFA and SWGDE (2020) happened to have very
similar structures with three major phases and similar definitions of each phase, this opens
opportunities for collaboration. Recommendations and proposed processes from IPCFA and
SWGDE (2020) can be merged to form a solid cloud forensic acquisition framework that could
encompass cases of both CSP-involved and CSP-free investigations. This framework could be
developed as extensible to allow for other public cloud service models such as SaaS or CaaS to
be integrated. The framework would act as a baseline to allow for faster developments of such
extensions.
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From technical perspective, there are still a lot of areas in the public cloud that has been
untouched to date, such as serverless and PaaS forensics, where the CSP takes care of your
infrastructure elements, and you only handle your application and code. This brings with it all
possible challenges to cloud forensics as your reliance on the cloud providers gets stronger and
deeper. Another arguable area of research would be investigations that embrace Microservices
architecture and Containerized platforms (CaaS). While they do run on an IaaS or PaaS layers,
each container provides a service that might fall within an investigation scope. These are just a
sample of the open areas of research when it comes to cloud forensics.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: EXISTING DF ACQUISITION
METHODOLOGIES AND PROCEDURES
Table 15 - Existing DF Acquisition Methodologies and Procedures
Methodology/Procedure
“Guidelines for Evidence Collection
and Archiving” (Killalea & Brezinski,
2002)

Phases and processes
- List systems from which the evidence will be
collected.
- Establish what is likely to be relevant and
admissible (collect less, more efficient).
- Plan order of volatility for each system.
- Remove external avenues for change.
- Follow order of volatility; collect the
evidence with relevant tools.
- Record the extent of the system's clock drift.
- Question what else may be evidence to be
collected.
- Document each step.
- Document people present at the crime scene.
- Generate checksums and cryptographically
sign the collected evidence.

"Guide to Integrating Forensic

- Develop a plan for acquisition.

Techniques into Incident Response"

- Likely value

(Kent et al., 2006)

- Volatility
- Amount of effort required
- Acquire the data.
- Verify the integrity of the data.
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“Electronic Crime Scene Investigation:

- If the computer is powered on, and there is a

A Guide for First Responders, Second

digital evidence seizure trained personnel, do

Edition” (NIJ, 2008)

not turn it off.
- Locate and secure all evidence within the
scope of authority for the specific
circumstances.
- Document, log, and photograph all
computers, devices, connections, cables, and
power supplies.
- Log and secure all evidence according to
agency policies pending forensic
examination.

“Digital Forensics Processing and
Procedures: Meeting the Requirements

- Inform relevant parties of consequences of
live capture.

of ISO 17020, ISO 17025, ISO 27001

- Establish remote connectivity.

and Best Practice Requirements”

- Start acquisition in order of volatility.

(Watson & Jones, 2013)

- Take network traffic dumps.
- Reserve/protect the evidence.
- Intercept evidence at scene.
- Create detailed records of scene.

“SWGDE Best Practices for Digital
Evidence Collection” (SWGDE, 2018b)

- Prepare possible acquisition tools, destination
media, and to collect memory and ancillary
data.
- Consider acquisition location, environment,
encryption, and boot loaders restrictions.
- Preview the contents of potential data sources
prior to acquisition to reduce the amount of
data acquired (triage).
- Execute the appropriate acquisition method
(physical, logical, targeted, clone):
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-

If live acquisition is used, tools should
execute trusted binaries from controlled
media.

-

If live acquisition is used, software
should execute at the lowest level of
privilege needed to ensure all possible
data is available for acquisition.

- Validate the integrity of the data as acquired.
- Document digital evidence acquisition per
organizational policy.
- Document chain of custody as required by
organizational policy.
“SWGDE Best Practices for Digital

- Prior to acquisition phase:

Evidence Acquisition from Cloud

- Identify the CSP, data sources, data types,

Service Providers” (SWGDE, 2020)

timeline, and utilized services. This might be
billing information for the cloud account,
DNS records, or privacy policies.
- Ask the CSP legally to preserve the data
sought. This can be carried out via the
involvement of law enforcements.
- Identify and choose which acquisition
methodology to use. If the CSP involvement
is required, contact the CSP via their legal
means.
- During acquisition phase:
- Document all evidentiary data via
handwritten notes, screen captures, or
photographs.
- Acquire and do not omit all attached media,
local and in the cloud. For media acquisition,
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follow the acquisition process outlined in
(SWGDE, 2018a).
- Confirm if the type of sought data can be
acquired using the acquisition methodology
selected before.
- Acquire the data with the selected
methodology. If the provider is asked to
provide the data, keep in mind it might need
to be unencrypted or transformed into another
format to be processes.
- If it was not possible to execute the selected
methodology, and the acquisition fails, then
take photographs and screenshots of the
relevant data.
- After acquisition phase:
- Calculate integrity hash values for acquired
data. If the CSP provided the data, re-check
the digital signatures.
- Verify that the executed acquisition
methodology was able to acquire all required
data. If data was furnished by the CSP, data
still needs to be verified.
- Document the whole process using the
organization’s defined policies and
procedures.
- Document any data received from the CSP in
digital media or storage.
- Store all acquired data following the
organizational policies and procedures that
address digital evidence storage.
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APPENDIX B: AZURE ACQUISITION SANDBOX
Table 16 - Azure Sandbox – Zool Corp. PROD Environment
Software/Tool name
Purpose
Linux CentOS 7.9
Web & App Linux servers
Nginx 2.5.6
Web servers – reverse proxy
WordPress 13.2
App servers – vulnerable CMS (WordPress)
Microsoft Windows 2016
DB servers
Microsoft SQL Server 2016
MySQL RDMS
Azure Load balancers
Traffic Load balancer between tiers
Azure Storage accounts
Storage account for all tiers
Table 17 - Azure Sandbox – Forensic Environment
Component name
Purpose
Microsoft Windows 10 Pro (with DF tools)
Forensic Server Image
Azure Blob storage
Immutable storage for evidence
Azure Fileshare
A file share to connect to forensic server
Azure Key Vault
Secret vault to save hash values
Table 18 - Azure Sandbox – Scripts to Deploy the Sandbox and Perform the Acquisition
Script name
Purpose
azDF_pocDeploy.ps1
Deploys the Zoolprod environment
azDF_pocDeploy.init
Cloud-init script
azDF_DFenvPrep.ps1
Deploys the forensic server environment
azDF_dsiskSnap.ps1
Acquires disk images
azDF_lnxMemSnap.ps
Acquires Linux memory images with LiMe
azDF_lnxMemSnap.sh
LiMe deployment bash script
azDF_winMemSnap.ps1
Acquires Windows memory images with WinpMem
azDF_winMemSnapLocal.ps1
Local execution of WinpMem
azDF_cloudLogs.ps1
Collect various logs from Azure subscription
All testing scripts can be found in the following GitHub repository:
https://github.com/azdfir/ipcfa-poc
Sandbox Notes:
-

All scripts have been created for testing purposes only, and they are not part of the
IPCFA methodology.

-

Requires two Azure pay-as-you-go subscriptions:
o One hosts the DF image in a Shared Gallery.
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o One is the sandbox to pull the Shared Gallery image.
-

Manually mount Azure File Share onto the forensic server.

-

Manually mount immutable storage using NFS3.0 to the forensic server.

-

Install zCopy in order to send screenshots and video captures to the protected blob.

-

Use Azure Cloud Shell with either Azure PS or CLI to add hash values to the created
Vault.

